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Abstract  
 
Online press plays an imperative role in the legitimation of ideas, individuals, events and 
interpretations. Evidence suggests that news media play a significant role in legitimising and de-
legitimising political candidates, particularly in the period leading to and after elections. There is 
increased interest in recent studies in the field of media framing, legitimation and de-legitimising 
of political candidates. While scholars provide useful insights on prospective media use of frames 
to de-popularise political leaders, up to now, studies have not gone beyond explaining the frames 
used by the news media. Little effort has been made to understand the relationship between media 
frames and the different discursive practices that affect the construction of such frames. Drawing 
on Van Gorp's (2007) framing theory and Foucault's (1980) concept of discourse power/knowledge 
to investigate news coverage in the South African online press, this thesis examined the frames 
used by News24 and IOL to legitimise and de-legitimise election candidates during their reporting 
of the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress. Using the national congress as a 
case study in point, qualitative archival data consisting of 100 news articles were retrieved from 
online archives of New24 and IOL. The information was analysed to assess how the content 
reported was framed to legitimise or de-legitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dhlamini-
Zuma's political leadership qualities both at the national and political party level.  Through a 
critical discourse analysis approach, six broad frames were thematically organised and presented 
as evidence on how news frames were constructed through culturally constituted communication 
artefacts. The study found that the reports by both, News24 and IOL were heavily influenced by 
the prevailing societal discourses that shaped politics and economy in the period of their 
construction. Notably, this thesis reveals how both presses used similar frames in their reporting. 
Even though they used similar frames, there were significant differences in approaches that were 
used by IOL and News24 in reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. As a 
result, this study contributes to the body of knowledge, by confirming how the press evokes 
cultural discourses when reporting on political candidates, to remind readers and allow them to 
interpret issues and topics using the culturally constructed reality as a frame of reference.   
Key words: legitimisation; de-legitimisation; online press; Cyril Ramaphosa; Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Background to the study  
 
The past decade has been the most turbulent for South Africa and its ruling party African National 
Congress, (hereafter referred to as ANC) government since the advent of democracy. Seen in 
modern times as a progressive nation led by a people-centred government, this perception began 
to wane after the assumption of power by Jacob Zuma as president of both the ANC and South 
African government (Booysen 2019: 8). Corruption, maladministration, factionalism, and poor 
economic performance led the country into recession (Pauw 2017: 34). These challenges were in 
large part, blamed on the leadership of Jacob Zuma. As a result, calls for a leadership renewal 
became the ‘new song of the day’, both in the ANC and across South African. Various attempts 
were made (with little success) through parliamentary procedures1 and protest to remove Jacob 
Zuma from the office of president (Karodia and Soni 2016: 56). Booysen argues that "the ANC 
quest to reposition itself away from the capture and corruption that characterised Jacob Zuma's 
rule, started in the run-up to it's 53rd elective conference" (2019: 9). What this means is that the 
plot to remove Jacob Zuma's dated back to 2012 when Cyril Ramaphosa was elected deputy 
president of the ANC under then ANC president Jacob Zuma.  All this was before the official end 
of his five-year presidential term. A later serious attempt to remove Jacob Zuma from the 
presidency was in October 2017. This was a few months before the ANC national elective 
congress. The attempts to remove Jacob Zuma from the presidency just a few months before the 
end of his term as president deserve careful consideration. These attempts help to illustrate the 
magnitude of the discontent and dissatisfaction that had engulfed members of the ANC, much of 
the South African population and the opposition parties2.  
The ANC National Elective Conference was scheduled to take place from 17 to 21 December 
2017. The conference would mark the official and constitutional end to Jacob Zuma’s ANC 
                                                 
1 The opposition pushed for three motions in which they needed to cast a vote of no confidence to remove Jacob Zuma 
as president of South Africa.  
2 South Africa has 24 opposition parties, the majority opposition party is the Democratic Alliance (DA) followed by 
the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).   
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presidency3. As such, the conference was the formal and official platform for the ANC leadership 
and members to vote for the change of leadership. This happened after every five years (Mathekga 
2018, Butler 2017 and Butler 2007).  However, the period saw the emergence of potential 
contenders to take over after Jacob Zuma. Among the key contenders who were vying for the 
presidential position was Cyril Ramaphosa, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Zweli Mkhize, and 
Lindiwe Sisulu (Du Plessis 2017: 23). Despite a considerable number of presidential aspirants, 
previously mentioned, Mathekga argues that the actual battle for the presidency was between Cyril 
Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (2018: 12). Both leaders were strategically positioned 
to take over from Jacob Zuma. Cyril Ramaphosa was the deputy president of both the party and 
government, while Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was close in proximity by virtue of her surname that 
she shared with Jacob Zuma, her former husband (Vandone 2019: 13). Lindiwe Sisulu was 
considered a potential presidential candidate. She announced her intention to run for the presidency 
in July 2017. However, she later withdrew from the presidential race to support the Cyril 
Ramaphosa campaign.  
The period leading up to the ANC December conference attracted attention from various sectors 
of the country: the private sector and the public sector (Mathekga 2018, Booysen 2016 and Du 
Plessis 2017). It was characterised by much political activity and politicking especially by those 
political figures who wanted to replace Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa. Du Plessis 
described the phase leading to the elective conference as a period of uncertainty for both South 
Africans and those of the international community who had interests in South African affairs 
(2017: 12). This was so because the winner of this race would become Jacob Zuma’s successor. 
To add, Mathekga notes that the phase leading to and during the ANC elective conference divided 
the country and the ANC (2018: 23). More so, the phase also heightened media interest and 
attention to the political dynamics pervading the nation. In this case, the media attention was 
predominantly fixed on the events that were unfolding in the period leading to the ANC elective 
conference, but more importantly on the political candidates and their political campaigns (Butler 
                                                 
3Jacob Zuma was legally going to continue as president of the South African government after the termination of his 
presidency as the ANC president at the ANC national elective conference in December 2017. According to Butler, 
this arrangement would leave Jacob Zuma a powerful man because he would be in control of the country’s resources 
(2019: 156). Mathekga notes that the comrades in the ANC were not prepared to have Jacob Zuma continue as 
president of the country after the congress. As a result, they forced him to step down as president of South Africa 
(2018: 24). 
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2017: 265). In relation to that Mathekga notes that the political events that took place at and before 
the conference attracted both local and international media interests (2018: 13). Butler also notes 
that the ANC elective conference exposed the level of polarisation that characterised the South 
African media (2018: 12).  Accordingly, the role of the media and how it covers political leaders 
and events of this nature deserves some careful consideration. Cushion and Jackson argued that 
during any political contest, the press claims a dual role of informing the citizens but also setting 
the agenda (as a political player) by influencing what the public talk about (2019: 986). Drawing 
on this assertion, it is therefore imperative to explore how the media report and represent political 
candidates during times of heightened political contests, particularly the ANC National Elective 
Conference.  
Following this background, the chapter outlines the synopsis of the study. This includes the 
statement of the research problem. The discussion of the problem statement includes a short review 
of the literature. The gap in the literature is identified. The chapter presents the main purpose of 
the study. Key research questions and objectives are outlined. The chapter then highlights the 
research methodology and the principal theories and conceptual framework that informs the study. 
The significance of the study is explained and a justification for conducting the study presented.   
 
Research problem for the study 
 
Drawing its inspiration from the Press Council in South Africa, the news press is expected to cover 
and report political events and political candidates in a fair, objective and impartial manner (2007: 
1). In that process, the news press and the news personnel should always uphold the news values 
of truth, objectivity, fairness and impartiality. They should always sidestep predisposed reportage 
of events and individuals by ensuring that their facts are always confirmed and that they are a true 
replication of the truth on the ground (Metz 2015; Ward 2015; Ward and Wasserman 2015). The 
role of the news press is therefore fundamental in that it equips citizens with information that 
allows them to make informed choices when presented with choices that affect their lives (Sunstein 
2018: 56). In elections periods, the news press becomes the main source of information for the 
electorate.  Sonnemaker argued that during elections periods, the news press plays a critical role 
of informing citizens in a deliberative democratic society (2015: 20). Therefore, at its optimal 
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level, the news press can ensure that citizens are objectively informed and act as a public forum 
and a sphere in which citizens can meaningfully and effectively participate in the governance of 
their democracy (McNair 2017: 45). To add, Altheide argues that, in its various forms the press is 
critical in providing education, news, and entertainment for the society (2018: 56).  
Regrettably, news reports of political candidates are normally presented in a manner that seek to 
legitimise or delegitimise one political candidate over the other (Chambwera 2016; Mesquita and 
Almeida Medeiros 2016; Pang, Abul Hassan and Chong 2014). In South Africa the situation on 
the ground in this matter under discussion was nerve-racking.  There was a growing concern over 
the way the news press framed political candidates, particularly in this election period. News 
reports on political candidates are presented to credit or delegitimise one political candidate at the 
expense of the other (Doudaki, Boubouka, and Tzalavras 2019; Wang, Kayuni, Chiweza, and 
Soyiyo 2019). Although the news press strives to report on political candidates objectively and in 
an impartial manner, news reports as seen and observed by various scholars, consists of distorted 
facts and are presented in favour of certain individuals and also presented in a manner that seeks 
to legitimise or delegitimise certain candidates (Oyesomi, Salawu, and Onyenankeya 2019). 
Chong and Druckman argue that in a major political contest like elections, the news press serves 
as a campaign tool that communicates ideologies of the most dominant and powerful ideologies in 
society (2007: 120). What this means is that the press frames their reports around the personalities 
and identities of political candidates to create desired public opinion that will affect the outcome 
of the elections. Maseng, Koosentse, and Ani observed that, though rampant in authoritarian states, 
the framing of political leaders is also a pervasive act in democratic states, particularly in South 
Africa (2018: 11604). This has led to the misrepresentation of political candidates and the rise of 
identity and personality politics. To add, the framing of political leaders has had detrimental effects 
on the choices that the electorate make when presented with different choices that are framed (Liu 
and Scheufele 2016; Tewksbury and Scheufele 2009; Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar 2016).  
Framing of political candidates has also led to the problem of media polarisation as different media 
may slant their reports in favour or against certain candidates. As a result, news reports will not 
reflect the true and actual reality but will be biased in favour of the candidate that a media 
institution supports (Chambwera 2016: 56).  
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Recently, researchers have shown increased interest in the field of media framing and legitimation 
of political leaders (Chambwera 2016; Davies-Laubscher 2014; Khuluse 2014; Maseng et al. 
2018). For instance, Davies-Laubscher explored the media framing of Jacob Zuma (2014: 3). His 
findings concluded that the framing process employed by the South African media reawakened a 
new discourse on the practice of polygamy. In another study, Maseng et al. examined how the 
South African media de-popularised politicians, paying definite attention to Jacob Zuma (2018: 
11604). These scholars established that the media used its agenda-setting role to negatively 
undermine Jacob Zuma’s popularity and influence public opinion about Jacob Zuma and his 
leadership dynamics (Maseng et al. 2018: 11604) Similarly, Chambwera examined how framing 
has been used by the Zimbabwean media to legitimise and delegitimise Robert Mugabe and 
Morgan Tsvangirai (2016: 3). This author established that frames available to journalists 
consciously or unconsciously, “are rooted in the culture and discursive practices in which they 
operate and are specific to historical period” (Chambwera 2016: 3).  In a different study, Tiung 
and Hasim illustrated how through frames, the newspaper moulds the image, personality and 
reputation of politicians through the pages of the newspaper by playing up or playing down their 
news and pictures (2014: 408). In another study, Khuluse investigated the print media portrayal of 
Jacob Zuma's rape charges case (2011: 5). Findings from this study established that the press media 
“framed news which pronounced the death of Jacob Zuma’s political career” (Khuluse 2011: 5).    
While these studies provide useful insights on prospective media use of frames to de-popularise 
political leaders, up to now, these studies have not gone beyond explaining the frames used by the 
news media. To illustrate the above, previous research did not seek to analyse how such frames 
were used to legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership and personalities of specific political 
candidates. Furthermore, while studies of media framing have been conducted by several scholars 
on local politicians (Davies-Laubscher 2014; Khuluse 2014; Maseng et al.  2018), little effort has 
been made to understand the relationship between media frames and the different discursive 
practices that affect the construction of such frames. As a result, our understanding on the 
relationship between the media framing and the legitimation discourse is informed predominantly 
by westerns scholarship that focused on analysing the legitimation strategies seen in various types 
of text (Fairclough 2013; Hart 2017; Meyer, Jancsary, Höllerer and Boxenbaum 2018; van Dijk, 
2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). Surprisingly, the topic of how the online press uses frames to legitimise 
or delegitimise political candidates has not been closely examined, particularly the online press’ 
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use of culturally constructed frames to legitimise and delegitimise the political and leadership 
qualities of political candidates in the period of heightened political contest. Consequently, little 
is known about the nature of frames used by News24 and Independent Online (IOL) to legitimise 
and delegitimise the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the period leading, during and after the ANC elective conference of 
December 2017. Therefore, the gap in the existing research has prompted this study.  
 
Aim of the study  
 
This study aimed to examine the frames used by News24 and IOL to legitimise or delegitimise 
political leaders during their reporting of the 54th National Congress of the African National 
Congress. It sought to provide a detailed analysis of how content is framed and reported by the 
online press with the intention to legitimise or delegitimise political candidates. To achieve this, 
the study made use of framing theory (Van Gorp 2007) and discourse power/knowledge (Foucault 
1980) to examine how the content reported in the period leading, during and after the congress 
were framed to legitimise and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma’s 
political leadership qualities both at national and political party level.  
Based on a constructivist cultural studies approach, this study considers that the conduct of the 
online press is a practice through which meaning is constructed and communicated either to 
inform, disinform or legitimate and delegitimate certain events or individuals in the society. As 
Mesquita and Almeida Medeiros argue, this study also shares their sentiment that “legitimacy is 
not given priority, but socially conferred and legitimated through a practical and ideational process 
of elaboration, enactment and feedback” (2016: 385). While the practical process of legitimacy is 
commonly carried out by those in control of resources in any given society (Beetham 2018; Uphoff 
1989), it is assumed that the online press plays an imperative role in the legitimation of ideas, 
individuals, events and interpretations (Mesquita and de Almeida Medeiros 2016: 385). This thesis 
provides evidence and emphasises that online press owing to its capacity to represent, signify and 
socialise ideas and represent individuals and events.  
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The information that was gathered for this study spans for three months: 1 October to 31 December 
2017. During this time the online press was fixated and abounded with reports concentrating on 
the activities surrounding the ANC national elective congress, its dramatic proceedings and the 
outcome of the congress (Mathekga 2018: 12). The congress was of national significance because 
its outcome was going to determine, amongst other things, who would be the leader of the ANC 
and in 2019 consequently become the next president of the Republic of South Africa (Du Plessis 
2017: 21).  Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma were selected in this study because 
they were the main contenders in that race to become the president of the ANC. In other words, 
they were everyone’s preferred candidates (Butler 2019, Mathekga 2018 and Du Plessis 2017).  
 
Research questions  
 
This study sought to answer the following questions:  
1. How exactly did News24 and Independent Online frame the leadership qualities of 
Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at party and national level in the 
period leading, during and after the 54th National Congress of the African National 
Congress? 
2. What are the similarities and differences in how News24 and Independent Online framed 
the leadership qualities of the two leaders? 
3. What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders? 
4. How did such framing seek to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and 
Cyril Ramaphosa? 
These significant questions were crucial in positioning the use of framing theory as a guiding 
theoretical foundation. This helped the researcher to explore in detail with the use of frames how 
News24 and IOL delegitimised or legitimised the political leadership of Nkosazana Dhlamini-
Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa when reporting on the 2017 December elective congress.  The media 
draws the audience’s attention to specific topics setting agenda and then goes on to construct a 
suitable frame that is used to understand the information given to them (Entman 1993: 51). With 
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this understanding, the main assumption that the researcher engaged was that creating frames for 
stories is commonly a ‘mind-full choice’ by sources, reporters, journalists, and editors. Framing is 
a conscious work by professionals (journalists in particular) that are expected to tell a story while 
laden with certain time and space constraints (Boesman, Berbers, d’Haenens and Van Gorp 2017: 
299). Because of the circumstances, journalists purposively structure the information and create 
an interpretive framework that allows their audience to understand the message. The study looked 
at how News24 and IOL framed the reports that focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana 
Dhlamini-Zuma. It examined how these frames legitimised and delegitimised these two political 
candidates. The key objectives of this study are listed below.  
 
Objectives of the study  
 
This study intended to achieve the following core outcomes: 
1. To explain the frames used by News24 and Independent Online in reporting the leadership 
qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at party level and 
national level before, during and after the 54th National Congress of the African National 
Congress.  
2. To establish the similarities and differences in how News24 and Independent Online 
framed the leadership qualities of the two leaders.  
3. To explore the political, economic and social conditions that may have informed such 
framing.  
4. To establish how such framing sought to legitimise or delegitimise the leadership qualities 
of Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.  
 
Significance of the study  
 
The present study contributed to the existing body of literature. It contributed to the current 
understanding of how the press evokes cultural discourses when reporting on political candidates, 
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to remind readers and allow them to interpret issues and topics using the culturally constructed 
reality as a frame of reference. The holistic analysis of this study added to existing research by 
identifying the different common culturally constructed frames that the IOL and News24 used to 
legitimate or delegitimate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa’s political and 
leadership qualities. No previous research that exists has ever holistically analysed the culturally 
constituted frames used to legitimise or delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril 
Ramaphosa in the election event such as the ANC 2017 December elective conference. Moreover, 
the study also confirmed results from existing studies that emphasised that the newspaper and 
journalistic discourse is constituted by society as it similarly constitutes society (Van Gop 2007; 
Chambwera 2016). Additionally, the critical and holistic analysis of this study added to the body 
of research that focuses on the presentation of female political leaders in Africa and South African 
in particular. Findings from this study confirm previous research that emphasised that there is a 
gender bias in the media that favour male political leaders and subject female leaders to incessant 
vilification. This study has revealed that the gender bias that is prevalent in the news frames does 
not exist in isolation. Instead, it is a replica of the patriarchal systems that shape society in which 
the media is functioning. Unlike previous studies that maintained that the African media utterly 
defies the ethics of news reporting (Guha 2018 and Cukier et al. 2016, Mavin et al. 2016), the 
present study revealed that the IOL and News24 strive for objective and fair reporting as they 
endeavoured to present a balanced reporting that placed more focus on policy issues and candidate 
manifestos as opposed to candidates’ personalities or their gender. This is a complete departure 
from previous studies that emphasised that the media in Africa when reporting on female political 
leaders, the absolute emphasis is placed on downplaying their personalities by amplifying 
culturally constructed gendered predispositions (Gedalya, Herog, and Shamir 2017; Thou 2015; 
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Tendi 2016). Furthermore, the study contributed to prior theory by applying, validating and 
extending the application of Van Gops’ (2007) framing theory and Michael Foucault (1980) 
concept of knowledge/power and discourse. The theories have been extended to analyse the frames 
used to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.  The results 
showed that the media select some aspects of the pre-existing discourse and frame them in a 
manner that conveys their preferred meaning. This meaning is not neutral. Instead, it is laden with 
power and ideologies meant to serve the interests of the ruling elites and maintain the status quo. 
Findings from this study have shown that apart from communicating ideas and information to the 
people, the press assumed the role of a political institution where it communicated and endorsed 
ideologies of the dominant groups in society while discrediting the interest of the powerless. 
Besides, existing research often separately depended on framing analysis or thematic analysis. The 
present research contributed by linking a variety of approaches in its methodology. The research 
included the case study, cultural studies approach, thematic analysis and critical discourses 
analysis. All the approaches were complementary to each other. A case study of the ANC 2017 
election was covered with specif focus on the leadership and political qualities on Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. 
 
The discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation 
  
Legitimation and de-legitimation are key terms used in this study. Every research has its contextual 
terms that are essential in defining the patterns of activities and events in a particular research 
context or setting. Understanding how legitimation and de-legitimation are defined and interpreted 
in this research is important in shaping the ideas of the study.   
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The following section briefly discusses the discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation. It 
unpacks the various key elements that inform the discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation. 
Among the key elements discussed in this section are authorisation, rationalisation, moral 
evaluation and mythopoesis. Focus on these elements is important in that it allows the researcher 
to situate the study within the broader discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation. It also helps 
in exposing the gap that exists in previous literature that focuses on legitimation and de-
legitimation.    
Evidence from various scholars suggests that interest in legitimation and de-legitimation have 
gained traction among political communication scholars over the past two decades (Fairclough 
2013; van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). The use of these two terms is usually related to 
discourse analysis (Fairclough 2003b; Van Leeuwen 2017; Van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). 
Generally, the term refers to the act of making something or confirming the legitimacy of 
something or a government. Mostly, the most protuberant act of legitimation is to discursively 
create, validate, and institutionalise established truths, ideals and order (Fairclough, 2013; van Dijk 
2008; van Leeuwen 2007). Also, as Deutsch stressed, "legitimacy holds is the assurance of the 
compatibility of a value-pursuing course of action with other key values" (1963: 309). However, 
for scholars like Oddo, legitimation is commonly perceived as an essential object of a political 
utterer in a quest to rationalise sequence of activities that are intended to be completed within the 
scope of the dynamic interest of the receiver (2011: 287). In relation to that, Van Dijk argues that 
since legitimation is profoundly ingrained in ideology, it presupposes norms and values. Moreover, 
Van Leeuwen argued that "the legitimations refer to how a group of individuals seeks to secure 
consent to their power from at least the most important among their subordinates" (2007: 14).  
More so, Frances (1982) cited in Lynn and Kartez (1995: 87) also argued that in political rhetoric, 
legitimacy is accomplished through communication that efficiently aligns actions with the 
prevalent social values of a particular time. This assertion was reinforced by Vaara who defines 
legitimation as “the creation of a sense of, beneficial, ethical, understandable, necessary or 
otherwise acceptable action in a specific setting” (2008: 985). This definition can be validated if 
one considers how governments and corporations have endeavoured to establish legitimacy in 
many contentious areas like immigration policy, defines strategy, and environmental issues. Put 
together, the definitions put forward by the various scholars (Fairclough 2013; van Dijk 2008; van 
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Leeuwen, 2007) suggest that “all facets of practice require legitimation, especially when practices 
are in the process of being established or changed” (Reyes 2011: 781).  
De-legitimation, on the other hand, refers to the act of diminishing or destroying the legitimacy, 
prestige, or authority of an individual or government (Reyes 2011: 782).  According to Screti de-
legitimation can be understood as "discursively creating and transmitting a negative image of the 
other" (2013: 212). Thus, put in other words, the term de-legitimation presupposes the absenteeism 
of linguistic alignment with the predominant societal ideals of that time in addition to the 
“absenteeism of positive, beneficial ethical, understandable action” (Screti 2013: 212). Concerning 
politics, Steffek argues that de-legitimation of a political establishment happens when policies are 
confronted and threatened (2003: 77).  
Scholars like Van Leeuwen argued that every system of authority attempts to establish the belief 
in its legitimacy (2007: 18). As such language has become the most important vehicle used in 
attempts to legitimize the systems or ideologies of those in authority. Scholars like Berger and 
Luckmann (1966: 112) cited in (Van Leeuwen 2007: 91) argued that “all languages are 
legitimation”. According to Van Leeuwen said, “incipient legitimation is present as a system of 
linguistic objectification of human experience is transmitted” (2007: 91). Effectively, what this 
means is that the initial process of legitimation takes place in every situation where communication 
of human experience is communicated. For instance, the transmission of kinship vocabulary serves 
to legitimize the kingship structure that is being communicated (Reyes 2011: 803). 
Evidence from various legitimation studies suggests that there are four common categories of 
legitimation (Björkvall and Höög 2019; Smits, van Leeuwen and van Tatenhove 2017; 
Smith, Morreale and Mariani 2008). For instance, Van Leeuwen states that there are four main 
categories of legitimation. These are authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and 
mythopoesis (van Tatenhove 2017: 34). Furthermore, Bjorkvall and Höög argued that these forms 
of legitimation can unfold and manifest independent of each other or can also occur in combination 
(2019: 400). In the process of their occurrence, these forms of legitimation, are understood to be 
the crust of the text and talk which may not refer to the exact meaning being communicated and 
legitimized. On the other hand, these forms may also operate as “thinly sprinkled across detailed 
descriptive or prescriptive accounts of the practices and institutions they legitimise” (Van Leeuwen 
13 
 
2007: 92).  What this effectively means is that these legitimation forms are easily recognised by 
exact linguistic resources and configurations of a linguistic resource (Screti 2013: 212). 
In his study, Van Leeuwen stressed that legitimation plays an important role in communication as 
it adds the answer (explicitly and obliquely) to the question Why (van Tatenhove 2017; Smits 
2017; Van Leeuwen 2007). What this means is that legitimation is operationalised when the 
question like; "Why should we do this? and, “why should we do in this way?”. Such questions 
provoke a response that seeks to legitimise a course of action. Four forms of legitimation are 
important in this thesis, and these include authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation and 
mythopoesis. Thus, legitimation is broadly discussed below.  
Authorisation 
 
Authorisation refers to the act or process of giving consent, permission, or license to carry out the 
desired course of action (Oxford Dictionary 2018: 24). However, scholars define authorisation as 
the act by a person in the position of authority to give consent or permission for a chosen course 
of action (Galvan and Guevara 2016; Idrus and Nor 2016). Van Leeuwen defined authorisation as 
“the process of legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom, and law and of a 
process in whom the institutional authority of some kind vested” (2007: 92). In other words, the 
process of legitimation by authorisation is made functional and operational when the individual 
communicating use or refer to some agreed or respected tradition or any institutional framework 
that is well known and mutually respected by all the parties involved in the process of 
communication. According to Galvan and Guevara, since legitimation involves the process of 
answering the questions "why should we do this? or Why should we do this in this way? 
Authorisation involves responding to such questions at two different levels” (2016: 452). The first 
level is called personal authorisation or personal authority legitimation while the second level is 
called impersonal authority (Van Leeuwen 2007: 92). 
Personal authority  
 
Personal authority refers to the authority that an individual has or enjoys by virtue of their status 
or role in any given institution (Abdi and Basarati 2017: 88). Abdi and Basarati opined that an 
instance of personal authority is the authority enjoyed by parents and teachers (2017: 88). To 
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substantiate that point, Van Leeuwen argued that the authority by parents and teachers is used to 
“invoke any justification for what they require others to do other than a mere "because I say so", 
although they many of cause choose to provide reasons and arguments” (Van Leeuwen 2007: 94). 
Moreover, Abdi and Basarari argued that personal authority legitimation normally finds its 
proficiency from the authority’s exclamation (2017: 88).  Thus, personal authority is a symbol of 
the “positional family” where verdicts are a function of the standing of a member and where 
conflict is resolved using members comparative power lying in their statuses. In relation to the 
above, Halliday, Matthiessen, and Halliday stressed that authority legitimation naturally takes the 
form of a “verbal process” clause (2014: 129). This means that the “projected clause” or the 
authority’s utterances, encompass some form of “obligation modality” (Halliday 2014: 129). 
Under personal authorisation of legitimation, there is also a dimension called the “expert authority” 
(Abdi and Bassarati 2017; Van Leeuwen 2007). As the name implies, under this dimension of 
personal authorisation, legitimation is given by an expert rather than the status that is held by an 
individual like in the personal authority. Commonly found in academic text and news reporting, 
this type of authorisation involves the mentioning of credentials of that authority. However, if the 
person is well known it is usually not important to mention the credentials of that individual since 
the name of the authority only will possess enough weight to provide the authority for a specific 
situation (Abdi and Bassarati 2017: 86). According to Van Leeuwen, “the process of expert 
authorisation in legitimation often takes the form "verbal process clause" or "mental process 
clause" with the expert as subject” (2007: 96). What this means is that in the multimodal text the 
credentials of the expert may be visualised or signified by laboratory equipment, files, and other 
professional features (Abdi and Bassarati 2017: 89). Moreover, the utterances of the expert in the 
process of legitimation of a course of action are laden with some sort of recommendation, some 
forms of an assertion that justifies a specific course of action as the best or a virtuous idea. To add, 
this process offers no reasons why that course of action should be taken, nor does it provide an 
answer to the question “Why should I do this?” What it simply does is to say this should happen 
because a certain individual has said so (Abdi and Bassarati 2017; Fairclough 2013; Van Leeuwen 
2007). 
Another dimension of the personal authorisation in legitimation is the “role model authority”. In 
this process of legitimation, celebrities, and popular personalities are used to motivate the 
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population to take a course of action. According to Van Leeuwen, in a role model authority “people 
follow the example of role model or opinion leader” (2017; 2007). The role model can be a part of 
the group or a popular figure from a distance. In this case, the reasoning behind is that the fact that 
this popular figure among the target population has espoused a particular form of behaviour, or 
accept as true certain things, is sufficient to legitimise the action of their supporters (Abdi and 
Basarati 2017; Fairclough 2013; Van Leeuwen 2008). Moreover, this kind of legitimation has been 
seen to be a common practice in advertising and lifestyle media. Van Leeuwen (2007) cited in 
Fairclough and Fairclough (2013: 67) observed that home decoration magazines legitimise their 
prescriptions (How to create your own dream home) by propagating stories that are replete with 
the experiences of how famous media personalities beautify or refurbish their houses and homes. 
According to Van Leeuwen (2007) cited Abdi and Bassarati (2017: 89) famous people or 
celebrities are instantly and easily recognisable, “role model authority” is effortlessly conveyed 
visually, merely by presenting celebrities involved in the activities they intend to legitimise.  In 
relation to this assertion, Van Leeuwen (2007) and Mead (1934) cited in Bates (2016: 193) also 
observed that individuals take on the behaviour of the clusters they fit in and subscribe to, of the 
"significant others" in their immediate and their wider social setting. 
Impersonal authority    
   
Legitimation scholars have established that not all authority is personal (Bjorkvall et al.  2019; 
Van Leeuwen 2017; van Tatenhove 2017; Smith 2008; van Leeuwen 2007). For instance, these 
scholars mutually agree that in this form of legitimation, the questions of "Why do this" is not 
answered by providing the reference to a name or individual. Instead, reference is made to the 
laws, rules, and regulations. Therefore, the issues are not who said why in this process, but the 
answer is because the law (rules, regulations, policies, and guidelines) say so (Van Leeuwen 2017: 
553).  Moreover, according to Van Leeuwen, the impersonal authority can also be the subject of 
"verbal process clauses" like personal authority (2007: 100). However, the difference between the 
two lies in that in impersonal authority there is a presence of nouns like “policy”, regulation, and 
rule (Van Leeuwen 2007: 100).  
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The authority of tradition 
  
The authority of tradition is a common practice in news media (van Dijk 2008: 44). Though it has 
been declining, it is normally evoked whenever there is an immediate need to legitimise a certain 
course of action. According to several legitimacy scholars in authority of tradition; the implied or 
overt answer to the question "why" simply because it is “our” tradition, custom or practice 
(Fairclough 2013; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). In other words, the 
legitimating phrase, in this case, is that “this is what we have always done” (Van Leeuwen 2007: 
94). Therefore, by using such phrases that evoke tradition as repeated practice, it is assumed that 
tradition carries enough weight to go be questioned and challenged. According to Van Leeuwen, 
the common phrase in this legitimation process is “it was the practise or custom” (2007: 94) 
 
Authority of conformity  
 
Authority of conformity has a lot to do with the individual relation to the behaviour exhibited by 
others in their immediate community (Bandura 1999; Chamorro-Premuzic 2016; Fairclough 2013; 
Van Leeuwen 2017; Van Leeuwen 2007; van Dijk 2008). What this means is that in authority of 
conformity the answer to the "why" question is simply because everyone is doing it and thus, “I 
should also do the same”. Van Leeuwen said, “the process of the authority of conformity is not 
about what we used to do but because that is what everyone is doing” (2007: 99). In this case, the 
message conveyed by the communicator is that “if everyone is doing it, so should you”. To that 
assertion, there is no further argument given by the communicator to justify why people should do 
a certain course of action (Fairclough 2003 cited in Nokkala and Saarinen 2018). On the other side, 
conformity legitimation may also adopt the method of an explicit. For Van Leeuwen, the 
conformity legitimation can be seen through high-frequency modality such as statements that 
begin with: "Majority of people….", "Many people …." (2007: 97). 
 
 
17 
 
Moral evaluation  
 
Moral evaluation legitimation is different from the authority legitimation because it is predicated 
on moral values (Fairclough and Wodak 2005; Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk 
2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). According to Fairclough and Wodak, moral evaluation is not imposed 
by the authority without any reasonable and sensible justification (2005: 76). To add, in moral 
evaluation, common words are "good and bad". These words that seek to moralise or demoralise 
certain courses of action are understood to "travel between moral, aesthetic and hedonistic" realms 
and work in conjunction with authority legitimation (Van Leeuwen 2007: 97). To illustrate the 
previous assertion, Van Leeuwen argues that the moral evaluation legitimation process can be 
witnessed when “President Bush legitimises aggressive policies by pronouncing his enemies as 
the "axis of evil” (2007: 97).  However, in many instances, as Van Leeuwen said, moral evaluation 
is associated with definite discourses that are of moral value. But these discourses are not easily 
made explicit and debatable (Fairclough and Wodak 2005; Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen 2017; 
van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). Concerning the above, scholars like van Dijk stressed that 
the moral value discourses are hinted at, usually by ways of adjectives such as “healthy, normal, 
and natural” (2008: 34). To add, Fairclough argued that the moral adjectives play a role as a 
catalyst that triggers a moral concept even when they are disconnected from the structure of 
interpretation from which they derive (2003: 33). What they do is that they “transfigure moral 
discourse into the form of generalized motives which are now widely used to ensure mass loyalty” 
(Habermas 1976:36 cited in Van Leeuwen 2007). 
Evidence from various legitimation studies has established that moral evaluation can be evident in 
three spheres (Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk, 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). These 
are “evaluation, abstraction, and analogies”. For Van Leeuwen, evaluation adjectives claim a 
fundamental place in moral evaluation legitimation. Nevertheless, as noted by Leech many 
adjectives are at once "designative and attributive" (1966: 45). What this means is that they 
communicate the concrete qualities of actions or objects and commend them in terms of some 
domain values. In other words, "praise is mingled with practicality". As a result, the mixing of 
praise with practicality plays a crucial role in that moral evaluation is concealed from being 
questioned and opposing arguments. According to Van Leeuwen, most commonly used adjectives 
in moral evaluation legitimation are “normal, natural”. He argued that  
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these adjectives modify either a nominal group which has a normalised reference to a 
practice (or one or more of its constituent actions or reactions) as its head (as in natural 
and healthy response), or an attribute in a relational clause which has the practice (or a 
constituent action or reaction) as its subject (as in being upset is natural): It is perfectly 
normal to be anxious. Showing signs of stress about starting school is natural and healthy 
(Van Leeuwen 2007: 99) 
Furthermore, abstraction is an alternative technique of expressing moral evaluation. This method 
of legitimation involves the process of referring to practices in abstract ways that normalise them 
by distilling from them a quality that links them to the discourse of moral values. For instance, as 
Van Leeuwen posits, abstraction can be seen in cases where " instead of saying the child goes to 
school for the first time, we might say the child takes up independence"(Van Leeuwen 2007: 99). 
However, what this phrase does is that the practice of going to school is legitimised in terms of a 
discourse of "independence". 
More so, another form of moral evaluation legitimation is the conscious use of analogies by the 
communicator. Van Leeuwen stressed that analogy or comparison is one of the most effective 
ways of expressing moral evaluation (2007: 99). This is because comparison in any given discourse 
carries with it de-legitimation or legitimation functions. Scholars argued that the answer to the 
question "Why must I do this"?  has nothing to do with good or bad (Fairclough and Wodak 2005; 
Fairclough 2003; Van Leeuwen 2017; van Dijk 2008; Van Leeuwen 2007). Instead, one is 
expected to carry out a course of action simply because that action or activity is like another 
activity that has produced positive outcomes or values. Illich argued that in some instances the 
comparison is unspoken (Illich 1971 cited Van Leeuwen 2007: 98). What this means is that an 
action that originates from a certain social custom or way of doing things is defined by a term 
which, accurately, denotes a practice "belonging to another social practice, and the positive or 
negative values which, in the given socio-cultural context, are attached to that other activity, are 
then transferred to the original activity"(Illich 1971: 20). For instance, in his study on schooling, 
Illich is seen importing terms from the military, the prison to refer to the actions of the teachers, 
and speaks of drilling pupils, and incarcerating pupils (1971: 20).  
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Rationalisation  
 
In modern discourse, rationalisation occupies a very critical place. Generally, rationalisation refers 
to the activity or process of trying to justify or explain a certain behaviour or an attitude using 
logical reasons. This can be done even where it is not appropriate (Oxford Dictionary 2015: 123). 
For Tolbert and Zucker rationalisation can be defined as “giving purpose to institutionalised 
actions” (199: 172). What this means is that the purpose of why a specific course of action is taken 
is explained. According to Van Leeuwen in the process of rationalisation, commonly two types of 
rationality are utilised (2007: 99). These are instrumental rationality legitimation and theoretical 
rationality legitimation practices. Thus, in the following section, a detailed discussion of these two 
types of rationalisation will be unpacked (Galvin and Guevara 2016, Idrus and Nor 2016 and van 
Leeuwen 2007) 
 
Theoretical rationalisation  
 
In theoretical rationalisation, legitimacy is predicated on whether actions or purpose is founded on 
truth or on the explanation of the way things are. According to Van Leeuwen "in the case of 
theoretical rationalisation, legitimacy is grounded, not in whether the action is morally justified or 
not, nor in whether it is purposeful of effective, but in whether it is founded on some kind of truth" 
(2007: 102). What this means is that theoretical rationalisation legitimation is closely linked to the 
class of naturalisation. However, theoretical legitimation broadens the scope of inquiry into the 
setup of things than naturalisation which offers a covert implicit portrayal of the way things are. 
As Van Leeuwen said, "where naturalisation only states that some practices or action is natural, 
theoretical legitimation offers an unambiguous representation of the "way things are". Therefore, 
for Van Leeuwen theoretical legitimation must take three levels or types. What he meant by this 
is that firstly, the definition of any activity must be in the terms of another, moralised activity. 
Simply put, this effectively means that for any given definition to be accepted as a legitimate 
definition, both activities must be objective and generalised, further, the connection between them 
should be constitutive (attributive) or significative (conveys signals and symbols) (Van Leeuwen 
2007: 99).   
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Mythopoesis  
 
The fourth type of legitimation is called mythopoesis. Storytelling is at the centre of this type of 
legitimation process. For example, in a story that involves morals, the protagonist is rewarded for 
engaging in activity that is accepted as socially legitimate. They can also be presented as heroes 
who were able to restore the legitimate social order. According to Van Leeuwen, the process of 
mythopoesis can be seen in the process in which schooling is legitimated (2007: 98). He argued 
that schooling is legitimated as an evolutionary, and a civilizing process. According to Wright 
(1975) cited in Taylor (2000: 508), stories play a vital role as tools of legitimation. He argued that 
“stories are symbolic in that they use symbolic action, specific actions that can nevertheless 
represent more than one domain of institutionalised social practice, and so provide a mythical 
model of social action” (Wright 1975 cited in Taylor 2000: 508).  
The previous section unpacked the discourses of legitimation and de-legitimation. In this section 
scholarly work that defined the legitimation and de-legitimation was discussed in detail. Moreover, 
various elements that form the backbone of the discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation were 
presented and explained. Firstly, the concept of authorisation and its various sub-elements was 
detailed. Secondly, the aspect of moral evaluation was also unpacked in detail. Thirdly, the 
elements of rationalisation and its sub-elements were also explained. Lastly, the element of 
mythopoesis was defined and explained using evidence from various scholars. This section is 
important to this study because it allows the researcher to define the key terms that form the basis 
for analysis in later sections of the thesis. The researcher sought to analyse how the media frames 
were used to legitimise or de-legitimise the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril 
Ramaphosa. Moreover, this section also allowed the researcher to expose the gap in the literature 
that force on legitimation and de-legitimation.  
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Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into eleven interrelated chapters. The sequences of these chapters are 
highlighted below as follows:  
Chapter one is composed of the background and introduction of the study. It introduces the 
research and outlines the research question, objectives and significance of the study. This chapter 
introduces the key components that were later discussed in the thesis. For instance, the chapter 
highlights the methodologies and theoretical and conceptual framework upon which this study is 
based.   
Chapter two introduces the case study. The case study that was chosen in this study is the 54th 
ANC national elective conference. In this chapter, the choice for this case study was justified and 
explained in detail. Its relevance to the study was also established.  
Chapter three presents the background and brief ownership set up of News24 and IOL. Not much 
literature has been written concerning the ownership structure of the two press. However, the 
researcher relied on the limited available literature. Focus on the ownership structure of the two 
press is imperative for the critical discourse analysis approach adopted to analyse data in this study.   
Chapter four focuses on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. It presents the 
biographies of the two leaders. The chapter also draws on previous literature and themes that are 
commonly used by scholars to refer to the leadership and political qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.  
Chapter five reviews the literature that is relevant to this study. In this chapter, the literature was 
presented thematically and in the order of research questions. These themes include media 
legitimation strategies, media framing of political leaders, socio-economic and political factors 
that affect the media framing and media framing of female political leaders.   
Chapter six is composed of the theoretical and conceptual framework. It places the study in a 
theoretical context. The theory of framing and Michel Foucault's concept of discourse 
power/knowledge was discussed. The difference debate about agenda setting and framing theory 
was also discussed.   
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Chapter seven outlines the research methodology employed by the researcher. The chapter 
explains the research paradigm, data collection and sampling procedure, coding and data 
presentation and analysis procedures. The ethical considerations were also explained.    
Chapter eight focuses on the presentation analysis and discussion of the two main frames that 
emerged from the data. The first frame that was discussed in this chapter is the Rand and Market 
Frame. Following the discussion of this frame, the chapter also presents, analyse and discuss data 
on the Economic recovery & Growth frame. These frames were presented, analysed and discussed 
in relation to the framing theory as well as previous literature.  
Chapter nine presents, analyse and discuss the Election victory frame in detail. Data were 
presented and analysed in response to the key research questions. The analysis was done using 
critical discourse analysis.  
Chapter ten of the thesis presents, analyse and discusses the findings from the broad frames that 
emerged from the data. Data on Jacob Zuma & State Capture, Factionalism & Unity, and 
Corruption frame were presented, analysed and discussed in relation to the framing theory, critical 
discourse analysis and previous literature.   
Chapter eleven concludes the whole study by providing a synopsis of how News24 and IOL 
framed the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and how they 
tried to legitimise or delegitimise either of the two political leaders. In this chapter, the key research 
findings are explained and discussed according to the key research questions.  
 
Conclusion   
 
This chapter introduced the study. The chapter focused on the background and introduction of the 
study. It further outlined the research question, objectives and significance of the study. The 
chapter also introduced the key components that were later discussed in the thesis. For instance, it 
highlights the research methodology that the researcher employed and theoretical and conceptual 
framework upon which this study is based. Furthermore, the chapter also defined the key terms. 
These are legitimation and de-legitimation. In this case, different literature that defined the two 
23 
 
terms were discussed.  It was highlighted that the discourse of legitimation and de-legitimation is 
complex and functions in various ways.   
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Chapter 2:  Background to the 54th national conference of the 
ANC 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on the 54th ANC national elective conference. Firstly, it presents the 
background of the conference. The constitutional provisions that underpin the conference are also 
discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the researcher also outlines the reasons why the conference 
was so important to the ANC and the South African population. In this case, two arguments were 
reviewed. The first argument is that the conference was a determinant of the political future of 
ANC. The second argument is that the conference was hope for economic revival in South Africa. 
Furthermore, the chapter also outlines the significance of the 54th National Conference to this 
study. Presenting the background of the 54th conference is important because it provides the 
context within which the press was operating during the period of the conference.  
 
The 54th national conference 
 
 The 54th National Conference of the ANC was held between 16 and 20 December 2017. It took 
place in the Nasrec Expo Centre, Johannesburg. This was a conference to elect the members of the 
National Executive Committee and other major ANC party officials (Mathekga 2018, Du Plessis 
and Butler 2017). The conference was convened under the theme of “Remember Tambo: Towards 
Unity, Renewal and Radical Socio-economic Transformation”. Mathekga argues that this 54th 
national conference of the ANC was one of the historical conferences in the history of the party 
(2018: 21). He said that “the battle at Nasrec was the most fiercely and openly contested elective 
conference yet held in the history of the ANC” (Mathekga 2018: 21). This is so because the 
conference revealed the long-concealed division and factional fights that were at the soul of the 
party. Additionally, the conference was said to be epic because of the battle to become president 
that was being pushed by two dominant factional groups in the ANC, the Jacob Zuma faction and 
the Cyril Ramaphosa faction. In the period leading up to the conference, it was claimed that ‘vote-
buying’ became the order of the day (Du Plessis 2017: 139). This points to the intensity and 
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seriousness of the conference. As if that was not enough, the conference was also characterised by 
unprecedented levels of political violence and intimidation. For instance, Mathekga notes that “the 
process of nominating candidates for various leadership positions was marred by deliberate 
disruptions and in the run-up to the conference court interdicts were issued and physical 
intimidation was resorted to, including public display of violence" (2018: 22). This situation was 
exacerbated by the increasing policy disagreements that were unfolding in the ANC in the period 
leading to the conference. A case in point was the increasing level of intolerance that became so 
evident among ANC members as they continuously engaged in public tiffs on the direction the 
party should take in policy formulation (Du Plessis 2017: 140).   
  
Events leading up to the conference  
 
The president of South Africa during the period leading up to the conference was Jacob Zuma. In 
2014 he was re-elected for a five-year term. At the time of the conference, Jacob Zuma was 
ineligible to contest for the position of president because he had already served two terms as 
president of South Africa (Mathekga 2018: 21). Jacob Zuma's presidency was marred by much 
political and economic turmoil. This led to continuous cabinet reshuffles; allegations made against 
him; the country's subsequent downgrading by international financial monitoring agencies and 
unending protest, much of it led by people who demanded the president’s resignation (Pauw 2017: 
67). Jacob Zuma has been accused of ‘state capture’ by allowing the Gupta family access to the 
Presidency as well as access to the cabinet and state resources. However, Jacob Zuma has 
repeatedly denied the allegations (Butler 2017: 45). 
In March 2017 Cyril Ramaphosa, who was the deputy president, launched his campaign in 
preparation for the December elective congress. Opposing him, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who is 
Jacob Zuma’s former-wife appeared at several ANC Women’s League events and announced her 
candidacy in the upcoming elective conference (Du Plessis 2017: 139). In August 2017, it was 
announced that Dlamini-Zuma, who was the African Union Commissioner at that time, was 
returning to the country to pursue her presidential campaign.    
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There were political dynamics that unfolded in the period leading to the conference. Scholars 
argued that the battle for the leadership of the ANC exposed the factional4 division that is 
embedded in the ANC (Mathekga 2018, Du Plessis 2018, Hartley 2018 and Butler 2017). To 
illustrate this point, various writters argue that Cyril Ramaphosa was aligned to the anti-Jacob 
Zuma faction in the ANC, whereas Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was endorsed by the pro-Jacob 
Zuma faction within the party. Consequent to that, the ANC Women’s League unapologetically 
endorsed Dlamini-Zuma while Ramaphosa was endorsed by the Trade Union movement’s 
COSATU (Du Plessis 2017: 142), which he had for long been associated.  
The conference was going to take place against a background of upheavals that were shaking the 
foundations of the ANC, the national economy and the presidency of Jacob Zuma. The conference 
followed a few months after an explosive policy conference that took place on 17 June 2017 
(Mathekga 2018 and Du Plessis 2017). This policy conference helped expose the factional battles 
that were in the party. From this conference, it was clear that the ANC was divided into two 
dominant factions represented by the two chief contenders. Mathekga stressed that “the ANC went 
into Nasrec consisting of two main factions, replicated perfectly in the broader society outside the 
party” (2018: 22). The most heated debates that pitted the two factions against each other centred 
around the direction the party was going to take. On one hand, the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
faction emphasised radical economic transformation, while on the other hand the Cyril Ramaphosa 
faction felt that the Jacob Zuma-led ANC “has sold to the nation and there was a need for the ANC 
to engage rigorously on policy so as to enable it to turn the country around” (Mathekga 2018: 21), 
while the Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma faction was premised on the gospel of the self-determination 
of the black majority. Put differently, this latter faction preached that “leave us alone to do as we 
please with our African resources" (Mathekga 2018: 79).   
Moreover, in the period leading to the conference, on the economic front, it was clear that the 
economic and currency markets had little confidence in the leadership of Jacob Zuma. For instance, 
the rand currency continued to weaken, and the prices of consumer commodities continued to 
                                                 
4 There were various causes of the factional battels that had characterised the ANC. According to Mathekga, ethnic 
differences was one of the main factors. There party was devided between the KwaZulu-Natal cabal against the 
Gauteng cabal. These were the two leading factions. On the other hand, the ANC factionalism was also defined along 
lines of economic and and party policies. There was a group of leaders who believed in land expropriation without 
compensation (radical transformists) and those who believed that land expropriation was not possible and should not 
be done (white monopoly capital).  
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increase. Another heavy blow on the presidency of Jacob Zuma was the Moody’s5 credit ratings 
downgrading of South Africa’s international financial status (Pauw 2017 and Butler 2017).  
Additionally, in the period leading up to the conference, it was in the public domain that Jacob 
Zuma ‘has sold the country’ to the Gupta6 family. This was done in the manner of awarding 
government contracts to the Gupta family as well as allegations of their influence in making 
appointments. According to Mathekga, “Jacob Zuma has sold the nation to the controversial Gupta 
family, in the process collecting for himself, his family and cronies some petty cash" (2018: 22).   
 
What do we know about the national elective conference? 
 
Our knowledge of the organisation of the ANC National Elective Conference is limited to what is 
stated in the constitution of the ANC (Butler 2007: 178). According to the ANC constitution, the 
National Executive Committee is bound to convene the national conference every five years 
(African National Congress Constitution 2007). This provision is well explained in Rule 10.1-10.5 
of the ANC constitution as amended and adopted by the 53 National Conference. Rule Number 10 
reads as follows:  
10.1 The National Conference is the supreme ruling and controlling body of the ANC. It 
shall be composed of: 
a) At least 90% of the [voting] delegates at Conference shall be from branches, elected at 
properly constituted branch general meetings. The number of delegates per branch shall 
                                                 
5 Moody's Investors Service, often referred to as Moody's, is the bond credit rating business of Moody's Corporation, 
representing the company's traditional line of business and its historical name. Moody's Investors Service provides 
international financial research on bonds issued by commercial and government entities. Moody's, along 
with Standard & Poor's and Fitch Group, is considered one of the Big Three credit rating agencies. 
The company ranks the creditworthiness of borrowers using a standardised rating scale which measures expected 
investor loss in the event of default. Moody's Investors Service rates debt securities in several bond market segments. 
These include government, municipal and corporate bonds; managed investments such as money market funds and 
fixed-income funds; financial institutions including banks and non-bank finance companies; and asset classes 
in structured finance. In Moody's Investors Service's ratings system, securities are assigned a rating from Aaa to C, 
with Aaa being the highest quality and C the lowest quality. 
 
6 The media was fervent in publishing the ‘Guptaleaks’, a series of  revelatory emails detailing how the Gupta family 
had suborned government ministers, civil servants and even the president himself so as to ensure that lucrative 
governments contracts and tenders were won by or benefited a network of companies connected to the Guptas 
(Mathekga 2018: 23).  
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be in proportion to its paid-up membership, provided that each branch in good standing 
shall be entitled to at least one delegate. 
b) The number of delegates to be [elected] allocated to [National Conference by] each 
province to attend National Conference shall be fixed by the NEC in proportion to the 
paid-up membership of each province. 
c) All members of the National Executive Committee shall attend ex-officio as full 
participants in and delegates at the Conference. 
d)  The remainder of the [10% of voting] delegates at the Conference shall be allocated 
by the NEC from among the Provincial Executive Committees, the ANC Veterans 
League, the ANC Youth League, and the ANC Women's League.  
10.1.2 Non-Voting Delegates: The NEC may invite individuals, who have made a special 
contribution to the struggle or who have special skills or experience, to attend the 
Conference.  
10.2 The NEC will appoint a conference preparatory committee that will circulate 
conference information in advance, determine the precise procedure for selection of 
delegates and indicate how the membership can then ensure their concerns are on the 
agenda. 
10.3 The Conference shall determine its procedures following democratic principles. 10.3 
Voting on key questions shall be by secret ballot if at least one-third of the delegates at the 
National Conference demand it. 
10.4 The National Conference will be convened at least every five years. 
 
Why is the national elective conference significant? 
 
The significance of the ANC national elective conference is considerable.  Hartley argued that the 
choice to focus on the 54th conference was informed by the level of anticipation that the people of 
South Africa and the world had over the outcome of the conference (2018: 21). Simply put, the 
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conference had two significant implications on the future of South Africa – the political and 
economic implications. Events of such magnitude always attract media attention both locally and 
abroad. Watkins argued that the political events and culture obtaining at a given time determines 
what the media focus on (2009: 45). Thus, in the section below, the two (political and economic) 
implications will be unpacked.   
On the political front, the conference was viewed by most South Africans as the most decisive 
stage for the ANC and the country since 1994 (Du Plessis 2017: 38). Mathekga said, “the 
conference will see the emergence of policy directives that will provide an insight into how the 
ANC intends to govern the country in the future” (2018: 21).  Simply put, the National Elective 
Conference as provided for by the ANC constitution was a place where policy and policy matters 
will be formulated (Butler 2019: 123). The conference has some other functions that are worthy of 
note. For example, the 54th National Conference Report and Resolution indicated that among other 
things, the 54th National Conference of the ANC reaffirmed the commitment and policies of the 
ruling party. Mathekga argues that the National Elective Conference is a place where policy 
matters are decided and voted and adopted together with the resolutions that will guide the party 
(2018: 22). For example, in the same conference, it was resolved that as a matter of policy, the 
ANC shall pursue expropriation of land without compensation. And this must be done without 
putting in jeopardy the agricultural sector and endangering food security in South Africa (Du 
Plessis 2018: 43). Butler argued that the conference was so important to South Africa because 
much of what will happen in 2018 and beyond depend on the resolutions and leadership coming 
out of the 54th National Conference (2017: 45). This scholar argues, “any predictions about the 
year ahead come to some strong caveats (Butler 2017: 45). What this means is that the outcomes 
of the conference were decisive for the future of South Africa.   
On the economic front, the conference was perceived as the last hope that the South African 
economy must regain after the so-called “decade of waste” (Butler 2019, Mathekga 2018 and Du 
Plessis 2017). The term “a decade of waste” refers to the rule of Jacob Zuma that was characterised 
by high levels of corruption. Jacob Zuma's reign was also associated with high levels of inflation 
as was seen by the weakening of the rand against the United States dollar (Mathekga 2018, Butler 
2017 and Du Plessis 2017). The country was heading for a recession with the economy 
experiencing stagnant growth. Marais and Groenwald observed that “investors, traders and fund 
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managers are keeping close eyes on the ANC elective conference” (2017: 1). This observation 
helps to illustrate the importance of the ANC National Elective Conference to the various 
stakeholders in South Africa. For Marias and Groenwald, the conference was of great significance 
because the outcome of the conference was going to have a bearing on the financial markets that 
were already in bad shape (2017: 1). Thus, for them, they expected a positive outcome. Marais and 
Groenwald argued that “the key risk is an outcome that is not favoured by the markets, which 
could have a negative impact on investor confidence” (2017: 1). However, for them, a win by 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as president and a candidate from the Jacob Zuma camp was not 
positive. While a win by Cyril Ramaphosa a vice-president who was not compromised would 
presumably reboot the confidence.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has looked at the background of the 54th ANC national conference. To that end, the 
events leading up to the conference were presented. The conference was seen to be of significant 
impact on the future of South Africa and ANC. For instance, it was indicated in this chapter that 
the conference had both political and economic implications on the future of South Africa. On one 
hand, the conference was perceived as the last hope that the South African economy must regain 
after the so-called “decade of waste”. On the other hand, the conference was viewed by most South 
Africans as the most decisive stage for the ANC and the country since 1994. Moreover, it was also 
indicated in this chapter that our knowledge of the organisation of the ANC National Elective 
Conference is limited to what is stated in the constitution of the ANC. To that end, rule number 10 
of the ANC constitution was outlined.  
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Chapter 3:  Background to News24 and IOL 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the background and brief ownership set up of News24 and IOL. There is very 
limited literature available in relation to the ownership structure of the two press. The researcher 
had to rely on this limited literature to engage crucial discussions on the ownership structure of the 
two press. Understanding how News24 and IOL are structured was imperative for the critical 
discourse analysis approach adopted to analyse the data in this study. It allowed the researcher to 
contextualise the journalists discourse within the broader continuum of news media ownership and 
its influence on journalist’s content. The chapter pays specific attention on understanding the 
background of the two press. Moreover, detail on the control structure of the press was also given 
considerable attention. The chapter unpacks the details pertaining to subsidiary relationships and 
ownership of News24 and IOL.  
 
Background of News24 
 
News24 that is wholly owned by the Media24. Media24 is arguably the largest print media 
company in South Africa (Chuma, Bosch and Wasserman 2017: 94). This company is a subsidiary 
of Naspers, a corporation that was transformed from an apartheid-sympathetic newspaper 
conglomerate. Information provided by the Media24 (2018) reveals that the company is owned by 
Naspers, which owns MIH Group, the owner of MultiChoice. The corporation is a global company 
that has investments across the world, including in Chinese companies like Tencent. Rumney 
stressed that Media24 owns a lot of daily and weekly newspaper in South Africa. It owns the Daily 
Sun, which has over the years dominated the South African newspaper market immensely (2015: 
66). Moreover, the company’s “major dailies and weeklies are The Witness, City Press, Beeld, Die 
Burger, Volksblad, Rapport, Sondag, Son (daily and weekly), Daily Sun, Sunday Sun and Soccer 
Laduma” (Rumney 2015 and Media24 2018). This larger control of most South Africa's largest 
newspapers has ensured that the Media24 enjoys a near monopoly of the media industry in South 
Africa.  Tomaselli observed that apart from the daily newspapers that the newspaper controls, the 
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company also publishes a variety of community newspapers (2017: 129). It also publishes more 
than 60 titles - some jointly with other companies or under licensing agreements with international 
titles - selling more than 5.9 million magazines a month that are read by more than 8.7million 
people (Media Landscape 2018). Therefore, the fact that News24, occupies a huge place in the 
news and media industry informed the choice of the researcher to select it as an object of study.  
 
Ownership of Naspers  
 
According Slabbert Naspers’ controlling structure is enormously multifaceted (2017: 1). To 
illustrate, Media24 is the principal acquiring firm and it is controlled by Naspers. Naspers is 
controlled by means of “high-voting A-shares held by Nasbel, Keeromstraat 30 Belleggings 
(Keeromstraat) and Wheatfields Investments (Wheatfields). Moreover, Nasbel and Keeromstraat 
hold 53%” of the rights to vote and do so in consultation with other shareholders based on a voting 
pool agreement (Slabbert 2017: 1). Bloomberg revealed that Wheatfields has 12.63% of the voting 
rights in Naspers and is not part of the control structure. Sanlam is a 50% shareholder in 
Wheatfields. Wheatfields holds minority stakes in Nasbel and Keeromstraat, but that does not 
afford it with control. Nasbel is 49% controlled by Heemstede, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Naspers (Bloomberg 2019: 1). The remaining shares in Nasbel, are extensively held by 2 611 
shareholders. Keeromstraat has 2 843 shareholders, none of them being controlling shareholders 
(Slabbert 2017: 1).  
The allocation of votes at Naspers shareholders meetings is as follows:  
87.1. N shares                                   48.31%  
87.2. Other A shareholders               1.35%  
87.3. Sub-total                                   49.66%. 
87.4. Keerom                                     31.3% 
87.5. Wheatfields                               19.04% 
87.6.  Total                                          100.00%  
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More so, Media24 has the largest combined circulation in South Africa (Rumney 2015: 45). Its 
combined daily circulation is over 500 000. To add, evidence from the Media24 reports indicate 
that the company commands a total readership of 7.7 million, while Media24's additional dailies 
have a circulation is over 800 000 (Media24 2018: 84). In addition, according to the Media24 
statistics, the company's weekly urban newspapers have a circulation of more than 1.4 million 
weekly (2018: 84). Its community newspaper division accounts for 1.3 million weekly (Rumney 
2015: 45). Apart from its dominance in the print space of South Africa, Media24 has been South 
Africa's leading online news media channel. Tomaselli stressed that Media24 plays a dominant 
role in providing the South African public with news and information (2017: 139). Its internet 
presence via 24.com was a setup of M-Web Studios and Media24 Digital merger in 2006. The 
24.com is widely known for its array of online services that it provides such as "careers, shopping, 
classifieds, property, health, free mail, instant messaging, blogs and photo albums"(Media24 2018: 
76). In 2017, News24 was named the best and most useful South Africa's news website. 
News24 has multiple sections that contain links to different information that users may be 
searching for. The main sections on the online site of News24 are South Africa, Travel, 
Technology, Green and Opinion. On its site, News24 also publishes Special Reports (SA Politics, 
Zimbabwe, AIDS Focus and so on). These sections on News24 platform gives the readers some 
in-depth coverage of the most events in the news. Moreover, their business news is accessed 
through Fin24.com and on the sport through Sports24.co.za. while Entertainment is reported on 
Channels24.co.za. 
  
News24 structures 
 
News24.com is South Africa's leading online news website. It is published in the English language. 
It was launched in 1998 after its creation by Naspers. Rumney stressed that News24 is South 
Africa's largest digital publisher (2015: 35). Its area of focus is international, local news, business, 
politics, technology, sports, and entertainment. 
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Background of Independent Online News and Media 
 
Independent Online South Africa is a news and information website that is based in South Africa. 
It is owned by Sekunjalo Investments from 2012 but it was previously owned by Independent 
News Media plc (INM) (Rumney 2015: 70). INM is a media organisation that is based in Ireland 
in the city of Dublin (Independent News & Media 2017: 3). The company was first established as 
Independent Newspapers Limited in 1904. It has a global presence in multiple countries where its 
operations include news media and entertainment. In Ireland, the company enjoys ownership of 
four national daily newspapers and three Sunday newspapers (Dooley 2018: 1). This also includes 
the highest circulation daily and Sunday papers in Ireland and 13 regional newspapers. 
The Independent News and Media group of companies were dominated by Sir Anthony (Tony) 
O'Reilly and his family between 1973 and 2012 (Independent News & Media 2017: 3). According 
to the Independent News and Media, O'Reilly enjoyed control of Independent News and Media 
after he first acquired one hundred percent of the "A" shares of the company for the Murphy and 
Chance families (2017: 3). According to Dooley, the company expanded overseas after it was 
floated on the Irish Stock Exchange and London Stock Exchange (Dooley 2018: 1). It was in 1999 
that the company was renamed to Independent News and Media plc. 
Independent News and Media (South Africa)   
 
According to Brand South Africa, “until 2013 the Independent News and Media was the second 
highest newspaper publisher in the whole country” (2013: 1). The company owns multiple daily 
and weekly companies. According to Rumney in South Africa only, the company owns a total of 
fourteen newspapers (2015: 96). The list of these newspapers includes “The Star and Pretoria 
News in Gauteng, the Daily Voice, Cape Times, Cape Argus and Weekend Argus in Cape 
Town, The Mercury, Post, Isolezwe, Daily News, Sunday Tribune and Independent on 
Saturday in Durban, the Diamond Fields Advertiser in Kimberley” (Independent News & Media 
plc 2018: 89). Moreover, the company also control the national Sunday Independent and a total of 
13 community newspapers in Cape Town. This huge presence in the news media and entertainment 
industry has placed the company on a strong financial footing resulting in it controlling the 
advertising and media industry as a monopoly. Records revealed by the Stats South Africa revealed 
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that group “accounts for 48% of the total advertising spend in newspapers, 22% of all newspapers 
sold in the country, and 63% of the English language market” (Roper, Newman, and Schulz 2019: 
10).   
In 2012 initial steps to sell the company's South African operation were announced. According to 
Rumney INM initially proposed to sell its South African operation for Euro 250 million. But the 
bids came in at around Euro 150 million (2015: 69). The company was then purchased by Iqbal 
Surve's Sekunjalo Investments consortium. According to the INM, Sekunjalo controls a 55% stake 
while the remaining stake is controlled by two government entities. The first entity is the 
investment arm of the South African government (Public Investment Corporation; 25%) while the 
second one is an investment arm of the Chinese government (China International Television 
Corporation and China African Development Fund; 20%) (Thamm 2015: 1). However, this 
arrangement has implications on the nature of this company. There has always been fears and 
reservations of the involvement of government in the media business in South Africa. Such that 
any case where there is government involvement in the ownership structure is followed by 
scepticism. This can be illustrated by the eminent journalist and media scholar Athon Harber’s (as 
cited by Thamm 2015) observation, “the ANC is working with their Chinese allies –ruling party 
to ruling party, in a way the Chinese government so often works – to increase their influence in 
our local media and counter what they view as a hostile media sector” (Thamm 2015: 1).  
The online site serves the online version of several South African newspapers, including "The 
Star, Pretoria News, The Daily Voice, Cape Times, Cape Argus Weekend Argus, The 
Mercury, Post, Diamond Fields Advertiser, Isolezwe, Daily Tribune, Sunday Tribune, The 
Independent on Saturday and Sunday Independent” (Independent News & Media 2018: 44). 
Therefore, it is IOL’s dominant presence in the South African media and news industry that made 
it a perfect choice as an institution for investigation in this present study  
Conclusion  
 
This chapter discussed the background and brief ownership set up of News24 and IOL. The chapter 
paid specific attention on understanding the background of the two press. Moreover, detail on the 
control structure of the press was also given considerable attention. The relationship between 
Media24, News24 and Naspers was unpacked. Also, the relationship between IOL and Independent 
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News and Media was also discussed.  The chapter also unpacked the complex nature of control 
that the Media24 and Independent News and Media has on different newspapers in South Africa.  
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Chapter 4:  Biography and leadership qualities of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter focuses on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. It discusses in detail the 
biographies of the two leaders. It draws on previous literature and themes that are commonly used 
to refer to the leadership and political qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. 
Profiling the background and lives of these leaders was essential in understanding how the two 
online press chose to frame their candidature for the 54th ANC national election campaign. 
Therefore, the chapter traces the history of these two leaders from birth to offer a detailed 
discussion of how this helped to guide how their legitimation and delegitimation of the two 
leadership qualities.  
 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma: a short biography 
 
Nkosazana Clarice Dhlamini-Zuma was born on 29 February 1949. She is sometimes referred to 
in political circles as NDZ. She completed her high school at the Amanzimtoti Training College 
in 1967. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma went on to acquire a bachelor’s degree in Zoology at the 
University of Zululand. After that, she pursued a degree in medical studies at the University of 
Natal. It was at this university that she got involved as an active underground member of South 
African Student Organisation wherein 1976 she was later elected as its deputy president. Due to 
the threat from the apartheid regime, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma went into exile in the same year. 
She completed her studies in 1978 at the University of Bristol in the United Kingdom. While she 
was in exile in Britain, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma did not disconnect her ties with ANC structures 
back in South Africa. Du Plessis argued that “in exile in the UK, she became chair of the ANC’s 
youth section and travelled throughout Britain and Europe gathering support for the ANC’s cause” 
(2017: 13). Her efforts, in this case, were driven by the agenda to influence the British government 
to break their contact with the South African government. Moreover, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
was also involved in the Black Consciousness movement in Britain.  
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Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma returned to Southern Africa in 1980. Upon her return, she worked as a 
Doctor at Mbabane hospital in Swaziland. Du Plessis stressed that “by default she became the 
doctor of choice for the ANC leaders and continued undercover activities” (2017: 17). It was in 
Mbabane that she married Jacob Zuma with whom she has four children. Du Plessis stressed that 
the marriage was a clandestine arrangement. After her return to South Africa in 1994, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma became the doctor of choice for Nelson Mandela. She was later appointed minister 
of health by Nelson Mandela. Du Plessis argued that “when the ANC came to power after the 1994 
democratic elections, he had no hesitation in appointing her to the health portfolio in his cabinet” 
(2017: 27). Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma served in the Ministry of Health from 1994 to 1999. After 
Thabo Mbeki assumed power in 1999, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was moved from the health 
portfolio to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Du Plessis “in June 1999, Thabo Mbeki 
shifted Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from the health portfolio to foreign affairs. For many, this was 
a curious move” (2017:24). This was so because Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had no background of 
foreign diplomacy. However, to some scholars, the transfer of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to 
foreign affairs was Thabo Mbeki’s way to prepare her for the presidency of the ANC in the years 
to come (Mathekga 2018 and Cilliers and Okeke 2012). After the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma also served alongside with Jacob Zuma. When Jacob Zuma became 
president, she served as the Minister of Home Affairs. In 2012, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was 
elected chair of the Africa Union. She served at the AU offices until 2017 when she returned to 
South Africa to launch her campaign for the ANC presidency (Mathekga 2018: 56).  
 
 A technocrat and reformist   
 
Several scholars describe Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a technocrat and an administrator (Bauer 
2012: Cilliers and Okeke 2012; Veins 2013). According to Bauer, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is a 
technocrat at heart (2012: 1). To illustrate that assertion, Bauer emphasised that Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma took over the Department of Home Affairs and ushered in wholesale changes the 
moment she assumed office (2012: 1). In addition, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was also credited 
for bringing stability to the Department of Home Affairs that had a reputation for having within it 
rampant corruption and unprecedented levels of incompetence (Du Plessis 2017: 36). Bauer argued 
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that “before she assumed office, the department was known for rampant corruption and 
incompetence it was a place where the government officials took bribes and slept on the job” 
(2012: 1). Cilliers and Okeke argued that “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma transformed the Department 
of Home Affairs by means of implementing effective internal control measures in finance and 
supply-chain management” (Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1). 
In relation to the assertion made by Cilliers and Okeke (2012: 1), Bauer opined that Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma encircled herself with fittingly capable persons and staffed frontline offices with 
extra staff to deliver more and better services (2012: 1). Friedman argues that Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma assisted in putting the Department of Home Affairs on a sound footing (2019: 1). This 
observation is like the argument that was made by Baure (2016: 1). These scholars argued that 
“among the most visible changes noticed in home affairs, the process of applying for official 
documents was streamlined to the extent where it now takes less than two weeks to apply for and 
receiving an identity document or passport” (Baure 2016: 1). Similarly, Freidman also stressed 
that under Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s watch, the Department of Home Affairs was known for its 
sterling performance in providing amenities to citizens (2019: 1). During her tenure at the 
Department of Home Affairs, in 2010 and 2011 the department received awards for service 
excellence and for being an employer of choice (Bauer 2012: 1). 
Cilliers and Okeke also described Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a reformist. These scholars argued 
that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is one of the few ANC cadres who moved successfully from the 
era of Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma (2012: 1). She managed to connect the two administrations 
irrespective of the animosity that existed within the ANC between the Thabo Mbeki and Jacob 
Zuma administrations. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s history as a health and foreign affairs minister 
suggests a capable person who has a lot to offer. Further, it also means that she has much to offer 
in bringing both “competent management and far-sighted political leadership to the commission” 
(Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1). 
Du Plessis argues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a reformist in that she transformed the 
administration side of the African Union (AU) (2017: 34). To this may be added that “Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma’s experience and her wisdom are underestimated” (Mathekga 2018: 69). To 
illustrate this argument, Du Plessis states that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a technocrat whose 
vast experience was able to bring “a degree of professionalism to the AU's lumbering bureaucracy” 
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(2016: 55). During the tenure of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in Addis Ababa, the most fundamental 
administrative issues were addressed. What this means is that “at least the basics: e-mails were 
answered, the website was updated, press releases were issued timeously” (Du Plessis 2017: 65). 
Moreover, in line with the above assertion, Allison also observed that during her tenure at the 
African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma “brought a level of respect for process and respect for 
professionalism” (2017: 1). To explain this assertion further, Allison comments that the 
professionalism and commitment of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma ushered in a new era in the African 
Union bringing with it dignity and recognition to the institution as staff and the commission were 
urged to handle issues professionally saying (Allison 2017: 1).  
According to Du Plessis, “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma achieved some memorable success but 
sullied her reputation with some embarrassing decisions and some inexplicable measures regarding 
the treatment of HIV/AIDS” (2017: 63). Her main role revolved around the drafting and 
implementing the ANC National Health Policy. The policy encompassed amalgamating the 
nation’s disjointed health services and but also ensuring that primary health care was the focus (Du 
Plessis 2017: 28). In addition, Du Plessis stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was influential 
in rolling out free health care for the pregnant women and children for the very first time in the 
history of South Africa (2017: 30). Another great contribution to the health sector was the 
introduction of an exchange programme with the Cuban government. In this programme, some 
Cuban doctors were sent to South Africa while a cohort of South African medical students studied 
medicine in Cuba. This move had a positive effect on the quality of health in South Africa (Du 
Plessis 2017: 31).  
 
An unpopular leader  
 
Despite her success at home and abroad, various authors describe Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as an 
unpopular leader in South Africa and elsewhere (Allison 2017, Cilliers and Okeke 2012 and Louw-
Vaudran). According to Louw-Vaudran, Dlamini-Zuma was not the person to rebuild the African 
Union (2017: 1). To substantiate this argument Louw-Vaudran said, “She wasn't popular, she 
wasn't liked” (2017: 1). To add, Cilliers and Okeke said that Dlamini-Zuma was unpopular with 
her colleagues at the AU (2012). Generally, Louw-Vaudran said, “the staff, the ambassadors, the 
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outside partners, all felt that she was very closed and uncommunicative” (2017: 1). The above 
observation can be validated by a similar observation that was made by Allison (2017: 1). Allison 
said, “it could take up to a month for African ambassadors to the AU to receive a meeting with 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, whereas her predecessor Jean Ping was much more easily accessible” 
(2017: 1). All this pointed to a leader who had her enemies. 
Moreover, Allison stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma never looked like she wanted the 
African Union position (2017: 1). It can be argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma did little to boost 
her reputation and popularity during her tenure in Addis Ababa. Also, it can be argued that 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma found it difficult to make a wide cross section of friends both at home 
and outside the country. To substantiate this argument, Allison said: “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
made few friends at Addis Ababa, in the process earning a reputation for being aloof and 
unapproachable while surrounding herself with imported South African staffers” (2017: 1). She 
was not a bad leader, but she did not deliver on the claims made by the South African delegates 
when they were campaigning for her to assume the leadership of the African Union. Jobson (2017) 
cited in Allison said, “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was expected to come in to reform the 
commission, she had that good reputation from her time in government in South Africa, but she 
hasn't used the position as we might have expected” (Allison 2017: 1). Further, Allison stressed 
that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's failure to transform the AU has made her unpopular in South 
Africa and beyond (2017: 1).  
Like the above assertions, some scholars contend that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was never a good 
candidate for the position of Commissioner at the African Union (Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1). 
Cilliers and Okeke argued that “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a candidate of choice for the 
African leaders at the AU summit” (2012: 1). To illustrate that argument, these authors recalls that 
her victory did not come because of her popularity with the member states. Instead, she won the 
position after South Africa and SADC strongly lobbied other member states (Cilliers and Okeke 
2012: 1). This lobbying for votes in favour of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma saw South African 
officials travelling to various countries across the African continent (Cilliers and Okeke 2012: 1). 
It has also been speculated that the South African government used its economic prowess to gunner 
support from other African states that were not in favour of the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-
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Zuma, especially the Francophone Central and West African states (Allison 2017 and Cilliers and 
Okeke 2012).  
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was also described as the most absent AU commissioner of all times 
(Du Plessis 2017, Allison 2017 and Cilliers and Okeke 2012). It was claimed that Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma was more closely involved in South African politics and the dynamics unfolding 
at home than in her job in Addis Ababa. Allison said, “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was the most 
absent chairperson from Addis since the AU was created” (2017: 1). This assertion is like the 
observation that was made by Désiré Assogbavi, cited by Lebhour. She argued that “Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma was spending a lot of her time in South Africa, even when the continent is burning” 
(Lebhour 2017: 1). To illustrate this point, Allison revealed that “one of the major criticisms that 
you hear in Addis from all quarters is that she had one foot in South Africa. Even from day one, it 
was clear that she was probably only going to be doing one term” (2017: 1). Lebhour argued that 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's agenda was to raise her profile by becoming the AU chairperson but 
that this did not yield the anticipated results (2017: 1). 
 
A ‘compromised’ leader  
 
Du Plessis’ claims that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s political career has been plagued by problems 
(Du Plessis 2017: 33). Months after assuming power as the health minister she was involved in the 
disputes around a new South Africa health policy. Butler argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's 
tenure in the ministry of health was plagued by a financial mismanagement scandal concerning the 
government-sponsored AIDS play Sarafina II (Bulter 2005: 110). It was also marred by 
increasingly strained relations with the non-governmental sector and health professionals. Her 
support of the drug Virodene set her against the Medicines' Control Council (MCC) and the 
Medical Research Council (MRC). Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s support of the AIDS plan was 
criticised as insufficiently informed by the institutional and social realities that characterised South 
Africa during that period. Du Plessis asserts that just like most policies that were administered 
during that period, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma AIDS policy “over-estimated the economic and 
human resource that was at government disposal that would allow them to institute such a 
humongous policy” (Du Plessis 2017: 45). 
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Evidence from various authors suggests that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s political career was 
marred by a lot of leadership and political controversies (Butler 2005; Du Plessis 2017; Mathekga 
2018; Allison 2017; Cilliers and Okeke 2012). For instance, Du Plessis argues that “political 
controversies have dogged Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s career, starting with Sarafina II in 1996 
while she was minister of health” (2017:30). The Sarafina scandal had a hugely detrimental effect 
on her political career because it was regarded as one of the first ANC big corruption scandal. Du 
Plessis stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not far from trouble in her political career 
(2017:29). This scholar said that the moment Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma came back from the AU 
she was involved in a scandal that involved the Presidential Protect Services (PPS). The PPS is 
mandated to protect the president, former presidency and their spouses. The problem was the PSS 
was not supposed to be given to anyone who is not in the presidium. What makes matters worse is 
that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma never bothered to explain to the public why all this was happening 
(Du Plessis 2017: 40).  
For Du Plessis (2017: 34) and Cilliers and Okeke (2012: 1), Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s 
appointment to Foreign Affairs shocked many because she was said to lack diplomatic skills. Du 
Plessis argues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma “was hardly known for her amenable personality or 
her diplomatic skills, and there were others in the department of foreign affairs better able and 
probably more capable of handling policy issues” (2017: 37). Moreover, Tony Leon, the politician 
turned diplomat, cited in Du Plessis, remarked that the appointments of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
into the foreign affairs ministry was tantamount to “sending the bull into the china shop” (Du 
Plessis 2017: 38). This criticism of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was later picked up by the press that 
nicknamed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as “Dogzuma”. This name was a name of the monster 
Godzilla that destroyed everything in its sphere of influence. Mathekga stressed that Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma’s early days in the department were characterised by her “brusque and abrasive 
management style” (2018: 67). Her assumption of power at the Foreign Affairs gave her the 
impression that she was the most powerful women in the country and arguably the entire continent. 
The media likened her to Madeleine Albright, the secretary of state in the United States. Albright 
Madeleine was known as a bad character, who was stubborn, arrogant and known for her blunt 
decisiveness.  
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Based on all these stories, authors have argued that there were slim chances of Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma winning the ANC election against her rival like Cyril Ramaphosa (Adebajo 2014; Butler 
2015; Davis 2015). For instance, Adebajo argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a suitable 
candidate for the office of the president based on previous experiences in government and in the 
party (2014: 1). This author contended that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not able, for whatever 
reason, to operationalise several of the institutional reforms she promised. Moreover, Davis states 
that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a good leader in that she was liable for the failure of the 
most administrative processes as she would micromanage the organisation (2015:1). This resulted 
in a slow process of decision making and the alienation of other voices of reason within the 
organization. According to Davis, one of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's failures was evident in her 
failure to reform the AU (2015:1). This scholar argued that “two years after she pledged to reform 
the AU, more than 95% of its peace and security budget and half of its annual $278m budget are 
still funded by external donors” (2015:1).  
Furthermore, Adebajo asserts that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership on the continent of 
Africa has not been satisfactory (2014:1). As a leader of the African body, Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma failed to lead the AU in the desired direction. This scholar said, “the commission's 
bureaucracy remains labyrinthine, dependency on Western donors continues and relations with the 
United Nations have worsened” (Adebajo 2014:1). In relation to the above assertion Butler argues 
that “in reality Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma would be a pitiful choice for president because she was 
at best a controversial minister under Nelson Mandela, allowing the Department of Foreign Affairs 
to be marginalised by Thabo Mbeki and claiming credit for Department of Home Affairs reforms 
undertaken long before her arrival” (2015:1). 
In line with Butler’s argument that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a controversial leader, Davis 
poses that if Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's work experiences are interrogated, it can be postulated 
that the idea that she did a sterling job as a minister does not hold up to criticism (2015:1). To add, 
Davis argues that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a capable minister in her tenure as Minister 
of Health. To illustrate her argument, Davis said: “in the first few years of the new government 
(1994), the health minister neglect to consult with civil society” (2015:1). This was clear on the 
issues of HIV and the Sarafina II scandal of 1996. Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa argued that the 
Sarafina II Scandal had a negative impact on the reputation of the government of South Africa 
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(2016: 4). This blame was squarely laid on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and her department director-
general, Olive Shasana. Similarly, Du Plessis argued that “matters went from difficult to disastrous 
in 1996 when Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma allocated 14 million to an AIDS awareness play, Sarafina 
II.” (2017: 45). Most of the bids that were presented were way below R 600 000. But she chose to 
award the contract to her friend Mbongeni Ngema after ignoring tender procedures. For Du Plessis, 
“although Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma did not face any legal consequences, her reputation was 
muddied” (Du Plessis 2017: 32). Du Plessis argues that: 
on the streets she became a figure of parody: the taxi drivers laugh about Sarafina 4 and 
Sarafina 5; the cartoonist fashion her unlike frame as a Broadway chorus girl chucking 
dollars about the stage of her profligacy; even her fellow parliamentarians joke about 
Sarafina 2 on public platforms (Du Plessis 2017: 32) 
To add, Du Plessis stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma became unpopular with the media and 
the private sector when she was the minister of health under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (2017: 
30). This was after she had a conflict with the private global pharmaceutical companies who were 
reportedly manipulating prices of drugs. In her response to this situation, Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma reacted by blocking the accessing of government medicine through third parties. This was 
in line with the ANC policy that sought to provide cheap medicine to the black poor population of 
South Africa (2018: 30). According to Du Plessis, “Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma became 
increasingly unpopular with big groups that were subsequently alarmed by rumours that she might 
succeed Mbeki in 2007.” This complex matter shows how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not a 
favourite of the private sector which would play a critical role in her defeat in her bid to become 
the ANC president in 2017. 
Moreover, Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa argued that the Sarafina II scandal validates the long-held 
criticism that Dlamini-Zuma's leadership was replete with leadership failures (2016: 5). For these 
scholars, the long-held notion that Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma's dislike in the public mind was based 
on gender bias cannot be sustained given the grave mistakes that she has made in all her previous 
leadership positions. However, these scholars did not completely dismiss the presence of gender 
bias when it came to leadership dynamics in South Africa. For example, Ndikhokele and 
Mtshiselwa stressed that: 
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 it makes sense, therefore, to argue that on the one hand, the idea of basing the rejection 
of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership on patriarchy is conclusive, while on the other 
hand the view that the above-mentioned failures and more importantly the Sarafina II 
scandal occasion a concern about her leadership is attractive (Ndikhokele and 
Mtshiselwa 2016: 4) 
What this meant was that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s ostensible incompetence, as well as the 
related scandals, meant that in influential quarters she was considered as incapable to lead. 
Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa endorse this view and argue how such scandals demonstrated her 
inability, “to lead the masses, [she] has the capacity to lead them to destruction” (2016: 4). 
According to Du Plessis, this scandal was very detrimental to the reputation of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and the ANC because it was the first sign of corruption that ‘was in the DNA’ of 
the ANC leadership (2017: 32). Du Plessis argues that “in more recent times, the scandal has been 
reframed as the defining corruption scandal, in that it was the first sign of corruption post 1994” 
(2018: 32). Put differently, this debacle set in motion a myriad of corruption activities that were to 
unfold in the ANC.  
Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa observed that in South Africa the concept of patronage is viewed in a 
negative light (2016: 4). These scholars stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was caught up in 
a web of politics that has a long history of patronage. For Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma belonged to the KwaZulu-Natal ‘syndicate’ that was associated with patronage 
(2016: 6). According to Calland (2013) cited in Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa, the fact that people 
who come from KwaZulu-Natal dominate in South Africa politics does not sit well with a lot of 
people (2016: 5). The reservations many had concerning the people linked to KwaZulu-Natal also 
brought to the fore the rise of “ethnic patronage” in South Africa. Thus, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
was viewed as one of the allies and players in the ethnic dominance of the KwaZulu-Natal people. 
In relation to the above point, Habib and Taylor state that the sceptics about a possible election of 
yet another Zulu person regardless of gender made sense to many (2001: 208). To illustrate, Habib 
and Taylor argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma originates from KwaZulu-Natal and that her 
possible election as South Africa’s president would subsequently gratify the ‘rising Zulu 
chauvinists’ and exhibited a concern around her candidacy among other Zulus (2001: 208). Thus, 
for these scholars, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma could be rejected for the position of president of 
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South Africa based on the notion of ethnic patronage, and more significantly on the rise of the 
KwaZulu-Natal ‘syndicate’ rather than on gender issues (Habib and Taylor 2001: 207). 
 
Cyril Ramaphosa: a short biography 
 
Cyril Ramaphosa had two siblings and he was a son of a policeman. He grew up in the South 
Western Native Township of Soweto where he attended school at Sekano-Ntoane High School 
(Butler 2017: 22). Cyril Ramaphosa did his matric at Mphaphuli High School in Sibasa, Limpopo 
in 1971. He completed his university studies at University of the North (Turfloop) where he gained 
a legal B.Proc. qualification. During his days at university, Cyril Ramaphosa became involved in 
campus politics and joined the South African Student Organization (SASO) (Hartley 2018: 23). 
According to Hartley, Cyril Ramaphosa rose through the ranks where he later served as the branch 
chairperson of that organisation at his university in 1972 (2018: 34). At the same institution, Cyril 
Ramaphosa was also involved as the chairman of the Student Christian Movement. Furthermore, 
in his days of activism as a student leader, he was detained for 11 months under a section of the 
Terrorism Act (Butler 2007: 31). This was after a pro-Frelimo rally that the students staged at the 
university. This detention was a first in the series of those that were to come, which culminated in 
the Soweto uprising (Butler 2007: 32). In June 1976, after the Soweto unrest, Cyril Ramaphosa 
was also detained again, this time for six months at John Vorster Square under the Terrorism Act 
(Moodie 2008: 45). Soon after his release, he continued to write legal articles and in 1981 he 
completed his university degree through correspondence with the University of South Africa 
(Mathekga 2018: 34). It was in that year (1981) that Ramaphosa joined the Council of Unions of 
South Africa (Cusa) where he served as its legal advisor (Du Plessis 2017: 21).  
 
The champion of strong institutions 
 
Evidence from various literature sources shows that Cyril Ramaphosa is normally portrayed as an 
individual who believes in building new, strong and working institutions in South Africa (Hartley 
2018; Mathekga 2018; Butler 2017 and Butler 2008). According to Butler, Cyril Ramaphosa’s 
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involvement in politics did not end at university (2017: 23). Instead, his wish to emancipate black 
people was seen in his desire to build institutions that pushed for what he believed was right (Butler 
2007: 67). Forbes stressed that “Ramaphosa first came to prominence in the 1980s as founder and 
promoter of the National Union of Mineworkers, created to improve the rights of black African 
workers” (2015: 1). In 1981, after he left university, Cyril Ramaphosa was actively involved in the 
formation of trade National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and in December of the same year he 
was elected the first secretary of that organisation. Moreover, in 1985, Cyril was very instrumental 
in the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Hartley 2018 and 
Mathekga 2018). In Durban, on the day of its formation, Cyril Ramaphosa delivered a keynote 
speech on the launch of the COSATU. 
Like the observations that were made by Butler (2017; 2007); Hartley (2018) and Lodge (2009). 
Lodge stressed that Cyril Ramaphosa was a champion of creating institutions in South Africa 
(2009: 154). He said Cyril Ramaphosa was commonly credited as having been the guiding genius 
behind the effort within the CUSA. He found the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), to take 
advantage of recent industrial relations legislation and of a more enlightened attitude within the 
upper echelons of the main mining employer, Anglo-America. In addition to that, Lodge argues 
that Cyril Ramaphosa was normally credited as the “guiding genius behind the effort within the 
CUSA fold of the National Union of Mineworkers” (2009: 156). To illustrate this point, Lodge 
argued that “Cyril took advantage of the recent industrial relations legislation and of a more 
enlightened attitude within the upper echelons of mining employer, Anglo American” (2009: 56).  
Mathekga argues that under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa in the NUM, the organisation 
developed into a very strong and influential union that controlled labour issues in the mining sector 
(2018: 45). This scholar notes that “NUM under Cyril Ramaphosa became an indomitable force 
on the labour front. In the fight against apartheid economic disruptions, in the form of labour 
strikes, inflicted serious harm on the system” (2018: 36). Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa also played 
a crucial role in the formation of COSATU and became its first secretary-general. According to 
Mathekga “COSATU was not an ordinary union focused only on the narrow shop floor interests 
of workers; it built solidarity with other social movements” (2018: 43). To add, the growth and 
strength of COSATU was accredited to Cyril Ramaphosa leadership. Mathekga notes that there 
was an exponential growth of the COSATU under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa (2018: 37). 
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This scholar argued that “COSATU’s strength was its mass appeal: under Ramaphosa leadership, 
union membership grew from 6000 in 1982 to 300 000 in 1992, giving it control of nearly half of 
the total black workforce in the mining industry in South Africa” (Mathekga 2018: 37). 
 
A coordinator and mobiliser  
 
Evidence from various sources portrays Cyril Ramaphosa as a coordinator and a mobiliser (Butler 
2017; Butler 2007; Du Plessis 2017; Mathekga 2018). For instance, Butler argues that Cyril 
Ramaphosa’s ability to mobilise and lead was evident in the MDM7 (2017: 57). Similarly, 
Mathekga notes that although the MDM was poorly organised and lacked clearly defined the 
hierarchy of power from leadership to members, it had great ability to inspire the general 
population and the masses to embark on political action (2018: 39). The ability of the MDM to 
effectively undermine the apartheid government was attributed to its leadership under Cyril 
Ramaphosa. The UDF and MDM are important in understanding Cyril Ramaphosa type of 
leadership. Mathekga notes that Cyril Ramaphosa participation in the UDF and MDM exhibited 
his role and ability as coordinator. According to Makhoba cited in Mathekga, Cyril Ramaphosa 
must be described as a coordinator; a consensus-driven coordinator, in particular (2018: 42). This 
is so because of his contribution in the National Planning Commission where he was a deputy 
chairperson and National Development Plan (NDP). The NDP has been hailed as one of South 
Africa’s best long-term plan that has attracted harmony from different political parties. Mathekga 
notes that “the process of drafting and adopting the NDP was one of the few political processes 
that involved multi-stakeholder approaches as evident from wide buy-in from key interest” (2018: 
40). The success of the process of bringing different stakeholders with different interest together 
was given to the grand experience of Cyril Ramaphosa as coordinator.  
 
 
                                                 
7 When COSATU and United Democratic Front came under pressure from government restrictions, the two 
organizations came together to form the Mass Democratic Movement  
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The pragmatic negotiator  
 
One common phrase that has been used to describe Cyril Ramaphosa is that he is a pragmatic 
negotiator (Butler 2017; Butler 2007; Mathekga 2018). Butler describes him as a "consummate 
fixer for troubles and crisis" (2017: 89). In this case, Butler's portrayal of Cyril Ramaphosa can be 
vindicated by the person and activities of Cyril Ramaphosa active involvement in different crises 
where he played the role of a negotiator. Similarly, Moodie also describes Cyril Ramaphosa as an 
"a brilliant negotiator because he is able to see things from the vantage point of his antagonists and 
he respects them. If they cheat on him, however, he scathes them” (2008: 78). According to 
Mathekga, Cyril Ramaphosa was involved in the early negotiation of the release of Nelson 
Mandela and other ANC political prisoners in Lusaka, Zambia. He assumed the position of 
chairman in the National Reception Committee (2018: 32). He grew to fame after he coordinated 
the release of Nelson Mandela and other political leaders in South Africa. He was also a member 
of the International Mandela Reception Committee. Moreover, like the observations made by 
Butler (2007: 41), Hartley revealed that Cyril Ramaphosa was an indispensable player in the 
negotiation process (2018: 43). This scholar said that “Cyril Ramaphosa with the help of Roelf 
Meyer resuscitated the stalled negotiations resulting in the establishment of the Multi-Party 
Negotiating Forum” (2018: 43). Similarly, Butler argued that it was because of the influence of 
Cyril Ramaphosa and other players in the negations that the Record of Understating (26 September 
1992) was made possible (2017: 89). Moreover, Lodge stressed that Cyril Ramaphosa’s 
professionalism and integrity in handling the negotiations explains why there was progress and 
why the negotiations resumed in 1992 (2009: 45). 
Additionally, Mathekga argued that Cyril Ramaphosa’s negotiating skills as a pragmatic negotiator 
were also evident in his role in the peace negotiations on the international scene (2018: 65). Firstly, 
he was appointed by the Southern African Development Committee (SADC) to facilitate peace in 
Lesotho (Butler 2017; Hartley 2018; Mathekga 2018). In this case, he was credited for developing 
a sustainable road map that was very important in returning normalcy, national security and 
stability in the mountain kingdom (Butler 2017: 78). In a report to the SADC Security and Peace 
Council, the Department of International Relation and Cooperation (DIRCO) of South Africa 
described the character of Cyril Ramaphosa in the negotiation process as sterling (2014: 1). The 
report stresses that the presence of the SADC peace facilitator-led by Deputy President Cyril 
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Ramaphosa ensured that peace was restored in Maseru. It reads that "the presence of the SADC 
Observer Mission in Lesotho (SOMILES) and its effort to resolve both security and political 
stability to enable credible, free and fair elections yielded tangible and positive results"(DIRCO 
2014: 1). The successes in the negotiation resonate with the observations made by Gideon du 
Plessis cited in Biz News, he said: "Cyril shines which comes from his supreme negotiating skills, 
pragmatic decision making and invaluable knowledge of union machinations and their profound 
political influence" (2017: 1). Cyril's roles as a negotiator were also seen in the role he played as 
a Special Envoy to South Sudan. Hartley described Cyril Ramaphosa's role in the negotiations 
process as exemplary (2018: 58). Hartley opined the South Sudan conflict was an opportunity of 
Cyril Ramaphosa to do what he knew best: to negotiate a peace and lasting solution (2018: 57). 
According to South Africa’s Department of International Relation and Cooperation as a special 
envoy to South Sudan, "Cyril Ramaphosa mediated in the conflict that later resulted in the signing 
of the ceasefire agreement in January, May, and June 2014" (2014: 1). Steven Friedman cited in 
the Keller (2013: 1) stressed that "Cyril Ramaphosa does not have a reputation for being gung-
ho". To illustrate his assertion, Friedman argues that Ramaphosa is not the type of a muscleman 
politician who goes in and starts fixing and cleaning up things, instead he is a more of a "conciliator 
and bridge mender" (Keller 2013: 1). 
 
A visionary leader and a statesman 
  
Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa is commonly regarded as a “visionary pragmatist” (Butler 2007 and 
Moodie 2008). Moodie stressed that Cyril Ramaphosa has a unique leadership style and character 
that can be drawn from his early religious years (2008: 54). Moreover, Moodie argued that “for all 
the chimerical quality of Cyril Ramaphosa presentation of self, I think his life shows a powerful 
sense of calling” (2008: 45). To support this assertion Moodie argued that the character of Cyril 
Ramaphosa is manifested in the genuine foundations of his character that is his ability to work 
hard, his attention to detail, his self-control and his occasional bursts of anger when his deepest 
commitments are slighted (2008: 67). Butler argued that “through evangelism and preaching, he 
learnt the humility to engage the emotions and intellect of poorer and uneducated people” (2007: 
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383). More so, Butler argued that “even as a young child Cyril Ramaphosa’s self-possession and 
charisma impressed his peers and his elders” (2017: 382).  
However, Moodie disputed the deepest respect to Christianity that Cyril Ramaphosa is highly 
associated with (2008: 67). Moodie argued that the evangelical Christianity that Cyril Ramaphosa 
is highly celebrated for ‘has long left his repertoire’ (2008: 56). To that end, what might have 
remained in Cyril Ramaphosa is the deep commitment to the respect of human dignity, especially 
the dignity of black South Africans. In line with the above assertion, Butler observed that “Cyril 
Ramaphosa recognises others with integrity as well, and they respond to his recognition of them” 
(2017: 78). In this case, the picture that Butler creates is that of a leader who has a vision but also 
open to the suggestions of others (2017: 78).  
Furthermore, Mathekga stresses that Cyril Ramaphosa “has had an enormously impressive and 
varied experience of public leadership” (2018: 35). Butler argued that “Cyril Ramaphosa was a 
natural leader who enjoyed an easy mastery of others” (2007: 282) This scholar said Cyril 
Ramaphosa has seen it all. Because of all the experiences that Cyril Ramaphosa has gained over 
the years; Mathekga believed that “Cyril Ramaphosa may be the most well-equipped and capable 
leader to run the ANC and the country in the post-apartheid era” (2018: 35). Moreover, Moodie 
likened Cyril Ramaphosa’s style of leadership to the Foucauldian leadership called "pastoral 
power" (2008: 67). What this meant according to Foucault is that this type of leadership comes 
with a calling. The calling sent to one who is expected to lead people in the wilderness. According 
to Foucault as a shepherd, the Christian pastor is expected to be well versed and informed as to the 
material needs of each member of the flock and provide for them when necessary (1980: 120). 
Furthermore, the leader must know what is going on, and what each of his members does. Lastly, 
the pastoral leader must know what goes on in the soul of each other. To that end, Moodie stressed 
that that kind of leadership is stressing and suffocating, and this is what we see in Cyril Ramaphosa 
when they describe him as both "arrogant and humble" (2008: 67). This is related to the 
observation that was made by Butler when he argued that Cyril Ramaphosa tries to lead by serving 
the needs of his constituency. Pastoral power for Cyril Ramaphosa involves institution-building- 
hence his insistent constitution-writing (Butler 2017: 45). As a leader, he wants to structure lives 
so that they retain dignity and autonomy. Mathekga stressed that while this approach to leadership 
by Cyril Ramaphosa may seem patronizing and controlling, he remains humble in the sense that 
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he is a servant of the people who perceive himself as the one who is serving a calling that 
transcends his own (2018: 88). 
Butler argued that Cyril Ramaphosa spent most part of his life fighting for the emancipation of the 
black people (2011: 90). Because of that, he ceases to be a businessman. Butler argued that “Cyril 
Ramaphosa spent close to a decade embroiled in debates over black economic empowerment 
(BEE), the controversial attempt to increase ownership, management and control of South African 
business by black citizens” (2007: 351). This author also argued that “if you went through Cyril 
Ramaphosa’s diary, treating him as a real businessman, you could cancel 70% of his meetings” 
(2007: 351). Simply put, Butler reasons that much of Cyril Ramaphosa’s “philosophical activity 
has never been at the intersection between business and politics, where he has been able to apply 
his experience to the resolution of intractable policy problems” (2007: 351).  
Most scholars describe Cyril Ramaphosa as an astute businessman (Butler 2007; Hartley 2018; 
Lodge 2008; Marcus 2007). Cyril Ramaphosa is notably known for his vast investments in 
different businesses (Marcus 2007: 66). He is the executive chairman of Millennium Consolidated 
Investment (MCI). He was the chairman of the Black Economic Empowerment Commission 
(Butler 2007: 44). Cyril Ramaphosa was also a director in several companies, namely, South 
African Breweries, First Rand Limited, Macsteel Holdings, Alexander Forbes and Medscheme 
Limited. It is noteworthy to mention that Cyril Ramaphosa stepped back from his positions in his 
businesses after he was elected South Africa's deputy president in May 2014 by Jacob Zuma 
(Mathekga 2018: 1). According to Forbes "Cyril Ramaphosa stepped down as chairman of 
investment firm Shanduka Group in May 2015 and a year later completed the process of selling 
his 30% stake in Shanduka” (Forbes 2015: 1). The diagram below illustrates a list of Cyril 
Ramaphosa’s shares and other financial interest.  
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Table 4.1: List of Cyril Ramaphosa’s shares and other financial interests 
 
Number of shares Nature  Name of company 
50 Sports cars  Puma Sport Cars 
100 Game farming  Ntaba Nyoni Estate 
7500 Paper packaging  Mondli LTD 
100 Cattle farming  Ntaba Nyoni Freedlot 
Source: T Muringa.  
 
Like the firm belief by most scholars that Cyril Ramaphosa is an astute businessman. Robert 
Lenzner cited in BBC Africa describes Cyril Ramaphosa as the “highest capitalist” in the land of 
South Africa (2019: 1). He argues Cyril Ramaphosa moved from being a leader of the trade unions 
that fight for the needs of the workers to be an employer of the workers. Robert Lenzner said, 
"from being a militant trade unionist and a general secretary of the biggest trade union organization 
in the world has surprisingly become a capitalist" (BBC Africa 2019: 1). What this means 
according to Robert Lanzer is that Cyril Ramaphosa should be understood as a "capitalist, the most 
prominent black member of the business establishment and a board member of the conglomerate 
he once stuck" (BBC Africa 2019: 1). Simply put, Cyril Ramaphosa has become a role player and 
owner in the system in which he has been fighting for his entire carrier. Moreover, Lenzer contends 
that Cyril Ramaphosa is a media baron (Robert Lanzer cited BBC Africa 2019: 1). To illustrate 
this, Robert Lanzer indicated that Cyril Ramaphosa under a company called New African 
Investment Ltd. owns The Sowetan which was once the country's largest daily paper. Cyril 
Ramaphosa also had shares in Times Media Ltd as its chair and Pearson Plc. (which owns the 
Financial Times of London and half of the Economist magazine) jointly own the Financial Mail 
business magazine and Business Day, the country’s biggest business daily (Hartley 2018: 56). 
Some of Cyril Ramaphosa’s businesses where he was either a partner or director are illustrated in 
the diagram below.  
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Table 4.2: Cyril Ramaphosa directorship and partnerships 
 
Directorship/Patnership Nature of business 
Ramburg Investiment Meet abattoir 
Rumburg beef Meet abattoir 
Main Street Tshivhase Trust 
Musanda Investiment Shelf company (dormant) 
Tshivhase Share Dealing Purchase, hold, sell JSE shares 
Rumburg Properties Meat abattoir 
Puma Sports cars Car Manufactures 
Ntaba Nyoni Freedlot Cattle farming 
Ntabe Nyoni Estate Game farming 
Adopt-a-school Foundation Schools (NPO) 
Peaceway Trading Property company 
Mulambo Investment Shelf company 
Source: T. Muringa  
 
In relation to the observation made by Robert Lenzer cited BBC Africa (2019: 1), de Villiers 
argued that Cyril Ramaphosa presidency was not going to improve the conditions of poor South 
Africans (2017: 1). de Villers argues that Cyril Ramaphosa is a "deeply compromised capitalist 
billionaire with hands stained with the blood of the 34 victims of Marikana" (2017: 1). Moreover, 
Cyril Ramaphosa has been involved in a lot of scandals that compromises his character. As Robert 
Lenders cited in BBC Africa (2019: 1) notes, Cyril Ramaphosa's involvement in the Lonmin Mine 
as a non-director caused a lot of controversy to his political rise. Cyril Ramaphosa was a non-
executive board member in the same company when he rose to fame in the year 2012. Robert 
Lenzers cited in BBC Africa (2019: 1) argued that Cyril Ramaphosa’s involvement in the mining 
industry will place him in an awkward situation. de Villers argued that "Gold Fields employs about 
90 000 miners, most of them black, many of whom work long hours as little as $200 a month. 
These are the people he once represented" (2017:1). In the same vein, Zamikhaya Maseti cited in 
Naki (2016:1) echoes that Cyril Ramaphosa was a capitalist and his ascension to power was a clear 
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contradiction of the interest of the people he claimed to represent. Maseti said "Cyril Ramaphosa 
is the people's ideological and class enemy as a capitalist. If the people support him, what are their 
understanding of the class contradictions and the dynamics that Marxist-Leninist theory talks 
about?" (Naki 2016:1). 
The involvement of Cyril Ramaphosa in scandals surfaced at the Marikana Commission where it 
emerged that the management of the company had pleaded with Lonmin shareholder and ANC 
heavyweight, Cyril Ramaphosa, to coordinate "concomitant action" against "criminal" protesters 
and is seen by many as therefore being responsible for the massacre. Smith argued that Cyril 
Ramaphosa a board member of the company was accused of encouraging violent police action 
(2015: 1). These revelations placed Cyril Ramaphosa on the chopping block and made him equally 
liable for the massacre just like any other shareholder of the company. A lot of developments, 
however, took place that may have influenced the fall of Cyril Ramaphosa. In the same year 
(2012), Cyril Ramaphosa was elected deputy president of South Africa. In the following year on 
3 February 2013, he resigned from his position at Lonmin. To his advantage, the Marikana 
commission of Inquiry cleared Cyril Ramaphosa of any responsibility. The report read, "The 
commission has found that it cannot be said Mr. Ramaphosa was the cause of the massacre, and 
the accusations against him are groundless." (Farlam 2017: 108). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the biographies of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. The 
history of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was traced and presented. Additionally, the chapter also 
discussed the various leadership attributes of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The review of literature 
on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma showed that there is a general negative perception about the 
leadership from the scholars. The chapter also unpacked the history of Cyril Ramaphosa. Various 
literature that focused on his background and leadership were reviewed. Overall, it emerged that 
Cyril Ramaphosa is a favourite of most scholars. This is because of the various leadership attributes 
that are attributed to him. The chapter highlighted the significance of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
and Cyril Ramaphosa background to this study. The next chapter reviews relevant literature on 
media and legitimation strategies, media framing of political leaders and content. 
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Chapter 5:  Review of relevant literature 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter reviews the literature that is relevant to the study. Literature review is always a crucial 
chapter that helps to place the study in focus. The chapter reviews four different sets of literature: 
➢ Firstly, the chapter reviews the literature on media and legitimation strategies.  
➢ Secondly, it reviews the literature on the media framing of political leaders.  
➢ Thirdly, it also reviews the literature on the framing and presentation of female political 
leaders.  
➢ Finally, the chapter turns its focus on reviewing literature that focuses on the various factors 
that influence media frames and news content. 
 There is a dearth of literature that focuses on the framing of the political leadership and leadership 
qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
 
Media legitimation and de-legitimation strategies 
 
Most studies in the field of legitimation and de-legitimation have focused on strategies used by the 
media in reporting political leaders (Erjavec 2001; Lavrusheva 2013; Mikkola 2017; Ross and 
Rivers 2016; Sadeghi and Jalali 2013). However, their focus was not entirely satisfactory in that 
they could not account for the use of frames and their cultural construction that allows them to 
work as a means of legitimising and de-legitimatising the political candidate's tools. For example, 
several researchers on legitimacy has established that the media and journalists employ different 
legitimation strategies when reporting on events and political candidates (Erjavec 2001; 
Lavrusheva 2013; Mikkola 2017; Ross and Rivers 2016; Sadeghi and Jalali 2013). Mikkola argued 
that the Finnish media outlet used the most common legitimation strategies of rationalisation, 
moralisation, normalisation, and narrativisation when covering on the co-operation negotiations in 
the period of the economic downturn (2017: 34). Mikkola argued that “all these strategies were 
used in various forms to establish legitimacy or illegitimacy of the co-operation negotiation 
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announcements” (2017: 4). In another study, Lavrusheva revealed that the media uses different 
legitimation strategies to allow people to make sense of the world around them (2013: 87). To 
illustrate, Lavrusheva’s study revealed that the UK media used “authorization, rationalization, 
narrativization and moralization” strategies to establish legitimacy of the political candidates 
(2013: 87). Lavrusheva argued that “strategic type has its own distinguishing features, objectives 
and ways of introduction. Hence each strategy is used to fulfil some specific objectives in addition 
to the legitimation and delegitimating purposes” (Lavrusheva 2013: 87-88).  
Furthermore, evidence from various legitimation scholars suggests that “to create, enact and extent 
social orders through narrative”, individuals are bound to exercise different strategies of 
legitimation (Berger and Luckmann 1996; Habermas 1976; Luckmann 1996; Walker and Laughter 
2019; Van Leeuwen 2007). According to Walker and Laughter, the legitimation strategies that are 
used by journalists help them to “provide the explanation and justifications of the salient elements 
of the institutional tradition and justifies the institutional order by giving normative dignity to its 
practical imperatives” (2019: 45). This observation is similar to the argument posed by Van 
Leeuwen when he contends that all forms of communication replicate legitimation by means of 
terminology, vocabulary, framing, and various form of practicing language (2007: 23). More so, 
Habermas stressed that if an individual is considered legitimate, that individual will embody 
authority and right to influence others in their decision and relationships (1976: 98). To add, Berger 
and Luckmann reiterates that if a view is legitimised, it ultimately can be creased “into the fabrics 
of discourse such that alternative viewpoints have a harder time gaining visibility” (1996: 23).  
In additions, Van Leeuwen explained how “legitimation strategies occur through narrative work 
such as moral evaluation” (2007: 91). Much of Van Leeuwen’s findings have been used to explain 
how journalists avow their authority by means of such legitimation tactics. These tactics may 
include but not limited to “quoting experts, bearing witness, self-reflexivity, storytelling, using 
semantics such as “said”, “according to”, and “confirmed,” and operating as an “interpretive 
community” that codifies journalistic practice” (Walker and Laughter 2019: 11). Similarly, 
Carlson argued that journalists constantly employ strategies of consolidation in a bid to guard their 
position against contestation from other parties seeking to increase their own authority or to rip to 
shreds authority they view as hostile (2007: 264). In support of the above, Carlson argued that in 
any given society, authority is never guaranteed, rather it is characterised by struggle and 
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necessitates continuous reproduction. Therefore, journalists should engage in a mode of constant 
process of authority maintenance (Eason 1988: 45). Moreover, Carlson argued that journalist 
efforts to constantly assert authority “are often discursive as journalists publicly solicit 
interpretations of what constitutes quality news and conversely what is considered problematic or 
outside of journalism” (Carlson 2007: 267). Therefore, from the discussion above, it can be said 
that journalists participate in “paradigm repair-work” and other devices to hoist their content above 
the fray and present their narrative as the only true one.  
Carlson argued that “discourse in the form of quotes, debates, articles, assessments, etc.” and can 
be regarded as public text that mirrors and form broader framework of action. Similarly, 
Fairclough argued that “text are social spaces in which two fundamental social process 
simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, and social interaction” (2007: 
76). Put differently, what this means is that in any given discourse, interpretations are constructed 
that form future discourse and informs action. Thus, for Carlson, discussion about political events 
and certain individuals in the media does not only reflect opinion and appraisal about those 
portrayed, rather they “organise, produce, and disseminate meaning about those events and 
particular individuals” (Carlson 2007: 267). This assertion is like the argument put forth by Fiske 
when he argues that “discourse is structured and structuring, for it is both determined by its social 
relations and affects them” (1994: 3). Thus, the discourse is continuously reproducing and always 
acting on the social while it is also being acted upon by that same social.  
Walker and Laughter (2019) argued that the commitment to master narratives by the media allows 
them to legitimise events and individuals. These scholars argued that “this commitment to master 
narratives means complicating facts can be obscured, alternative ideologies demonised, 
countercultures rarely covered (except as “other”), and power elites as voice of reason- all in the 
name of a good moral” (Walker and Laughter 2019:11). In the same vein, Campbell states that 
journalists include terms such as “post-racial America” that serve to let dominant White 
mainstream off the hook for any further racial introspection (2011:45). This means of 
communication by journalists therefore plays a vital role in legitimising the dominant ideology 
within society. In relation to that assertion, Shah and Thornton argued that “the press enacts a 
mass-mediated ritual of social control though its coverage, allowing politicians, reporters and 
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others with access to the public discourse the opportunity to legitimate specific stories – generally 
once that reinforces a white supremacy” (1994: 144).  
In another study, Erjavec explained how the thematic and form structure of the news report work 
to legitimise and naturalise against the Roma (2001: 699). Erjavec argued that “the syntactic 
structure of discriminatory discourse offered the readers categories which differed very little: the 
headline and the lead constructed a close interpretation of the situation and the rest of the news 
report strengthened, legitimated and naturalized this interpretation especially with the use of 
evaluation” (2001: 699). More so, the scholar also stressed that to construct a comprehensible 
meaning of the news text, the news producers first and actively “reduced the definition to only one 
event, which presented the majority of the population in positive light” (2001: 699). More so, 
Erjavec also found that the journalist engaged in the process of de legitimising the Roma ethnic 
group by mean of various strategies. This scholar argued that “to construct only one, natural 
dominant interpretation of the ethnic discrimination they selectively (mis) used information, used 
discourse difference with colonisation of common-sense language, and the strategies of denial of 
discriminatory discourse” (2001: 699).  
Furthermore, Ross and Rivers argued that different legitimating or de-legitimising strategies are 
evident whenever there is communication aimed at convincing people about a course of action 
(2017: 1). From a discourse analytical perspective, Ross and Rivers examined the “visual-
discursive features” of internet memes in the 2016 US presidential elections. The study was based 
on two candidates who were Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. The main purpose of this study 
was to examine how memes attempt to create a negative view of the candidates and reduce their 
legitimacy as potential United States’ presidents. In their analysis of the memes, Ross and Rivers 
used Van Leeuwen’s (2007) framework for the analysis of legitimising discourse in relation to 
how they de-legitimise. The study found that the memes were replete with latent meaning that 
were characterised by different de-legitimising strategies. These strategies include “authorization, 
moral evaluation, rationalization and mythopoesis” (Ross and River 2016: 2). Moreover, the study 
found that the originators of the memes (content) have actively and consciously involved 
themselves in practices of political participation that bear their ideological standpoint. To that end, 
the (de)legitimisation strategies of authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and 
mythopoesis have simply been used as communication vehicles through which the creators of 
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memes could communicate their disapproval or approval of the two political candidates. Ross and 
Rivers argued that:  
within this participatory digital culture, the strategies of de-legitimising are woven into 
the meme iteration not only to help the creator share their view and spread their message, 
in the hope of influencing others, but to delegitimize the target of the meme in order to 
bring about their own desired political result (i.e. the election of one candidate at the 
direct expense of another (Ross and Rivers 2016:11).  
This entails that the strategies of legitimation have become useful tools through which individuals 
can communicate if whether a course of action can be legitimate or de-legitimised. Similarly, 
Sadeghi and Jalali used the Van Leeuwen (2007: 91) model of the discourse of legitimation to 
explore the discursive strategies that were employed in Fars News. The main objective of their 
study was to examine how the Far news channels represent the Egyptian revolution as a legitimised 
action and Hosni Mubarak’s government as the delegitimise regime (Sadeghi and Jalali 2013: 12). 
Moreover, like Ross and Rivers (2016: 12), Sadeghi and Jalali also focused on a political figure, 
although their scope of analysis was broadened to include the Far news channel and Mubarak’s 
government. Consequently, the results of this study revealed that the news agency delegitimises 
the personality, leadership qualities and the regime of Mubarak by utilising several discursive 
strategies. In their findings, these scholars also highlight that the news media legitimised the 
Egyptian revolution using various discursive strategies. These strategies include the use of 
language and selected terms and frames that were in favour of the unfolding revolution. To add, 
the study's findings also revealed that the news agency did spend much of its effort in legitimising 
the revolution than delegitimising the regime of the Mubarak. It also emerged that the news media 
used the "authorisation" form of legitimation to persuade its readers to perceive the revolution as 
a noble and necessary event and see Mubarak as the villain who must be removed from power by 
any means. Among the many subcategories of legitimation, Fars News media mad use of “personal 
authority” more commonly. These findings are similar to the findings from the study by Ross and 
Rivers (2016: 12). In relation to the Far news agency role in devoting much of its effort in 
legitimising the revolution, Ross and River study found that the authority strategy of legitimation 
have become useful tools through which individuals can communicate if whether a course of action 
can be legitimate or de-legitimise (Ross and Rivers 2016: 12).   
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While these studies provide useful insights on prospective legitimation strategies employed by 
journalists and the media, no research has been conducted on how online press used frames to 
legitimise or delegitimise the political leaders and their qualities. Particularly, how News24 and 
IOL has used these strategies to legitimise the political leadership and leadership qualities of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.  
 
Media framing of political leaders 
  
Although extensive research has been carried out on media framing of political candidates, no 
single study exists which has investigated the news framing of the political leadership and 
leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. For instance, Chambwera 
examines how by certain frames the two Zimbabwean dailies (Herald and Daily News) legitimise 
and delegitimise the political leadership of Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai (2016). In this 
study, unlike the other de-legitimising scholars, the researcher did not make use of the Van 
Leeuwen model of the discourse of legitimation, but he made use of the framing theory as the basis 
of inquiry. Consequently, the key findings Chambwera’s study were somewhat different from 
those found in the studies by Ross and River (2016: 9), Sadeghi and Jalali (2014: 1580). 
Chambwera’s study revealed that the frames used by journalists to consciously or unconsciously 
report on the Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai are profoundly entrenched in the culture, 
values, philosophies and discursive practices in which they function, and in certain historical 
phases. What this means is that discursive delegitimising strategies were hidden underneath the 
frames that were carefully selected by the media to portray the political leaders. According to 
Chambwera, “The Herald and the Daily News functioning within the predominant culture may 
perhaps have utilised comparable frames as well as dissimilar ones to frame the party-political 
leadership of the winner and loser of an election” (Chambwera 2016: 56). Moreover, it was also 
highlighted that a similar frame can be used by two different newspapers to legitimise or 
delegitimise political leaders. Similarly, different frames can be used to achieve a similar purpose.  
Unlike Chambwera (2016: 78), Davies-Laubscher employed a mixed method design to investigate 
how the South African media focused on portraying President Jacob Zuma’s relationship as a form 
of cultural polygamy instead of identifying it as a multiple or concurrent sexual relationship (2014: 
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4). The newspaper analysis focused on the four key events in the summer and autumn of 2010 that 
illustrate how the South African media framed President Jacob Zuma’s practice of concurrent 
sexual relationships as cultural polygamy. However, a common feature of these two studies is that 
they both used the framing theory as the framework and basis of their analysis. Davies-Laubscher’s 
main objective in this study was to explain how the framing process (as practiced by the media) 
has stirred up novel discourse on the practice of polygamy and the effects it had on the South 
African women in terms of their bargaining power to “negotiate safe sex and practice their general 
attitude towards the dangers of contracting HIV” (Davies-Laubscher’s 2014: 35). 
Subsequently, Davies-Laubscher study revealed that the media engaged in the active use of frames 
that were aimed at representing Jacob Zuma in a negative way (2014: 35). To add, drawing on 
Entman argument, Davies-Laubscher stressed that most media frames are defined by what they 
omit, as well as include and the omissions of potential problem definitions, explanations, 
evaluations, and recommendations may be as critical as the inclusions in guiding the audience 
(Entman, 2007:167). To illustrate, during Jacob Zuma’s rape trial, the mainstream media 
continuously missed the chance of portraying Jacob Zuma’s sexual exploits as anything other than 
the frames already assigned to it, namely ‘culture’ or more specifically, ‘Zulu culture’. To be 
specific, the results of this study showed that the frames that were used by the media to report on 
Jacob Zuma at this time were misguiding or leading the public into the thinking in a negative way. 
These findings, however, can be paralleled with the assertion made by in the study by (Sadeghi 
and Jalali: 2014: 1581). Sadeghi and Jalali argued that the role of the media has shifted from simply 
informing people about what transpires around the globe (2014: 1581). For Sadeghi and Jalali, in 
contemporary times, apart from informing, the media produce content intended at manipulating 
realities methodically and offer them to their consumers in a means that is in concurrence with 
their entrenched interest (2014: 1581).  
In another study that focused on the news framing of Jacob Zuma in South Africa, Khuluse 
investigated the print media reporting on the Jacob Zuma case (2014: 5). Khuluse's main objective 
in this study was to establish “the level of bias, if any, in reporting a high-profile case of that 
magnitude” (2014: 67). The premises of his study were mainly on the role of media in the social 
construction of reality where the different values and preferences could colour the perception of 
facts. Therefore, Khuluse employed the ethnographic and qualitative content analysis allowed for 
64 
 
the systematic investigation of the content of newspaper articles while the use of discourse analysis 
highlighted the importance of language use in the social construction of reality (Khuluse 2014: 
67). However, key findings of this study revealed that the media played a huge role in creating 
people’s perception of the personality and leadership of Jacob Zuma. In this study, it was 
highlighted that media with the use of various discursive strategies like frames, participated in the 
social construction of the reality where the different values and preferences could tint the 
discernment of facts, largely painted a picture of Jacob Zuma as a corrupt man not fit to be in 
public office with his implication in corruption being perceived as a threat to the country's 
democratic ethos. The view was that this undermined democratic principles of equality, justice, 
and accountability.  
To add, Khuluse in his study revealed that the reality constructed by the media played a great role 
in de-popularising the legitimacy of Jacob Zuma as a president. This scholar argued that “the print 
media's position on the Jacob Zuma corruption case was clearly that corruption is the evil that the 
people of South Africa fought so hard to overthrow to bring equality and justice for all” (Khuluse 
2014: 67). The press was adamant that the presence of this ‘pest’ in the public domain could never 
be tolerated. In reporting the corruption case, the press highlighted how the allegations against 
Zuma were an antithesis of democratic leadership. Hence most of the press had a negative approach 
to the case and gave Zuma a name as a villain. According to Khuluse the newspapers socially 
constructed reality of a man who had lost all the honour and worth. 
Furthermore, Khuluse’s (2014: 67) findings discussed in the previous paragraph can be likened to 
the findings from another study that was conducted by Maseng et al. (2018: 11604). Maseng et al. 
examined how the South African media de-popularised politicians, paying definite attention to 
Jacob Zuma (2018: 11604). The study adopted the framing theory as the basis of its analysis. 
However, in their key findings Maseng et al. revealed that the media is and continues to be a 
crucial instrument of societal socialisation. As such, the ever-increasing involvement of the media 
in the transmission of principles, moral standards and values, resulted in the South African peoples 
being extra vocal concerning their displeasure, which led to relentless national demands for the 
removal of Jacob Zuma from power (2018: 11604). Moreover, these scholars further argued that 
the media used its agenda-setting role to negatively undermine Jacob Zuma’s popularity and 
influence public opinion about Jacob Zuma and his leadership dynamics (Maseng et al. 2018: 
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11604). To illustrate their findings, Maseng et al. highlighted that before Jacob Zuma's rise to 
power as ANC president, both his “personal and political image has already received massive 
negativity as a result of the various socially and politically related factors which were 
simultaneously reported by the media” (2018: 11604). What this means is that the media, using 
frames and agenda-setting has managed to socialise the population, presenting them with the 
negative images of Jacob Zuma. In addition to that, Maseng et al. stressed that the media maligned 
Jacob Zuma’s reputation in two ways, “vilification came from the political front, and while on the 
other hand, his certain social practices were portrayed through negative sentiments by the media” 
(2018: 11604).  
Moreover, the findings from the study by Maseng et al. (2018: 11604) are similar to the 
observation that has been done by Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli (2001: 77). In relation to the role 
of the media in socialising the people using its agenda-setting and framing techniques, Teer-
Tomaselli and Tomaselli argued that in an elusive manner and more expressively, the news media 
choose to frame the kind of stories in a certain way. Simply put, what the media does is that it 
provides its audience with images through which we perceive others and ourselves as well. As a 
result, the images, frames, and catch-phrases that are laden with "signifiers act as raw material we 
use to confirm, modify or negate our already existing sense of identity" (Tomaselli and Tomaselli 
2001: 34). To add, drawing on Hall, it can also be deduced that the media as it is, is a significant 
arena of contestations in the “circuit of culture” (1997: 55). It is a place where the presentation, 
construction, regulation, ingesting and manufacture of meaning are all closely drawn in the 
formation of identity, at both the individual and national level.  
Furthermore, Tiung and Hasim showed how the Malaysian media framed political personalities of 
different politicians (2009: 407). Employing the framing theory, the study examines how the 
eleven national and provincial newspapers frame news of Datuk Yong Teck Lee. These scholars 
argued that the Malaysian newspapers engaged in the active process of moulding the image, 
personality and reputation through the pages of the newspapers by means of playing up or playing 
down their news and pictures. Generally, findings from this study revealed that provincial and 
mainstream newspapers were dissimilar in the ways they reported on the politician. To put 
differently, the scholars highlighted that “some newspapers tended to portray Datuk Yong 
negatively, while others pictured him as the hero of Sabah” (Tiung and Hasim 2009: 409). The 
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study also revealed that there were also neutral reports. Put together, this study shows how “the 
perception of the people can be developed through their exposure of newspaper coverage, framing 
of news can help to show how newspapers can play up or down such news and at the same time 
develop or destroy the reputation of political personalities” (Tiung and Hasim 2009: 409).  
Moreover, in a different study, Watkins examined the role of media in creating meaning using 
frames while de-legitimising certain individuals (2009: 12). Watkins examined network television 
news (ABC, CBS, NBC) coverage of the "Million Man March” that was widely and attended by 
most Americans. In this study, Watkins’ focus was to investigate the overriding “framing practices 
– problem definition, rhetorical devices, use of sources, and images –employed by journalists” to 
make logic of the Million Man March. In this study, Watkins argued that “what gets selected, 
packaged, disseminated, and received as news is mediated by organizational processes, ideological 
beliefs, and power relations” (2009: 67). To that end, Watkins argues that news must never be 
regarded as a neutral reflection of reality, instead, it is as a mass-produced cultural artefact. 
Nevertheless, Watkins’s key findings revealed that the media frames selected by the journalists 
did not necessarily determine what the public thought about the march. However, the framing 
decision practiced by the same journalist effectively shaped the parameters of the public dialogue 
that ensured. Moreover, the findings also revealed that the other way the news media make social 
and political events and individuals more comprehensible is by employing a strategy that captures 
the spirit and vitality of movements through celebrity spokespersons. To illustrate this, the scholars 
stressed that the focus that was placed on the individual leader of the “Million Man March” is not 
a special unique journalistic practice. Rather, what it means is that most news frames pivot around 
the actions of those individuals that achieve newsworthy credentials.  
In line with the observations made by Teer-Tomaselli and Tomaselli (2001), Hall (1997) and 
Maseng et al. (2018) that media actively participate in the creation of cultural meaning through 
agenda setting and framing. Likewise, Watkins argued that in the process of engineering news, the 
news producers make framing judgments. What this means is that the journalists play a conscious 
or unconscious decision regarding how to render real-world phenomena intelligible (Watkins 
2009: 98). Moreover, Watkins stressed that journalists in the media houses make sense of the 
surrounding environment by means of using frames (2009: 98). The observation by Watkins in his 
study was similar to the assertion by Entman (1993). Entman argued that framing involves the 
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process of selection and salience. To explain this further, he stressed that "to frame is to select 
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such 
a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation” 
(Entman 1993: 34).   
In a study similar to Watkins’ (2009), use of the framing theory as the basis of analysis, Tiung and 
Hasim examined how 11 newspaper framed news of Datuk Yong Teck Lee, a political leader from 
Sabah (2009). More so, in this study, Tiung and Hasim described how the newspaper moulds the 
image, personality, and reputation of politicians through the pages of the newspaper by playing up 
or down their news and pictures. The key findings of this study revealed that the reports of the 
same individual differed between mainstream national and provincial newspapers. According to 
Tiung and Hasim, some newspapers tended to portray the politician in a negative manner while 
others pictured him as the hero of Sabah. More so, the findings of the study revealed that there 
were both neutral and objective reports. The study also highlighted that the perception of the people 
can be formed once an individual is exposed to news coverage. This is made possible by the 
framing of the news that enables the newspapers to play down or up news and, in many instances, 
can build or destroy the reputation of political personalities. Tiung and Hasim argued that 
“journalists and editors draw the map or the internal story pattern for readers, and the map which 
is also known as framing, functions cognitively in structuring political debates, influencing the 
information levelling on the readers, and attributing to the policy responsibility” (Tiung and Hasim 
2009: 123). The above observation is related to the findings of the study that was done by Wright 
and Holland on the media portrayal of the former Australian prime minister (2014).  
Furthermore, recent work on framing has established that the role of the media has shifted from 
being an information gatekeeper to an active political player (Sadeghi and Jalali 2014, Chilton 
2004, Bacue and Burgoon 2003). For instance, Sadeghi and Jalali argued that the role of the media 
has shifted from simply informing people about what transpires around the globe (2014: 1580). 
These scholars argued that, in contemporary times, apart from informing, the media produce 
content intended at manipulating realities methodically and offer them to their consumers in a 
means that is in concurrence with their entrenched interest (Sadeghi and Jalali 2014: 1580). 
Furthermore, Sadeghi and Jalali stressed that the discourse of the media has shifted and moved 
above the surface level of language structures (2014: 1580). Effectively, what this means is that 
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news articles are replete with underlying meanings and intentions that are hidden behind the 
discursive construction of them. Similarly, Chilton argued that the news media in different 
countries engage in an active process of packaging meaning into news in a fashion that their readers 
will trust and not question. Chilton said, “the representative news agencies of different countries 
try to deliver pre-packaged news in a way that their readers would trust in what their favourite 
government gives them as realities happening around the world” (2004: 35).  
 
Media framing of female political leaders   
 
Recent research on framing of political leaders has tended to focus on the way gender plays out in 
the media frames rather than how such frames were constructed to legitimise or delegitimise their 
leadership qualities of political candidates (Guha 2018; Cukier Jackson, Elmi, Roach and Cyr 
2016; Mavin, Elliott, Stead, and Williams 2016). For instance, research has established that a 
woman leader is not portrayed positively in the news media as compared to their male counterpart 
(Guha 2018 and Cukier et al. 2016, Mavin et al. 2016). Guha argued that “women political 
candidates across the world are often misrepresented in all media platforms” (2018: 67). In the 
same study, Guha found that the stereotypes used to portray women are similar in print media and 
on social network platforms like Facebook. Furthermore, in another study that examined the 
representation of women leaders in Canadian broadcast, Cukier et al. found that women are 
underrepresented and are less likely to be portrayed positively or on leadership/expert positions 
and are more often represented as victims (2016: 45). More so, Cukeir et al. argued that “women 
are less likely to be framed as leaders or experts and are less likely to hold news host or anchor 
positions” (2016: 45).  
To add, Mavin et al. revealed the “gendered nature of media constructions of women managers 
and leaders” (2016: 314). These scholars argued that women’s leadership is glamourised, 
fetishised and sexualised in both print and electronic media. Similarly, Vos in a study that analysed 
television news coverage of female politicians in Belgium revealed that female politicians receive 
less news coverage when compared to their male counterparts with the same social and political 
status (2013: 389). To add, Vos also argued that “in addition to a political gender bias that pervades 
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society, a real gender bias exists in the media.” Put differently, the presentation of female leaders 
is affected and reflect on the gender bias that pervades society. 
 In another study, Gedalya et al. examined the journalistic coverage of “Tzip Livni over the 
Knesset election campaign” where she was running as a candidate for the position of prime 
minister (2017: 167). Findings from this study point towards a gender bias reportage of the media. 
Gedalya et al. found that the media reflected deep gender bias, by portraying her as “lacking 
experience, unable to make decisions, and in general framed stereotypically with feminist traits” 
(2017: 165). For example, the media uses words like “young child, puppet on a string “and 
“incessant talker” (Gedalya et al. 2017: 165). These findings are like the observation that were 
made by Greenwald, and Lehman-Wilzig (2017: 1). In a cross-national study that examined the 
socio-cultural conception of gender in Israel and American press coverage of female candidates, 
these scholars found that the media sensationally presented female candidates in the media. To 
illustrate, the media highlighted the female candidate’s appearance and sexuality more than their 
policy promises (Greenwald, and Lehman-Wilzig 2017: 1). In relation to this, Nacos revealed that 
the female politician is depicted as not fit for political office simply because they are weak, 
indecisive and emotional. Nacos argued that the news media represented the female politician as 
a “bitch” who does not fit in the conventional profile of soft women. In relation to that, women 
who participate in politics are portrayed as “outsiders,” the exception, not the standard. Nacos 
shows that the women who receive coverage in the media are “most newsworthy when they are 
doing something ‘unladylike” (Nacos 2005: 440). 
For instance, in a study that examined the representation of female terrorists in the media and 
framing patterns in the news coverage of women in politics and in terrorism Nacos argued that 
even though women have been among the leaders and flowers of terrorist organisations throughout 
the history of modern terrorism, the mass media stereotypically portrays females as terrorist and 
politicians as intruders in a profoundly masculine dominated field (2005: 435). In addition to that, 
Nacos emphasised that the contrast of news framing patterns in the news concerning females in 
politics and the ingrained stereotypes in the reporting of the woman extremists establish 
resemblances in the representations of these legitimate (women in politics) and illegitimate 
political players (women in terrorism) (2005: 436).   
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In addition to that, Nacos found that the media continue to utilise diverse framing patterns in the 
news with regards to females and males. This scholar argued that “journalists commonly work 
with gendered ‘frames’ to simplify, prioritize, and structure the narrative flow of events when 
covering women and men in public life.” (2005: 440). More so, the study also revealed that there 
is the pervasiveness of gender stereotypes, for instance, the feminine sympathetic disposition and 
the man expected aggressiveness that influence individuals to imagine males and females to act in 
a different way. As a result, “women in politics are commonly seen as compassionate, practical, 
honest, and hardworking, while men are seen as ruthless, ambitious, and tough leaders.” (Nacos 
2005: 440). Additionally, by preserving these types of stereotypes, the news media amplifies the 
belief that the gentleness of woman office-bearers make them good candidates for handling 
proficiently societal challenges and policies, for instance, education and social welfare, but they 
are not capable to handle national security and foreign relations – zones best reserved to aggressive 
males. Similarly, Gidengil and Everitt found that, “the media represents female politicians as 
caring mothers most of the time not as politically active beings who are capable of leading the 
country, in fact, they are perceived as weak in politics” (2003:98). In relation to Everitt and 
Gidengil (2003: 210), Ross (2002: 92) contended that female politicians regarded the news media 
as a barricade to the office. This is because women politicians in their entirety are tremendously 
under-represented in the political sphere, and in instances where they are represented, the 
importance is positioned on trivialities like the type of dressing and not on policies and ideologies 
(Ross 2002: 92). Similalry, in a study that focuses on the female body and voice in audiovisual 
political propaganda jingles, Ngoshi and Mutekwa argued that the women have remained 
entrapped in a nationalist discourse that is male generated and they have not transcended that 
paradigm (2013: 246). Ngoshi and Mutekwa found that “judging by the lyrical content of their 
songs, the choir women seem to be suggesting that women cannot and should not conceive of their 
own and national emancipation outside the terms of the predominantly male-dominated national 
liberation movement” (2013: 246).  
To add, Wright and Holland analysed Australian media portrayals of former Australian Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard's alleged sexism and misogyny's speech to parliament in October 2012 
(2014: 588). In this study, Wright and Holland argued that there were various frames that the media 
used to vilify the speech and person of Gillard. These are the strategic attack, uncontrolled 
emotional outpouring, and hypocrisy (Wright and Holland 2014: 588). In this case, the scholars 
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argue that these framings as carefully done by the media professionals, “demonstrates the role the 
media plays as a gendered mediator, perpetuating the gender double blind that constrains female 
political leaders, as they negotiate the demand to demonstrate masculine leadership attributed 
without tarnishing the feminine qualities expected of them” (Wright and Holland 2014:78). 
Consequently, the study found that the gendered media framings restricted the significance and 
relevance of Gillard's speech, truncated calls for broader contemplation on Australian political 
culture and further isolated females from political leadership. In addition to that, the study also 
revealed that the speech received acceptance in other countries while the mainstream domestic 
media framed the speech as a "hypocritical distraction arising either from the tactics of diversion 
or personal weakness in coping with the sustained attack". This difference of reportage between 
national and international media is as Goldsworthy cited in Holland points out, as result of context, 
which is the broader cultural context of international coverage contrasting with the specific 
political and electoral contexts. Wright and Holland argued that these leading framing damaged 
the “substance of the speaker's message, removing the legitimacy of Gillard's challenge to the 
sexism and misogyny on display” (2014:78). Moreover, by undermining her messages these 
framings also prevented the speech from acting as a rallying cry for a wider process of 
introspection into the gendered Australian political landscape. Gillard confronted continuous 
gendered coverage in the Australian media all over her prime ministership, as a result, this has 
covertly and overtly questioned the likelihood she could function as a “female leader”.  
In another study, Omari focused on the portrayal of female politicians in Kenyan media (2008: 
56). In her study, Omari argued that Kenya's print media is replete with stereotype images that 
portray women only in their domestic roles at the expense of their roles in national development. 
Findings from this study revealed that women and women's issues were allocated less space and 
portrayed more negatively compared to their male counterparts in all the analysed newspapers. To 
add, the media also depicted women almost exclusively in traditional roles in the home, and not 
as independent-minded and creative beings who have made many positive contributions to the 
country socially, economically, and politically (Omari 2008: 56). To substantiate these findings, 
Omari demonstrates that the marginalisation and negative portrayal of women politicians in the 
Kenyan media is influenced by the factors like patriarchal values that pervades the Kenyan society, 
a small number of women professionals in the media industry, and the fact that the media industry 
is largely male owned and dominated. 
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In a similar study, Thou explored how the Kenyan newsprint media in their coverage framed the 
22 female parliamentarians in the 10th parliament (2015: 13). The main objective of this study was 
to examine the amount of media coverage and the level of prominence given to stories on women 
in politics. The study also sought to identify the dominant gender frames used in newsprint media 
content. The key findings of this study were that the newsprint media coverage of women in 
politics is low. Also, their stories placed in the inside pages and rarely do their names hardly make 
it to the headlines making them invisible. To explain these findings, Thou argued that “hidden” 
influences such as cultural backgrounds of the media professional, principles of what makes news 
and commercial interest contribute to the low coverage of women” (Thou 2015: 78).   Thou’s 
findings can be likened to the observation that was done by Norris (1997: 19). In his study, Norris 
found that female political leaders were less noticeable in the news media. In many instances, 
females are regarded as inconsequential inside the political domain and incompetent of bringing 
constructive transformation, only because of the stereotypical positions dispensed to them by 
culture and society which encumbers them in sundry spheres (1997: 19). 
Moreover, Ngubane analyses the representation of male and female politicians during the 2016 
local government elections in South Africa (2010: 45). Using qualitative research methods, critical 
discourse analysis, and framing theory, Ngubane argued that in media there exist some differences 
and disparities that are pervasive between male and female politicians in relation to their depiction 
in the political arena (2010: 48). To illustrate, Ngubane argues that this is in part because women 
politicians encountered a lot of challenges to cross the threshold into decision-making or 
protuberant positions in most societies that are mainly male dominated (2010: 46). Therefore, key 
findings of Ngubane's study revealed that there is a great disparity with regards to the coverage of 
both women and man politicians in the print media (2010: 49). The results highlighted that women 
are less mentioned to in the news media or equated to men and did not feature equally in the 
political news, as they were reported in fewer articles concerning the 2016 local government 
election (Ngubane 2010: 45). Thus, the imbalance of coverage in the media would mean those 
female politicians will have less exposure and public acknowledgment problematic for them. In 
relation to the Ngubane’s findings, the Global media monitoring project also opined that “females 
continue to be underrepresented in the total population of people heard, seen, or read about in the 
print media regarding politics” (2010: 45). 
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Fountaine and McGregor examined how the news media framed women politician in the 2001 
local body election (2001: 55). These scholars argued that the coverage of political female leaders 
in this election “raises issues of both positive and negative gender stereotyping, including the 
female candidate, dubbed “the naked politician”, who stripped for billboards. Moreover, these 
scholars argue that the concept of “symbolic annihilation” was evident in the way women were 
framed in the media. Simply put, the concept of “symbolic annihilation” refers to the media’s 
condemnation of women (Tuchman cited in Fountaine and McGregor 2001). Findings from this 
study revealed that “the presence of women leaders led to the media’s feminisation of the dominant 
‘game’ or strategy frame, albeit in superficial ways” (Fountaine and McGregor 2001: 55). In 
addition, the scholars also indicate that the New Zealand media did not judge the female leaders 
‘behaviour harshly (as too aggressive), rather it appeared disappointed that the women did not 
resort to dirty tactics when they were attacked by their male counterparts. More so, Fountaine and 
McGregor study argued that the modern bias facing women in politics is that the media simply use 
traditional frames – that are constructed around the dominance of men – in coverage of women, 
making it difficult for women politicians to be presented as anything other than political outsiders 
(2001: 59). In relation to that Gidengil and Everti for instance regard the application of 
conventional political frames such as metaphors of warfare and sport to women as a more subtle 
but insidious form of bias than preoccupation with “feminine characteristics (1999: 133). Results 
from Gidengil and Everti cited in Fountaine and McGregor indicate that “what is perceived 
positively to be combative in a man may be judged negatively- to be aggressive in a woman” 
(2001: 60). 
 
Political, economic and social conditions that affect news framing 
 
Most studies on the factors that affect media framing has tended to focus on structural, economic 
and institutional factors that affect media frames instead of paying attention to discursive practices 
and culture effects on news frames (Sood and Iyenga 2016; Wagner and Meyer 2016;Van Ruler 
2005 and Verhoeven 2016). For example, existing evidence from recent studies suggest that 
different corporations (political or business) influence directly and indirectly the framing of news 
and news content (Sood and Iyenga 2016, Wagner and Meyer 2016, Van Ruler 2005 and 
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Verhoeven 2016). In general, this group of scholars argue that the continuous interaction between 
the media and the political candidates and public relations personnel influence the way the media 
report on events and individuals. Sood and Iyenga argued that “candidate’s main goal is to spread 
their messages to as many voters as possible, and so they utilise the media both to clarify and 
articulate their messages.” For instance, Verhoeven argued that companies and business 
establishments serve as a substantial source of news for journalist (2016: 509). Similarly, Wagner 
and Meyer argued that “political parties and actors produce a large number of messages” (2017: 
367). Put differently, what this means is that corporations and political actors influence and, in 
some instances, decide what journalists say, how they say it and to whom they may say it. 
According to Verhoeven the relationship between corporations and journalist can be evident in 
how public relations by business establishments affect what the journalists say, and how they say 
it in their newspapers (Verhoeven 2016: 509). Verhoeven argued that “the relationship between 
PR professionals and journalists and what journalists report about corporations has consequent 
effects on the public” (Verhoeven 2016: 509). In this case it can be deduced that corporations and 
different organisations engage in an active process of transmitting desired messages to the public 
through mass media through arranging positive news coverage and communicating with journalists 
on their organisational issues. Iyenga argued that “political candidates spend a lot of time 
interacting in different ways with the media, keeping is as much on their terms as possible” (1990: 
23). Thus, this process allows them to shape what the media report about them and their activities.  
More so, findings from Van Ruler study indicate that the relationship that exist between 
corporations and the media and framing can be termed as “corporate framing mediated-moderation 
model” (2005: 45). In this case the scholar argued that there is a frame negotiation that takes place 
in the process of news construction between journalists and the corporations. What this means 
according to Van Ruler (2005: 45) and Verhoeven (2016: 510) is that the production of news 
involves an interdependent practice that takes place in three levels. To illustrate the above point 
Verhoeven argued that:  
on the level of the individual PR professional and journalists who are part of the same 
network and have an interdependent relation. On the organization level where there is 
an interdependency between the editorial of the media; the PR departments of 
corporations and the marketing and advertising departments (Verhoeven 2016: 510)  
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In relation to the argument raised by Verhoeven that corporations play a critical role in affecting 
the framing and content of journalist news (2016: 510). Heath also observed that press relations 
have become the chief responsibility of public relations officials (2010: 345). In this case, public 
relations officials devote a great deal of their time creating ways that allow them to manage and 
use the mass media to a “corporation’s advantage”. To illustrate, Heath stressed that there is a 
multi-layered process of co-production of news that is normally used by PR officials in conjunction 
with journalists. He stressed that this multi-layered process of news production is also influenced 
by the cultures of the organizations or corporations and media organizations that involved. This 
similar observation can be related to the observation that was made by Verhoeven when he argued 
that “the process of news production as it is influenced by the social factors, it owes a vulnerable 
to the influence of the “broader societal cultures that they are part of”.  Therefore, drawing on these 
arguments (Verhoeven 2016 and Heath 2005), it can be hypothesised that the news framing is 
heavily reliant on the external forces that are epitomised by the needs of corporations and 
organisations to maintain a good reputation.  
Furthermore, evidence from studies on newspaper framing has revealed that corporation possesses 
a substantial influence on the type of media frames. As a result, researchers have not treated the 
effects of culture and discourse on media frames in much detail (Ihlen and Nitz 2008 and Miller 
2006). For instance, a study conducted by Miller revealed that the media content and frames are 
affected and mirrored the events that were happening in the corporate world (2006: 1001). To 
illustrate this observation, Miller argued that “when environmental issues or accounting fraud 
occurs and when health issues are at stake, the media adopts protesters/antagonistic frames (2006: 
1001).  Put differently, what this entails is that media frames as they are packaged to the public, 
they are not independent of the unfolding events that are obtaining in their surroundings. Like 
Miller’s observation, Ihlen and Nitz argue that the media uses events from the world and different 
organization to frame their news (2008: 65). These scholars argued that “occasionally, mixed 
frames from corporations and other organisations are used in the media news” (Ihlen and Nitz cited 
in Verhoeven 2016: 511).  
The argument that news frames are informed and dependent on the events obtaining in the 
corporate world was also amplified in a study by Danielian and Page (1994: 1056). In a study of 
American television news aired between 1969 and 1982, Danielian and Page found that “business 
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topics are considerably more visible in the television news in the US and Europe” (1994: 1056). 
More so, the results from their study also revealed that corporations were also mentioned most 
frequently of all interest groups reported in the news. In another study, Grant and Dimmick 
illustrated that events happening in corporate and business news dominated local television news 
in the USA (2000: 400). Further, another interesting finding from the study by Grant and Dimmick 
was that “corporate video news releases have been found to play a role in agenda building in the 
USA” (2000: 400).   
On the other hand, evidence from other studies suggests that political candidates and corporations 
do not necessarily influence news frames (Esrock, Hart, D’sliva and Werking 2002: 67). Esrock 
et al. suggest that instead of being impacted by the events and frames from the corporations, 
“journalists follow, as part of their interpretive practice, their own discursive strategies for 
handling corporate press news releases and that they introduce frames, thus maintaining primary 
press release frames while reframing secondary frames” (Esrock et al. 2002: 67). Moreover, a 
consensus among these scholars point to the fact that journalists are not always reporting on what 
the political candidates and organizations do and say. Rather, reporters often chose to cover any 
aspect of the election campaign or organization that is independent from the influence of the 
candidates or that is more interesting. The assertion made by Esrock et al. (2002 :67) resonates 
with the argument made by Wagner and Meyer when they contended that no matter how much the 
political actors and corporations may influence how the media report its stories, “much of what 
the people hear and read in the news is ultimately determined by the journalists and editors” 
(Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367). For Wagner and Meyer, the media still retains its gatekeeping 
role in news covering that allows it to frame political candidates and organisations in a manner 
suitable for them. In additions, these scholars argue that “media outlets are systematically more 
likely to sample messages from some political actors than from others because they have a partisan 
bias towards specific parties” (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367). 
To illustrate, the gatekeeping role of the media where it engages in the process of sampling bias is 
commonly driven by “supply side or demand side factor” (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367). What 
this means is that on the supply side the, the proximity of a media house to an ideology, 
organisation, institution or social group will motivate the media outlets to report more on that 
particular political party or candidate. On the demand side the media’s frames are influenced by 
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the type of the audience they are trying to please. To illustrate this assertion Wagner and Meyer 
highlighted that:    
if some media outlets are closer to specific parties in ideological, organizational and 
institutional terms, those outlets are may report more about those actors and be more 
responsive to their messages. On the demand side, media outlets will differ in the 
political actors their readers support, and it may be that (Wagner and Meyer 2017: 367) 
Expanding on the argument that the proximity of a media house to a particular ideology, 
organization, institution or social group will motivate the media outlets to report more on that 
particular political party or candidate, Richardson stressed that journalistic discourse possess some 
very unique and definite textual features, some particular means of text production and 
consumption, and is defined by a “particular set of relationships between itself and other agencies 
of symbolic and material power” (Richardson 2007: 1). Put differently, what this means is that 
news text is affected by a myriad of factors like the “language of journalism, its production and 
consumption and the relations of journalism to social ideas and institutions. These three forces are 
so much integrated such that it is difficult to extricate or separate them (Richardson 2007: 1). 
Fairclough states that the key forces (language, production and consumption and the relation of 
journalism to social ideas and institutions) are different elements but not discrete (2000: 122). To 
illustrate his argument, Fairclough argued that the gathering and creation of the news is closely 
connected with the activities and views of (habitually powerful) social groups.  
A considerable amount of literature has proved that the media occupy a special role in society 
because it either works to inform, disinform and in some instances it fans partisanship (Deacon et 
al. 2016 and Faris, Roberts, Etling, Bourassa and Benkler 2017). For instance, Faris et al. in a 
study that analysed both mainstream and social media coverage of the 2016 United States 
presidential election found that the media in the USA is rooted in different traditions (2017:3). On 
one hand was the media that was aligned to the leftist tradition while the other one was rooted in 
the right-wing tradition. Owing to that, the media coverage of the election was biased towards a 
candidate while delegitimising the other candidate. To add, the results of Faris et al. study also 
revealed that “on the conservative side, more attention was paid to pro-Trump, highly partisan 
media outlets. On the other side, by contrast, the centre of gravity was made up largely of long-
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standing media organisations steeped in the traditions and practice of objective journalism” (2017: 
4).  
In another study, Deacon et al. offered a comprehensive account of how the print media and 
broadcasting media covered the elections campaign in the period leading up the British elections 
(2016: 183). Findings from this study indicate a growing increase in media polarisation during the 
campaign periods. To illustrate, Deacon et al. argued that “the news media reporting -print and 
broadcast-reflected the increasingly fragmented party system in that both the SNP and UKIP 
received unprecedented amounts of coverage in the UK wide election” (2016: 183). More so, the 
results from this study also illustrate a growing bias in how the newsprint cover the campaign. To 
support this assertion Decon et al, argue that most newspaper openly supported the Conservatives 
party and its policies and representatives and covered it in a favourable manner as opposed to other 
small political parties and their candidates (Deacon et al. 2016: 183).  
More so, Kostadinova analysed how print media cover election promises of different political 
candidates (2015: 636). The analysis of the pledges and the newspaper articles in the period 
between 1990 and 2009 revealed that the pledges that are made by main political opponents are 
more likely to be covered than those that were from smaller political opponents. More so, the study 
also illustrates that the media was more inclined to cover stories that were related to economic 
policy in elections. To add, another interesting finding from this study was that the print media did 
not focus on ideological priorities of political candidates and their parties but were more disposed 
to report on their economic pledges and personalities (Kostadinova 2015: 636). These observations 
are closely related to the argument that was made by Iyengar and McGrady (2007: 55). According 
to Iyengar and McGrady “journalists have a tendency to report on what political elites are doing 
or planning to do, often ignoring other policy actors who are deemed to be less newsworthy than 
officials” (2007). For Iyengar and McGrady, media coverage is therefore driven and affected by 
the actions of “political elites, real world events, and competition for readership, more than partisan 
logics or journalists’ preferences” (2007: 55). Put together, findings seem to suggest that news 
media tends to cover the strategy of campaigns and personality. By strategy of campaigns the 
media is normally biased to follow and given more coverage to a candidate who is leading in the 
campaign or the political figure who appears to be the favourite of the public.  
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Studies over the decade have shown that partisan bias is a dominant factor that affects the media 
reporting and framing of political parties and their candidates (Baumgartner and Bonafont 2015; 
Larcinese, Puglis and Snyder 2011; Wagner and Meyer 2017). An underlying consensus that has 
emerged from media and political bias studies is that newspapers have a habit of favouring 
incumbents with campaign messages that resonate with their editorial agenda, and their political 
philosophy. For instance, Wagner and Meyer argue that “partisan bias may also affect what the 
media report on messages of political actors” (2017: 414). Put differently, media coverage of 
election or political events and political actors is likely to be more favourable to individuals than 
others. To add, Wagner and Meyer observed that during political campaigns and elections, partisan 
media have a habit of “deemphasising negative stories or scandals about political actors they prefer 
and overemphasise the faults of disliked ones” (2017: 145). In their study, Wagner and Meyer 
found that “partisan bias affects the micro-level coverage of individual party press release by the 
media" (2017: 145). To add, these scholars also indicate that the messages with a high news value 
are reported more if the message is from an actor the outlet is biased towards or favour more. In 
relation to Wegner and Meyer’s argument, Baumgartner and Bonafont argued that the media 
coverage of political actors reflects the opinions, preferences and links that are inherent between 
political parties and certain media outlets (2015: 280). Wegner and Meyer said, “media coverage 
reflects the preferences and partisan links between political parties and individual media outlets, 
which lead to important inequalities on how newspapers cover different parties” (2015: 280). What 
this simply means is that in any given political events, some political elites would have more 
favourable media coverage than other. This will also depend on the political orientation and 
ideological affiliation of a journalist (Baumgartner and Bonafont 2015: 280).  
Similar to the above, Larcinese et al.  emphasised that media tend to favour political parties and 
certain political candidates based on two grounds (2011: 1178). Firstly, the media behaves in a 
partisan manner because the bias is an institutionalised mode of operation within the system of a 
certain media outlet. This kind of set up is referred to as “political parallelism” (Hallin and Mancini 
2004: 6). Hallin and Mancini argued that media partisan coverage of political candidates is rampant 
in the media system where there is political parallelism. In this case, political parallelism describes 
“how the political system and the media system are tied to each other and how well different 
political views are represented in the media” (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 6). Simply put, what Hallin 
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and Mancini meant is that in a system where political parallelism is high; there are greater chances 
for journalists to display bias in their reportage (2004: 6). 
The existing body of research on the political economy of the media has established that economic 
competition exerts influence on the type of the media content and framing on news (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004 and Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). For example, Hallin and Mancini argued that 
“commercial pressure can encourage media to differentiate themselves politically” (2004: 186). 
Findings from the study conducted in Austria by Hallin and Mancini revealed that “in case of 
Austria, a formerly stable, institutionalised party-press parallelism has perhaps been replaces by a 
more flexible, economically driven partisan bias determined by market interests.” What this means 
is that the media content and framing of issues in this case has ceased to be influenced directly by 
political allegiance to political parties. Rather, their content is now driven by the need to satisfy 
the needs of their consumers who are inevitably aligned to a political party ideology of political 
actors. The assertion above can further be explained by what scholars’ term as the “profit motive” 
of the news media. these scholars argue that the media are business who are interested in generating 
profit. Because of that, the nature of their content is driven by the need to retain readers and viewers 
test.  
More so, existing research also recognises the critical role played by media ownership on media 
frames and news content (Hanretty 2014, Stetka 2012 and Yanich 2010). A consensus among these 
scholars is that there is a direct relationship between ownership of a newspaper and the news 
content that the newspaper produces. For example, Yanich argued that ownership matters in the 
production of news on local media outlets (2010: 51). In a study that examined the relationship 
between local news content and ownership structure in 17 television markets in the United States, 
Yanich observed that “the station-level ownership profiles positively affected local content” (2010: 
51). Put differently, Yanich argued that “consolidated ownership profiles of individuals stations 
can negatively affect the amount of content on the station.”  In another study Stetka explored the 
“various practices of business and political instrumentalization of media by their local owners, 
often” (2012: 433). Findings from this study highlight that business and political 
instrumentalisation of media normally result in constrained editorial independence and increasing 
intertwinement of the systems of media, politics and the economy. In a different study, Hanretty 
examines the level of owners influence in 211 different print and broadcast outlets in thirty-two 
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diverse states in Europe (2014: 235). In this study, Hanretty argued that the influence put on 
journalists by the owners of the media inevitably affect the type of news content and the editorial 
policy of that media outlet.  
In addition, Okech’s study in Kenya examined how media ownership forms shape content in the 
Kenyan media (2008: 45). Findings from Okech’s analysis of two Kenyan newspaper revealed that 
ownership patterns affected news coverage in the 2002 Kenyan elections. Okech argued that “the 
emerging winner in the election was the candidate with most coverage from the newspapers” 
(2008: 45). More so, the study also revealed that the media coverage of the election was personality 
driven. Therefore, put together the findings from this study suggest that “objectivity though 
practiced in some instances, it widely affected by the editorial line of the said newspaper” (Okech 
2008: 45). Moreover, communication scholars stressed that concentrated private ownership of 
media institutions affects the type of content that is given to the public (Bagdikian 2000; Baum 
and Zhukov 2019; Herman and Chosky 2002 and McCheseney 2000). For example, Baum and 
Zhukov argued that if newspapers are privately owned, chances are that those newspapers are 
likely “free to follow the whims of individual owners, that may be driven by profit, ideology, and 
a sense of civic duty” (2019: 37).  
Like the findings made by Baum and Zhukov (2019: 39), Bagdikian argued that ownership 
merging incumbers the multiplicity of news, as well as plummeting its public and foreign policy 
content (2000: 55). Similarly, Gehlbach and Sonin argued that “media ownership typically 
influences media bias, but media ownership itself is endogenous to the anticipated bias under state 
and private ownership” (2014: 163). In the case of government press these scholars argue that the 
government owned media content is heavily affected by “the mobilising character of the 
government” (Gehlbach and Sonin 2014: 163). Simply put the government affect the content and 
framing of issues in cases where it needs the public to take a plan of action. As such, the 
government would not hesitate to influence the media it controls to report in a biased manner. To 
illustrate, Gehlbach and Sonin argued that government control and its mobilising character 
increases bias in news content and “the bias in news reporting reduces the informational content 
of the news” (2014: 163). In another study, Besley and Prat found that even without clear 
censorship, the government often influence news content by preserving an intricate association 
with the media (2006: 720).  
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However, even though previous studies provide useful insights on institutional and structural 
factors that affect media frames, such expositions are unsatisfactory because they fail to account 
for the role of culture and discourse in influencing the media frames.  
 
News values and their impacts on journalistic discursive practices  
 
News values refer to "the criteria of news selection and presentation of events as published news" 
(Caple and Bednarek 2016: 435). Harcup and O’Neill defined news values as “as systems of 
criteria central to the decision-making process as to what will or will not be selected as news and 
as ideological constructs (2017: 71). According to Caple and Bednarek news values help explain 
that makes something “newsworthy” (2016: 435). As a concept, newsworthiness can be traced to 
the seminal work of Galtung and Ruge (1965). These scholars put forward a system of aspects 
describing events that together can be used as defining “newsworthiness8’. To achieve this, 
Galtung and Ruge (1965) focused on newspapers and broadcast news to devise a list that they used 
to describe what they believe were significant contributing factors as to how news is constructed. 
In their seminal study, Galtung and Ruge described news values as a “chain of news 
communication” (1965: 55). According to these scholars,  
‘chain of news communication’ involves processes of selection (the more an event satisfies the 
"news factors", the more likely it is selected as news), distortion (accentuating the newsworthy 
factors of the event, once it has been selected), and replication (selection and distortion are repeated 
at all steps in the chain from event to reader) (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 55) 
Moreover, Galtung and Ruge’s concept of news values was based on three compounding 
hypotheses. Firstly, the two scholars argued that “the more factors an event satisfies, the higher 
the probability that it becomes news. Secondly, they argued that these factors will tend to exclude 
each other and finally, the events that satisfy none or very few factors will not become news. 
Galtung and Ruge argued that news values cannot be universal because they vary between different 
                                                 
8 The concept of newsworthiness means the worth of a happening or issue to be reported as news, as established via a 
set of news values (such as Negativity, Proximity). 
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cultures. In support of Galtung and Ruge’s concept of news values, Joye, Heinrich and Wöhlert 
(2016: 5) opined that:  
Among the many lists of news values that have been drawn up by scholars and journalists, some 
attempt to describe news practices across cultures, while others have become remarkably specific 
to the press of certain (often Western) nations. In Western practice, decisions on the selection and 
prioritisation of news are made by editors based on their experience and intuition, although 
analysis by Galtung and Ruge showed that several factors are consistently applied across a range 
of news organizations. 
Galtung and Ruge (1965) theory of news values was later tested on the news presented in four 
different Norwegian newspapers from the Congo and Cuba cries of July 1960 and the Cyprus crisis 
of March-April 1964. According to Joe et al., Galtung and Ruge (1965) hypothesis of news values 
was tested in various countries and “the results were mainly consistent with their theory and 
hypothesis” (2016: 6). Later in 2001, Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) work was updated by Tony 
Harcup and Deirdre O’Neill (2001) in a seminal study that focused on the British press. Harcup 
and O’Neill’s content analysis study that analysed three main national newspapers in the United 
Kingdom was important in that it developed a set of values that could be applied to the 
contemporary world. Forty years on, they found some notable differences, including the rise of 
celebrity news and that good news (as well as bad news), was a significant news value, as well as 
the newspaper's agenda. They examined three tabloid newspapers. 
Yan argued that methodologically and conceptually, “news values can be approached from four 
different perspectives: material (focusing on the material reality of events), cognitive (focusing on 
people's beliefs and value systems), social (focusing on journalistic practice), and discursive 
(focusing on the discourse)” (2020: 41). Moreover, Bednarek stressed that a discursive perspective 
tries to systematically examine how news values such as Negativity, Proximity, Eliteness, and 
others, are constructed through words and images in published news stories (2019: 157). This 
approach is influenced by linguistics and social semiotics and is called "discursive news values 
analysis" (DNVA). It focuses on the "distortion" step in Galtung and Ruge's chain of news 
communication, by analysing how events are discursively constructed as newsworthy (1965: 65). 
However, in a briskly embryonic market, achieving relevance, giving audiences the news, they 
want and find interesting, is an increasingly important goal for media outlets seeking to maintain 
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market share (Reichstein and Brusch 2019: 1063). This has caused news establishments to be more 
open to their audience contribution and opinion and forced them to embrace and apply news values 
that attract and keep audiences. Given these changes and the rapid rise of digital technology in 
recent years, Harcup and O’Neill updated their 2001 study in 2016, while other scholars have 
analysed news values in viral news shared via social media. The progression of co-operative media 
and citizen journalism is swiftly changing the traditional difference that exists between news 
creators and docile audience and may perhaps in future lead to a redefinition of what "news" means 
and the role of the news industry (Reichstein and Brusch 2019: 1063). 
News values  
 
A myriad of internal and external factors poses a great amount of pressure on the journalistic 
decision (Moyo, Mare and Matsilele 2019: 490). This pressure is more common and heavily felt 
during the decision-making processes. Many different factors have the potential to influence 
whether an event is first noticed by a news organisation, second, a story will be written about that 
event, third how that story is written, and fourth whether this story will end up being published as 
news, if so, where it is placed (Harcup and O’Neill 2017: 1470). Owing to all these considerations, 
Moyo et al. argued that "there is no end to the list of news criteria" (2019: 490). Damstra and De 
Swert opined that there are multiple competing lists of news values (2020: 146). These can be 
classified into two categories. The first category includes aspects of events and actors. While the 
second category involves the aspects of news gathering and processing. Cape and Bednarek argued 
that:  
the selection criteria of news include not only the newsworthy aspects of happenings or 
news actors, or the professional practices of journalists, but also external aspects that 
impact journalism practice, such as the influence of proprietors or advertisers, meeting 
deadlines or competition among news providers (2016: 445). 
Therefore, in the following sections, the various news values that affect news selections are briefly 
discussed.   
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Values in news actors and events 
 
Frequency as a news value is associated with the events that occur abruptly and are in accordance 
with the news organisation’s agenda are more likely to be reported more than those events that 
occur slowly or at the ill-timed moment of day or night (Damstra and De Swert 2020: 146).  In the 
concept of frequency, continuing developments and trends less likely to obtain plentiful coverage 
(Harcup and O’neill 2017: 1470).  Moreover, timeliness, according to Galtung and Ruge refers to 
the selection of news events that have only just happened, are current, ongoing, or are about to 
happen are newsworthy (1965: 67). Familiarity also refers to the selection of news that has a lot to 
do with people or places close to the target audience. Harcup and O'Neill prefer the 
term proximity for this news value, which includes geographical and cultural proximity (2017: 
1470). Negativity is commonly associated with bad news. According to Damstra and De Swert, 
"bad news is more newsworthy than good news” (2020: 1464). Every so often referred to as "the 
basic news value". Contrariwise, it has also been put forward that positivity is news value in certain 
cases (such as sports news, science news, feel-good tabloid stories (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 67). 
Conflict is also another prominent news value. Conflict involves news selection predicated on the 
opposition of people or forces resulting in a dramatic effect. According to Caple and Bednarek 
events with conflict are often quite newsworthy (2016: 435). The news value of conflict is 
sometimes included in negativity rather than listed as a separate news value. Unexpectedness is a 
selection of news based on events that are out of the ordinary, unexpected, or rare are more 
newsworthy than routine, unsurprising events (Harcup and O’neill 2017: 1470). Moreover, 
ambiguity explains how news is selected based on events whose implications are made for better 
copy than those that are open to more than one interpretation, or where any understanding of the 
implications depends on first understanding the complex background in which the events take 
place (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 67). 
Values in the news process 
 
Continuity is one of the most common value in the news process. According to Tandoc Jr and Oh 
continuity involves a situation where a story that is already in the news gathers a kind of inertia 
(2017: 997).  Continuity is common because the media organisations are already in place to report 
the story, and partly because previous reportage may have made the story more accessible to the 
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public (making it less ambiguous) (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 67). Composition is also commonly 
cited by various scholars as a dominant factor in the news processes (Galtung and Ruge 1965; 
Tandoc Jr and Oh 2016; Harcup and O’Neill 2017). Muddiman and Stroud argued that composition 
refers to the idea that stories must compete with one another for space in the media (2017: 586). 
For instance, editors may strive to offer a balance of dissimilar types of coverage, so that if there 
is an excess of foreign news, for instance, the least important foreign story may have to make way 
for an item concerned with the domestic news (Muddiman and Stroud 2017: 586). In this way, the 
prominence given to a story depends not only on its news values but also on those of competing 
stories. Competition also plays a crucial role as a news value in the news processes. What this 
means is that commercial or professional competition that exists between media may lead a 
journalist to endorse the news value given to a story by a rival (García-Perdomo, Salaverría, Kilgo 
and Harlow 2018: 1180).  Caple and Bednarek argued that in news processes co-option occupies 
a crucial place. According to these scholars co-optation as a factor in news processes explains the 
types of a story that is only slightly newsworthy in its own right may be covered if it is related to 
a major running story (2016: 445). Further, prefabrication in news processes explains a story that 
is slight in news terms but the way it is presented may influence its selection as newsworthiness.  
Reichstein and Brusch argued that “prefabrication involves a story that is marginal in news terms 
but written and available may be selected ahead of a much more newsworthy story that must be 
researched and written from the ground up” (2019: 1063). Joye et al. argued that the predictability 
of a story affects its selection as newsworthy (2016: 5). According to these scholars, “an event is 
more likely to be covered if it has been pre-scheduled” (Joye et al. 2016: 5). Damstra and De Swert 
identified that the impact of the story on the audience allows it to be selected as newsworthy (2020: 
1464). For Damstra and De Swert “the impact of a published story (not the event), for example, 
whether it is being shared widely (sometimes called Shareability), read, liked, commented on. 
Engaging with such analytics is now an important part of newsroom practice” (2020: 1464). 
Reichstein and Brusch argued that the logistics of covering a news story play an important role in 
determining the newsworthiness of a story and therefore its publication. Reichstein and Brusch 
"although eased by the availability of global communications even from remote regions, the ability 
to deploy and control production and reporting staff, and functionality of technical resources can 
determine whether a story is covered” (2019: 1062).   
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Nevertheless, drawing on the two categories of the news values discussed in the previous sections. 
It is assumed that the IOL and News24 news selection processes and reportage of the ANC 2017 
election conference where the focus was specifically placed on the political and leadership 
qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa were in party influenced by any of 
the news values highlighted above. It is assumed that news personnel at IOL and Ns decision to 
cover certain aspects of the ANC elective conference, Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril 
Ramaphosa was influenced by as systems of criteria central to the decision-making process as to 
what will or will not be selected as news and as ideological constructs (Caple and Bednarek 2016: 
435). Additionally, drawing on the material perspective of the news values, it is further presumed 
in this study that certain aspects of the event itself (ANC 2017 December elective conference) 
heighten the likelihood of it becoming ‘news’. These aspects include the popularity of the ANC as 
a ruling party, the popularity of Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa and the conflict 
that arose during the voting process in the conference.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the literature that is relevant to the study. This chapter is significant because 
it placed the study in focus. Four sets of literature were reviewed. Firstly, the chapter reviewed the 
literature on media and legitimation strategies. Secondly, it reviewed the literature on the media 
framing of political leaders. Thirdly, it also reviewed the literature on the framing and presentation 
of female political leaders. The chapter discussed the literature on the various factors that influence 
media frames and news content. Finally, the concept of news values and how they affect the news 
processes was unpacked in the chapter. The next chapter presents and discusses the conceptual 
analysis and theoretical framework of the study. 
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Chapter 6: Theoretical and conceptual framework 
 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapter has focused on the review of relevant literature and presented three main 
areas of attention. The chapter also gave a historical overview of the surrounding issues relevant 
to this thesis. This current chapter presents the theory upon which this study is based.  
The study sought to examine how with the use of frames News24 and IOL legitimise and 
delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The framing theory is presented and 
discussed on how it naturally informs on the ideas of this thesis. The framing theory has been the 
subject of debate for many years and the discussion about its role and place in communication and 
political communication continues unabated. Nevertheless, in this current study the researcher 
examines the theory’s main attributes and the debates which surround them. When that is done, 
the researcher sets out to engage and apply some of the elements that are applicable to this current 
study. 
 
Framing theory  
 
The history of framing theory can be traced from two different disciplines. According to Scheufele 
and Tewksbury (2007), framing has both psychological and social roots. From the psychological 
point of view, the studies conducted in relation to framing have revealed that the same information 
that is presented to a similar audience can lead people to think differently or make different 
decisions (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). For example, 
Kahneman and Tversky cited in Scheufele and Tewksbury argued that the reason why there is 
always a difference in the interpretation of the information presented to people “is that a given 
consideration needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval and use” (2007: 8). What 
this means is that the processing of information that one does is directly or indirectly influenced 
by the frames of reference already existing in a person’s head. To illustrate this assertion, Scheufele 
and Tewksbury argue that if a person does not understand or comprehend a certain notion or topic, 
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that exact concept is not an accessible thought, and as a result that individual cannot be affected 
by any frame associated to that concept (2007: 8). Nevertheless, equivalence framing is related to 
the concept of loss and gain (Bazerman 1984 and Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In this case, 
frames are purposefully and logically equivalent. However, that logically equivalent information 
is presented in a certain way that either encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the 
meaningful context. Moreover, these “different but logically equivalent frames” motivates the 
individual to change their preferences in relation to an occurrence (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 
263).  
In relation to that Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar argue that equivalence frames are every so 
often presented in terms of opposite terms like “gains versus losses, full versus empty, fat versus 
fat-free” (2016: 8). Furthermore, in their study, Cacciatore et al.  stressed that individuals are more 
averse to risk when presented with the making choices in terms of gains (2016: 8). On the other 
end, if the same information is presented in terms of loses the same individuals are more risk-
seeking. Additionally, Kahneman and Tversky indicated that “human choice is more contingent 
on the description of choice problems” (1979: 263). To add, these scholars argued that when 
individuals are presented with outcomes defined as potential gains, individuals expressed risk 
aversion and chose certain payoff. But when the same outcome is presented in terms of losses 
rather than gains, individuals portray the attitude of risk seekers. Therefore, from its psychological 
roots, framing is understood to be how the information is presented as opposed to what is being 
presented (Cacciatore et al. 2016: 8). These types of frames are commonly used and associated 
with research that is related to framing effects (Scheufele and Iyengar 2014). Because of that, 
equivalency framing is beyond the scope of this section. This is so because in this study the 
researcher did not examine the effects of the frames on an induvial as they receive information, 
but examine how the media create and employed frames they used to legitimise and de-legitimise 
the Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the battle for the ANC presidency in 2017.    
The application of the framing theory in the field of sociology has revealed that framing 
encompasses the creation of meaning and how people succeed in making sense of their day-to-day 
interaction with the world (Cacciatore et al. 2016; Entman 1993; Entman 2007). Scholars like 
Cacciatore et al. defined this kind of framing as emphasis framing because certain sets of 
consideration are emphasised over the others (2016: 19). Emphasis framing is understood as a 
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persuasion technique in which case focus is placed on those specific aspects of an issue that 
encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context. The process of giving 
salience and consideration to a topic and concept is central to this study. This is so because this 
study endeavours to unpack how the use of certain frames (consideration of issues over others) 
was utilised by the media to legitimise and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma.  Moreover, the sociological roots of the framing theory can also be traced back to the works 
of Goffman (1974). In his study, Goffman argued that individuals make use of schemas of 
interpretation. Essentially, this means that individuals make use of a framework that assists them 
in making an otherwise hollow sequence of events into something that is meaningful (Goffman 
1974: 63). Therefore, this type of framing symbolises the process of communication where central 
organising ideas form the basis of the information that is to be communicated is presented. To 
illustrate, Gamson and Modigliani argued that emphasis framing must be understood as "central 
organising ideas” that gives meaning to a stream of unfolding events (1989: 3). Nevertheless, 
Shulman and Sweitzer argued that emphasis frames are common in studies that seek to examine 
how political issues are thematically portrayed, or the content being communicated (2018: 155). 
Thus, in this study, the researcher endeavours to examine the way the media engages in the process 
of “organising ideas” to create a narrative that assists them in legitimising or delegitimising the 
two political candidates who were vying to succeed Jacob Zuma as state president.  Additionally, 
emphasis framing will be applied to this study to explain how News24 and IOL emphasised on 
certain issues and presented them in such a way as to legitimise and delegitimise the leadership 
qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
 
Framing defined  
 
Different scholars have come up with differing definitions of the concept of framing (Goffman 
1974, Gitlin 1980 and Shulman and Sweitzer 2018). For example, Entman asserts that framing can 
be conceptualised as “the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a 
narrative that highlights connection among them to promote a particular interpretation” 
(2007:164). This definition emphasises the notion of selection and negation of other parts of an 
event and chose others to present them in a way that favours a pre-determined outcome. In relation 
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to the definition proposed by Entman (2007); Tewksbury and Scheufele (2007) argued that framing 
as known in the media is predicated on the key assumption that how a particular issue is categorised 
in the news reports can highly influence how the same issue is understood by the audience. More 
so, Scheufele and Iyengar said, “framing effects refer to behavioural or attitudinal outcomes that 
are not due to differences in what is being communicated, but rather to variations in how a given 
piece of information is being presented (or framed) in public discourse” (2012: 13). Similarly, 
Gitlin defined framing as the process that involves “persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, 
and presentation of selection, emphasis, and exclusion by which symbol-handlers routinely 
organize discourse” (1980: 23). This definition helps echo Pan and Kosicki’s conceptualisation of 
framing (1993: 57). According to these scholars, framing is a conscious or unconscious stratagem 
of creating and meting out news discourse or characterisations of the discourse itself (Pan and 
Kosicki’s definition 1993: 57). Tuchman (1987) cited in Chong and Druckman 2007: 103) stressed 
that frames in communication “organise everyday reality”. They do so by providing "meaning to 
an unfolding strip of events" and promoting "particular definitions and interpretations of a political 
issue" (Shah et al. 2002 cited in Chong and Druckman 2007: 103). 
In relation to Shah et al (2002) cited in Chong and Druckman (2007: 103), Jamieson and Campbell 
suggest that frames activate knowledge, stimulate “stocks of cultural morals and values, and create 
context” (1997: 72). By so doing, frames occupy a central position in communication as it is. 
Similarly, Maher argued that framing is “a process by which potential elements are either included 
or excluded from a message or its interpretation by virtue of a communicator’s organising 
principles” (2001: 99). Moreover, for scholars like Van Gorp, framing is the way in which 
journalists shape the news within some latent structures of meaning as well as the way audience 
view the world as journalists do (2007: 60).  
However, the huge number of definitions attached to the concept of framing is alarming. It is proof 
positive that a lot of conceptualisation and operationalisation of the concept has been tried by many 
scholars (Maher 2001; Pan and Kosicki 1993; Scheufele and Iyengar 2012; Van Gorp 2007). 
Whether they succeed or not that is beyond the scope of this study. However, for the purpose of 
this study, it is apparent that framing involves the process of communication through organising 
principles or ideas that are employed in the creation of reality characterised in news reports that 
help promote a certain interpretation. Therefore, this definition extended to this current study will 
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help to explain how in the process of communication journalists actively engage in the process of 
mental interpretation, presentation, prominence and omission of issues when they were reporting 
on the political contestation between Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. 
In reporting (constructing) of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, News24 and ILO 
can be said to have gathered and put together some elements of the two leaders’ leadership qualities 
in a bid to construct a reality that was reflected in their news discourses. Consequently, in exploring 
how the two-news media construct the reality in their reporting it is inevitable for the researcher 
not to consider the constructive approaches within the study. Thus, this study will inevitably infuse 
the constructive approach as it explores other framing approaches that might be pertinent to this 
study.  
Central to the process of framing is the use of frames. According to Gamson and Modigliani frames 
can be understood as “interpretive packages that give meaning to an issue” (1989: 3). For these 
scholars, lying at the heart of this package is “a central organising idea, or frame, for making sense 
of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue” (1989: 3). Similarly, Gitlin argues that frames are 
broadly unspoken and unacknowledged, that is crucial in organising the world for journalists who 
report them and to some extent, for the ordinary individual in most instances rely on the news 
report presented to them by the journalist (2003: 44). At the core of this current study is the need 
to elicit and explain the central organising ideas that affected and motivated the construction of 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as national and political leaders in South Africa. 
To achieve this, this study adopts the standpoint that there is an unspoken interrelationship between 
“the microcosmic elements in a given message and the macrocosmic worldview of the 
communicator” (Maher 2001: 6).  
Furthermore, Scheufele argues that framing should be understood on two levels. These two levels 
are macro level and micro level (1999: 103). For this scholar, as a macro construct, the concept 
"framing" can be interpreted as the styles of presenting information that reporters and other 
correspondents utilise to present information in a manner that reverberates with prevailing 
underlying schemas amongst their audience (Tewksbury and Scheufele 2007: 8). Moreover, 
schemas are defined as “cognitive structures that represent knowledge about a concept or type of 
stimulus including its attributes and the relations among attributes” (Fiske and Taylor 1991: 131). 
For Entman, schemas play a vital role in that they assist the audience to process and make sense 
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of new messages by deciding, deliberately or involuntarily, how the messages presented to them 
fit into their understanding and feelings about their surrounding environment (2007: 163). Thus, 
in the process of making decisions on how to tell the stories, journalists need to insert for their 
consumers prompts on how that narrative adheres with their entrenched attitudes and ideals. In 
relation to that, Reese took a step further and applies the element of time (2007: 148). To that end, 
this scholar argues that “frames are organising principles that are socially shared and persistent 
over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (Reese 2007: 148). 
Thus, drawing from the previous assertion by Reese (2007: 148), it can be argued that in framing 
the leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, journalists at News24 
and ILO did not just create and impose their particular world views on their audience, rather they 
evoked time-tested worldviews and paradigms that were in sync with those of their intended 
audience. This can be explained by Tuchman (1987) cited by Scheufele (1999: 119). Tuchman 
argues that “the mass media dynamically set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to 
interpret and discuss public events” (Tuchman 1987 cited by Scheufele 1999: 119). In relation to 
the previous assertion, Neuman, Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) cited in Scheufele (1999: 119) 
assert that the mass media give a spin to any given story. It achieves this by considering their 
“organisational and modality constraints, professional judgments, and certain judgments about the 
audience” (Scheufele (1999: 119).     
According to Reese frames are “structures that draw boundaries, set up categories, define some 
ideas as out and others in, and generally operate to snag related ideas in their net in active process” 
(2007: 150). Owing to this assertion, one can reason that frames must not be seen in the light of 
mere story topics or themes such as crime or business (Chambwera 2016: 45). Rather, frames are 
fundamental in that they construct specific meanings around topics through emphasis, 
interpretation, and omission. Drawing on this line of reasoning, it can be argued that when 
analysing frames in the newspapers' stories as is done in the current study, it is of vital importance 
that one does so and rises above the text to investigate the influence around how the text was 
presented (Chambwera 2016: 45).  
Moreover, D’Angelo demonstrates that framing is steered by a “combination of cognitive, 
constructivist and critical perspectives” (2002: 878). The cognitive paradigm of frames explains 
the process of individual interaction with the media text and then make use of their prior knowledge 
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or interpretive schemas to make meaning of the text. According to D’Angelo in a cognitive state 
“frames exist as prior knowledge, used by individuals to “efficiently” process information 
conveyed in news frames” (2002: 878). To illustrate this point, individuals can also converse about 
political issues using their mental frames about those issues (Gamson 1992: 44). This relates to 
Neuman et al.’s observation that a person’s prior knowledge makes available a basis to 
“alternatively accept, ignore, and reinterpret the dominant frames offered by the media” (1992: 
44). On the other hand, the critical paradigm examines frames as “controlling, hegemonic and tied 
to larger elite structure” (Reese: 2007: 150). Moreover, the constructionist paradigm perceives 
news reporters as originators of interpretive packages of the viewpoints of politically interested 
patrons and a frame can dominate news coverage for a long time (D’Angelo 2002: 870). The 
argument of the constructivist paradigm relates to Gamson and Modigliani’s assessment of frames. 
They perceive frames as “central organizing principles” (1989: 25). However, while the current 
study lies heavily within the constructivist paradigm, it also borrows some ideas from the critical 
paradigm in as far as it examines power contestations manifesting as well as influencing the frames 
used and applied by News24 and ILO. The cognitive paradigm is applied in this case to explain 
how the constructed portrayal of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were supposed 
to reverberate with the cognitive schemas of their addresses.  
 
Episodic and thematic frames 
 
A further useful distinction of frames can be seen in the works of Gross (2008), Iyengar (1990) 
and Scheufele (1999). According to Gross, frames can be separated into episodic or thematic 
frames (2008: 169).  Episodic frames are events or context. Fundamentally, episodic frames are 
constructed in a manner that helps to limit the audience's comprehension of problems or political 
issues in the context of what is being reported, not making any connection between problems 
(Gross 2008: 169). According to de Vreese episodic frames can also be referred to issue-based 
frames (2005: 51). For de Vreese, issue-specific frames allow for “a profound level of specificity 
and details relevant to the event or the issue under investigation” (2005:51). This ensures a high 
level of issue-sensitivity. On the other hand, thematic frames are understood as the types of frames 
that place issues within the wider context. Gross argued that thematic frames allow the audience 
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the privilege to create connections between problems and place them in broader and inclusive 
societal discourse (2008: 173). However, placing the two types of frames in context, thematic 
frames was more applicable in this thesis, considering that the study aimed to examine the 
representation of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the context of an election. 
To achieve this examination, the context within which the press reported the two political 
candidates had to be examined from a perspective of thematic rather than episodic frames. The 
assumption informing this study is that the representation of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril 
Ramaphosa was informed by deep embedded historical narratives as well as the broader social 
discourse of politics in the country. 
Scheufele and Tewksbury said that there are two types of frames, namely media and individual 
frames (2007: 9). This is so because frames are understood as schemes that are operationalised to 
present and to understand the news. Scheufele and Tewksbury’s (2007: 9) assertion derives its 
inspiration from the argument put forward by Kinder and Sanders who argued that, “frames serves 
both as devices embedded in political discourse, which is equivalent to the concept of media 
frames, and as internal structures of the mind, which is equivalent to individual frames” (1990: 
77). To illustrate, frames, therefore, consciously and unconsciously organise the world both for 
journalists who report it and to some considerable extent for those who rely on the news report 
from the journalists (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 9).  
 
Media frames and individual frames  
 
Media frames are normally understood as “the central organising idea or storyline that provides 
meaning to unfolding strips of events” (Gamson and Modiglian 1987: 37). Central to this type of 
frame is the “essence of the issue”. This type of frame also assumes that the frames and media’s 
role predicated on turning hollow and nonrecognisable activities into a noticeable occurrence. In 
relation to that, Tuchman cited in Fountaine and McGregor (2001) also conceptualised media 
frames as the type of frames that organise everyday reality and the news frame is part and parcel 
of everyday reality. It also perceived as an important feature of the news. What this means is that 
media frames “are central to journalism as they work as routines for journalists that allow them to 
swiftly identify and organize information and to package it for efficient relay to the audience” 
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(Gitlin 1980: 79). Therefore, the concept of media framing can comprise the intention of the 
source, but the purposes can also be unintentional.  
On the other end, the individual frames are defined as the “information-processing schemata of 
individuals and media frames as attributes of the news itself” (Giltin 1980: 78). According to 
Friedland and Zhong “frames are bridges that connect the broader social and cultural spheres and 
everyday understanding of social interaction” (1996: 2). Scheufele defined individual frames as 
“mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individual processing of information” (2012: 13). To 
that end, there are also two levels at which this type of framing can operate. What this means is 
that two levels of reference can be used to interpret and process information: global and long-term 
political view and short term, issues related to framings. According to Scheufele global political 
views are a result of certain personal characteristics of individuals and have a rather limited 
influence on the perception and interpretation of political problems, short term, issue-related 
frames of reference can have a significant impact on perceiving, organizing, and interpreting 
incoming information and on drawing inferences from that information (2012: 13). Similarly, 
McLeod argued that individual frames refer to the “cognitive devices that operate as non-
hierarchical categories that serve as a form of major headings into which any future news content 
can be filed” (1987: 78). To add, Chong and Druckman argued that individual frames refer to an 
individual’s mental comprehension of a specific situation (2007: 101). These scholars said, “unlike 
frames in communication, which reflect a speaker’s emphasis, frames in thought refer to what an 
audience member believes to be the most salient aspect of an issue” (Chong and Druckman 2007: 
101). Thus, from these assertions, individual frames denote the process through which the audience 
make sense of the political news they receive from the media.  
This study is more concerned with media frames as opposed to individual frames. Essentially, 
individual frames are not applicable to this current study because they are concerned with how the 
audience receives the frames as presented to them by the media. Whereas this study is interested 
in examining how the media frames operate in constructing meaning that influenced the 
representation of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.   
 
Frames as independent and dependent variables  
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Scheufele categorised frames into independent and dependent variables (1999: 103). On one hand, 
dependent frames involve the various factors that influence the creation and modification of 
various frames. For example, at the media level, a reporter or journalist may be influenced by a 
myriad of factors such as social-structures or organizational variables (Scheufele 2007: 9). In this 
study media frames analysis is useful as it helps to address the question: what other factors 
influence the journalists or other societal groups to frame certain issues in the way they do it?  
Shoemaker and Reese argued that the dependent frames can refer to the effects of the individual 
or ideological disposition of an individual, while at the individual level, dependent frames are an 
outcome of the way an individual can frame an issue (1996: 34). Basically, dependent frames look 
at the relationship of frames to other variables. Thus, it can be assumed that the frames that were 
used to report news on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were probably influenced 
by other surrounding factors such as the journalistic culture of an organisation or the individual 
organizational culture of that certain organization.  
In this study, the research question: what other factors influenced the framing of Cyril Ramaphosa 
and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma will be examined from the perspective of media frames as 
dependent variables. Dependent variables are of crucial importance because they will help in this 
current study to explain the outcome (frames) of the production process. This includes 
organisational pressures, journalistic routines, and elite discourse (de Vreese 2005: 52).  
On the other hand, independent frames are concerned with the frames that are independent of other 
variables. In this type of frames, the main issue is the question:  what kind of frames influence the 
audience’s perception of certain issues, and how does this process work? Scheufele argued that in 
independent frames, “the most logical outcome is a link to audience frames’’ (1999: 108). 
However, since the main question that is answered by the research that examines media frames as 
independent variables is limited to “what kind of media frames influences the audience's 
perception of certain issues, and how does this process work” (Scheufele1999: 108). These kinds 
of media frames will not be applicable to this current study.  
 
Framing and agenda setting  
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The terms framing, agenda setting, and priming have attracted substantial scholarly attention since 
their introduction (De Vreese 2005; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Scheufele 2012). Generally, 
agenda setting refers to the notion that there is a strong and solid correlation that exists between 
the emphasis that a communicator places on any given issue (e.g. ‘based on relative placement or 
amount of coverage’) and the significance given to those specific issues by the receiving audience 
(McCombs and Shaw 1972: 176). Scheufele defined agenda setting as “the transfer of salience 
from mass media to audience” (2012: 13). Thus, what agenda setting means is that if a certain 
topic is covered more frequently in the new media, there are high chances that the audience will 
regard the most covered issue as more important (McCombs and Shaw 1972: 176). However, 
priming refers to “the changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations” 
(Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 63). In simple terms, priming is understood to function when news 
content suggests to news audience that they ought to use specific issues as yardsticks for assessing 
the conduct and performance of social and political leaders. Iyengar and Kinder said priming is 
when “media coverage makes an issue more salient in people's minds, this issue is also more likely 
to be used as one of the standards by which governments, policies, and candidates for public office 
are judged” (1978: 63). 
Scheufele stressed that priming is normally seen as an appendage of agenda setting (2007: 13). In 
this case, priming is said to be an extension of agenda setting based on two reasons. Firstly, both 
agenda setting and priming are grounded on a ‘memory-based model of information processing’ 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1973: 208). To illustrate, Iyengar and Kinder argued that the models 
assume that people form attitudes based on the considerations that are utmost salient and available 
to them when they are faced with a situation that requires them to decide (1987: 35). In relation to 
that, Tversky and Kahneman stressed that “judgments and attitude formation are directly correlated 
with the ease in which instances or associations could be brought to mind” (1973: 208). Secondly, 
priming is argued to be an extension of agenda setting based on the theoretical foundations. Collins 
and Loftus argued that when making some issues more salient in the audience’s mind (agenda 
setting), the media can affect and influence the considerations that people consider when making 
judgments about political candidates or issues (priming) (1975: 409).  
However, for the purpose of this study, a distinction between agenda setting and framing is 
analysed. The relationship between the two has sparked a continuous debate (Cacciatore et al, 
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2015). According to the De Vreese the main difference between the two concepts is that while 
agenda setting deals with the salience of issues, framing deals more with the presentation of those 
issues (2005: 1). Agenda setting is defined as the idea that there is a strong relationship between 
the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues and the importance that the audience place 
on those same issues (McCombs and Shaw 1972 cited in Scheufele 2007). Framing, therefore, 
differs greatly from agenda setting simply because it is founded on the assumption that how an 
issue is characterised in the news reports is likely going to have an influence on how its intended 
audience will receive and understand it (Scheufele 2012: 45).  
Drawing on Scheufele’s model of agenda-setting and framing classification, the difference 
between agenda-setting and framing will be explained by examining two questions. These are: a) 
how the news messages are processed and b) how the effects are produced (Scheufele 2007: 148). 
These questions will be tested against the two theories simultaneously. 
 
News processing  
 
According to Scheufele another level of comparison between agenda setting and framing can be 
done by comparing the differences that exist between the model of media effects (2007: 13). To 
that end, the question that should be asked in this comparison is whether the consumers of the 
news content encounter the same experience when they are exposed to the two processes (agenda-
setting and framing). Simply put, the comparison is premised on questioning the amount of 
attention to news content that an individual need for the two processes to take place. For framing 
scholars (Scheufele 2012; 2007; Tewksbury and Scheufele 2007), it is normal to assume that 
framing effects take place only when the audience of the news content place considerable attention 
to the news messages. For example, Scheufele argues that “the content and implications of an issue 
frame are likely to be most apparent to an audience member who pays attention to a news story” 
(2007:13).  
On the other end, a similar logic of comparison can be applied to the agenda-setting process. 
Eveland argues that “people attending to a message and engaging in some level of elaboration of 
it are most likely to recall information about it later” (2004: 177). Essentially, what this means is 
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that the accessibility of an issue- and therefore its place on the agenda - may be higher when people 
attend to messages about it. However, from the above illustration, it may seem that agenda setting, 
and framing are operating at the same phenomenological process, but within the process of news 
processing by the audience lies a significant distinction. Scheufele reasoned that “attention to 
messages may be more necessary for framing to occur than an agenda-setting effect” (2007: 14). 
The argument advanced by Scheufele (2007: 14) is similar to the findings from Chong and 
Druckman’s study (2000). Chong and Druckman suggest that the mere repetition of frames may 
have a huge effect on the less knowledgeable persons that are less focused to marginal prompts 
but more “more knowledgeable individuals are more likely to engage in systematic information 
processing by comparing the relative strength of alternative frames in competitive situations” 
(Chong and Druckman 2000: 45)  
Therefore, drawing on the assertion by Scheufele (2012; 2007 and 1999), the most evident 
distinction between agenda setting and framing based on the model of effects is that sheer exposure 
to the news texts is enough to trigger the process of agenda-setting, but it is not the same with the 
framing process. For the framing process to set in motion, it needs more than exposure to the news 
content. An individual requires both exposures and that the audience pays enough and thoughtful 
attention to the messages as they are presented to them with latent meaning packaged in various 
forms (Scheufele 2007: 9).  
 
Locus of effects  
 
Another level of comparison of framing and agenda-setting is the “locus of cognitive effect” 
(Scheufele 2007:15). According to Scheufele “in both framing and agenda-setting the audience 
process information provided by the news and store it in memory” (2007:15). Agenda setting 
approach is premised on the memory-based models of information processing and this makes it 
fall within the framework of accessibility model. Price and Tewksbury argued that the agenda-
setting effects believes that the crux of effects is dependent on the heightened and increased 
accessibility a topic or issue obtains from its handling in the news (1997: 481). Drawing on this 
analysis, it can be postulated that in agenda-setting, it is not the information about the subject/issue 
that influences the audience. Rather it is the amount of processing time and consideration that is 
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placed on an issue that conveys the effect. Contrary, the framing approach assumes that the locus 
of effects lies within the description of an issue or the label used in news coverage about the issue. 
Scheufele argues that “it is the underlying interpretive schemas that have been made applicable to 
the issue that are central effects of a frame” (2007: 15). Therefore, from the level of psychology, 
the difference that exists between framing and agenda setting is the matter of “whether we think 
about an issue and how we think about it” (Scheufele 2007: 16). 
 
Second level agenda setting  
 
Scholars like McCombs and Shaw argued that there is no convincing comparison that can be drawn 
between agenda setting and framing (1972: 176). To illustrate this argument, McCombs argue that 
framing can only be understood as an extension or improved form of agenda setting (2005: 453). 
From McCombs and Shaw's framework of agenda setting, framing refers to making characteristics 
of an issue more prominent by presenting them to the audience in different modes, as a result 
shifting audience's attention (1972: 176). Weaver, McCombs and Shaw coined this aspect “second 
level agenda setting” (2004: 273). Ghanem likened framing to agenda setting because it is 
concerned with the process of how the news media tell the audience about how to think about 
issues (1997: 3). Moreover, Entman defined framing “as the process of selecting some aspects of 
a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment 
recommendations for the item described” (1993: 51). However, reacting to Entman’s (1993) 
definition of framing, McCombs and Ghanem argued that Entman’s definition can be rephrased to 
read hence: “framing is the construction of agenda with a restricted number of thematically related 
attributes in order to create a coherent picture of a particular object” (McCombs and Ghanem 2001: 
89). Additionally, expanding his earlier definition, Entman stressed that “agenda setting is equal 
to successfully performing the first function of framing, that is, to define problems worthy of public 
and government attention” (2007: 163). Therefore, for Entman attribute or second level agenda 
setting encompasses framing’s main business of highlighting the causes of problems, encouraging 
moral judgments and promoting favoured policies (2007: 163).  
102 
 
Though the definition of Entman (2007) highlighted above, is regarded as one of the best and 
widely cited, most scholars have criticised it for failing to explain the similarity between framing 
and agenda setting (Cacciatore et al. 2015; Scheufele and Iyengar 2012; Scheufele and Tewksbury 
2007). For example, Scheufele and Iyengar (2012) stressed that the definition of framing proposed 
by Entman (2007) has brought a lot of confusion when it tried to differentiate from agenda setting. 
Scheufele said, “the all-encompassing definition of framing also helped set the stage for a 
conceptual vagueness surrounding the concept of framing that is still lingering in many studies on 
the topic today” (2012: 6). However, Scheufele stressed that the imprecision in the early definitions 
has led scholars like McCombs (2005) to propose for framing to be regarded as the appendage of 
agenda setting (Scheufele 2012:7). McCombs (2005) was motivated to call framing an extension 
of agenda setting chiefly because of the definition given by Entman (1993) that refers to salience, 
which is normally regarded as a key characteristic of agenda setting. Nevertheless, Scheufele and 
Iyengar note that a group of scholars who call for framing to be regarded as extensions appendage 
of agenda setting contend that mass media “influence audience perceptions by highlighting the 
importance of issues (first level agenda setting) or issue attributes (second level agenda setting, 
which they see as equivalent to framing)” (Scheufele and Iyengar 2012: 9).  
Therefore, one key difference between priming, agenda setting, and framing is that priming, and 
agenda setting are “accessibility-based effects” (Iyengar 1990: 21). According to Funkhouser cited 
in Scheufele, “media coverage can influence perceptions of salience among the lay audience, either 
for particular issues or attributed of issues (Funkhouser 1973 cited in Scheufele 2012: 7). 
Effectively, what this means is that the amplified salience means that pertinent nodes in the minds 
of the mass media consumers get stimulated and that this stimulation is distributed to interrelated 
ideas (Collins and Loftus 1975: 407). Consequently, these sets of nodes are easily and readily 
accessible and thus “retrievable from memory when we have to make decisions about candidates 
or policy choices and are more likely to influence our attitudes and evaluations” (Iyenga 1990: 
23). On the other end, framing is based on “applicability effect” (Price and Tewksbury 1997: 481). 
To illustrate, scholars who believe framing to be based on applicability effect argue that a frame 
is enervated or reinforced based on their applicability to a certain cognitive schema (Price and 
Tewksbury 1997: 481). In simple terms, the presentation of an issue or information (i.e., frame) 
makes it less or more probable for that information to be processed by means of utilising a certain 
schema. In relation to this, Bruner and Minturn (1955) cited in Scheufele (2012) note that, “If 
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presented (or framed) in a sequence of numbers, the stimulus is more likely to be processed as a 
number, but if presented in the context of other letters, it is more likely to be processed as a letter” 
(Bruner and Minturn 1955 cited in Scheufele (2012: 19). 
Therefore, the different theoretical foundations of “accessibility and applicability effects” have 
significant effects for fathoming the mechanism through which agenda setting, priming, and 
framing is premised. For instance, Scheufele argues that the theoretical mechanisms suggest that 
accessibility effects function collectively across the mass media audience (2012: 8). However, this 
does not rule out the moderating effect of the level of influence that political sophistication or pre-
existing knowledge on an issue have on agenda setting or priming. Iyengar and Kinder’s seminal 
work has already revealed that the political sophistication and pre-existing knowledge have 
significant and moderating effects on agenda setting and priming (1987: 35). Thus, in summation, 
the underlying theoretical assumption of agenda setting and priming stress that a topic can be 
primed or made prominent to the audience, even if they do not possess any background information 
of that issue (Scheufele 2012: 9). On the contrary, the applicability models believe effects like 
framing are dependent and vary in strength depending on an audience’s established schemas 
(Scheufele 2012: 9). Thus, for Scheufele, in framing, “the representation of information will be 
significantly more likely to have an impact if it resonates and is applicable to audience members 
mental schemas” (2012: 9). To illustrate, what the above quote entails is that the effects of framing 
in the audience are less likely to occur if the mass audience does not possess the relevant schemas 
or pre-existing knowledge of the issue reported by the media. 
Carragee and Roefs argued that combining framing with agenda-setting fails to take into 
consideration certain means in which frames create meanings and how they advance certain modes 
of perceiving topics (2004: 218). In addition to that, these scholars further argued that if we reduce 
framing to the level of agenda, we risk the problem of ignoring how certain frames apply to various 
issues and how a sole topic position can be a by-product of a single frame (Carragee and Roefs 
2004: 218). To illustrate their argument, Carragee and Roefs used the example of American policy 
from the aftermath of World War II to the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991(2004: 218). They 
said an examination of this event (Soviet Union's dissolution) may assist in identifying frames as 
they relate to certain countries, for instance, Vietnam. However, an investigation of that nature 
may neglect “that the ideological character of the Cold War frame informed news coverage of 
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American policies in many nations across four decades" (Carragee and Roefs 2004: 218). Relating 
the above assertion to this current study, the argument could be imperative in that an agenda-setting 
perspective may pay attention to the ideology operating at the time of the event neglecting how 
even a pre-independence ideology, for instance, one-party state, could have informed the news 
coverage of the two newspapers.  
The pedigrees of agenda-setting, and framing can also be another aspect that can be used to 
differentiate the two concepts. Carragee and Roefs argued that while agenda-setting has its 
ancestries in media effects, the same cannot be said about framing (2004: 218). For these scholars, 
framing is different from agenda-setting because its roots are deep and can be traced from the 
sociological research of scholars like Goffman (1974: 76). To add, framing can also be seen to 
have originated from the sociological work of Tuchman (1978) and Gitlin (1980). These scholars 
researched on how different frames could inform news production as well as the implications that 
the frames have ideologically. However, drawing on the above discussion, it is reasonable to argue 
that while attribute agenda-setting may describe the attributes of an object of particular news 
coverage which are meant to promote a particular meaning, frames are what informs the production 
of the news in the first place. It is frames and framing that govern what attributes will be attached 
to a specific object. To illustrate, Borah argues that in political matters “framing refers to the 
characterisations of a course of action where a central organising idea provides meaning to the 
event.” (2011: 248). It therefore appears from these scholars that although agenda setting and 
framing are harmonising, they are essentially not similar and the demand for framing to be treated 
at second level agenda setting places restricting limits on the functionality of frames. In a nutshell, 
this study, therefore, draws on the assertion by Reese (2011: 52). Reese asserts that “while the two 
(framing and agenda setting) are associated agenda setting does not take into account the more 
dynamic organising ability of frames” (2011: 52). Similarly, Chibuwe (2013) cited in Chambwera 
(2016: 52) argues that “it is the frames that a media organization employs that determine the 
salience given to the objects as well as the objects attributes” (Chambwera 2016: 52).  
 
Framing and culture   
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This study examined the use of framing to legitimise or delegitimise the leadership qualities of 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma during and after the 2017 ANC elective 
conference. This electoral conference can be described as a highly competitive environment. 
Chong and Druckman argued that “politics is typically competitive, fought between parties or 
ideological factions and the issues that are debated are framed in opposing terms” (2007: 99). In 
relation to that Carragee and Roefs note that the dispersal of political, economic and cultural 
resources in any given society has a tendency of shaping frame sponsorship and framing contests, 
thus studying the construction of reality through framing essentially encompasses the investigation 
of power (Carragee and Roefs 2004: 216-217).  
The above-discussed framing position resonates with Hall's (1997) argument on framing and 
power. Hall contends that social and political power cannot be overlooked when one is examining 
media effects (1997: 51). Similarly, Entman echoed Hall’s (1997) argument and stressed that 
framing occupies a central position in the political process (Entman 2007: 163). What this means 
is that power as we perceive it and speak about it is not a sanctuary of the select few but “frame 
production is a multifaceted process in which influence travels in different directions” (Borah 
2011: 250). Therefore, the fact that the production of frames is affected by a plethora of factors 
that operate at different dimension paves way for the inclusion of the discussion of discourse and 
power in this study. Discourse and power are some of the variables that influence the production 
of media frames (Hall 1997: 55). Consequently, the use of Michel Foucault's (1980) concepts of 
discourse, power/knowledge will be unpacked in the following sections.  
Apart from power, culture is another notion that has been neglected by framing (Van Gorp 2007). 
Van Gorp contends that there is a need to examine “how frames as part of culture get embedded 
in media content, how they work and how they interact with the schemata of both journalists and 
the audience member” (2007:61). Hall stress that culture is the sphere of construction and 
dissemination of meaning between members of a society (Hall 1997: 55). News reporters in news 
media deliberately or unconsciously hand-pick frames drawing from the innumerable cultural 
reserves of frames that are readily accessible. These stocks of frames are in sync with a person’s 
belief system together with other influences inside and outside the media situation (Van Gorp 
2007: 61). As a result, this study adopts the view that framing encompasses the interchange that 
happens between the “textual level” (that is frames applied in the media) the extra-media level (the 
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discourse of frame sponsors) and the reserves of frames that are readily available and accessible 
in any given culture (Van Gorp 2007: 63). 
 
Framing, discourse power/knowledge  
 
This study employed the Foucauldian perspective to examine the frames that were used by News24 
and ILO when they covered Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. To investigate 
framing from a Foucauldian point of view, this study adopted the view that the news media in 
South Africa operate as political institutions who are also products of the power dynamics and are 
responsible for diffusing the power relations embedded in the broader South African society.  
Frames are referred to as “largely unspoken and unacknowledged” (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 
13). The concept of discourse as proposed is relevant to this study as it proposes the analysis of 
text beyond its face value. Discourse analysis presupposes the analysis of the present text beyond 
its surface attributes (Foucault 1980). In this study, the approach that was adopted aimed to explain 
the frames that were utilised by News24 and ILO to explain “the history of the present” (Foucault 
1980: 90). According to Hook, when one seeks to explain the history of the present, they engage 
in the process where they “interrogates the present, examines its values, discourses and 
understandings with recourse to the past as resource of destabilising critical knowledge.” (2001: 
20). This is the reason in the previous chapter the researcher sought to evaluate the background of 
the two leaders (Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) and how they arose to become 
prominent individuals both at a party and national level.  Moreover, as concluded by Maher (2001: 
99) that the “the microcosmic elements of the text need to be related to macrocosmic elements 
outside the text” relates perfectly with the proposition made by Hooks when he contends that: 
 If one is to guard that one's analytic efforts do not result in mere markings of textuality, 
with limited political relevance, restricted generalisability, and stunted critical 
penetration, then it will be necessary to corroborate the findings of textual analysis with 
reference to certain extra-textual factors (history, materiality, conditions of possibility) 
to drive the analysis of the discursive through the extra-discursive (Hook 2001: 38). 
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Foucault defined discourse as “the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an 
individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a 
number of statements” (1980: 66). Bloor and Bloor stressed that “discourse can also refer to actual 
written text or spoken data, and to the whole act of communication involving production and 
comprehension, not necessarily entirely verbal” (2017: 153). According to the above assertion, 
discourse can therefore be understood as the process of communication that encompasses notions 
like environment, contextual information or knowledge that is common to both a producer of text 
and their audience. Further, Mills stresses that when Foucault refers to “the general domain of all 
statements” he was referring to all “meaning-producing utterances and statements which have 
some effect” (Mills 2003: 53). Further, by “individualisable group of statements”, Foucault 
referred to utterances which combine into a grouping as in when we refer to a discourse of 
femininity (Foucault 1980: 66). More so, Foucault refers to discourse as “the regulated practices 
that account for a number of statements are the unwritten rules and structures which produce 
particular utterances and statements” (Mills 2003: 53). Taking a closer look at the expression that 
“the regulated practices that account for a number of statements”, the expression gives the 
impression that discourse bears some semblance to frames. It can therefore be inferred that frames 
are an integral part of the discourse and as such, corroborating framing and the Foucauldian 
concept of discourse in this current study assisted in answering the research questions:  What other 
political, economic and social conditions that may have informed the framing of Cyril Ramaphosa 
and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma?. Moreover, the concept of discourse was a useful tool in helping 
the researcher to understand the context that influenced the coverage of news by News24 and ILO. 
It also laid the foundation for the critical discourse analysis that was employed as a data analysis 
technique in this study. 
Conceptualising framing as a function of discourse, therefore assisted the researcher to dig deep 
beyond the written text in our analysis. This is because as argued by Hook, discourse analysis 
equips the author with the ability to interchange simultaneously in or out of the media text (2001: 
38). In addition to that D’Angelo also stressed that frames are two folded in their functioning, they 
are both “internal structures of the mind” and “devices embedded in political discourse.” (2002: 
23). Consequently, in adopting this line of reasoning the study tried to circumvent the shortfall of 
treating “frames as mere story topics or object attributes” (D’Angelo 2002: 23). As such, this study 
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concurs with Carragee and Roefs who argued that frames should not be treated as simple story 
topic (2004: 220).  
According to Mills, the concept of discourse that was advanced by Foucault is intrinsically 
connected with power relations (2003: 34). Foucault argued that “the relations of power cannot 
themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, 
circulation, and functioning of discourse” (1980: 93). Therefore, trying to understand discourse, 
“through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp, precisely the points at which 
discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power” (Foucault 1980: 70). 
Consequently, in this study explaining frames utilised by News24 and ILO to frame the political 
leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma made it easy for the researcher to 
understand the power relations that were obtained in the period leading and during the 2017 ANC 
elective national conference. Nevertheless, it is imperative to highlight how:   
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than 
silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby 
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling 
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits 
and produces power, it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile 
and makes it possible to thwart it (Foucault 1980 in Mills 2003: 54-55). 
In line with the above assertion, it can be noted that frames like discourse are “open to resistance 
and contestations” (Chong and Druckman 2007: 115). In addition to that Chong and Druckman 
note that politics is naturally competitive, as a result, issues that are produced for public discussion 
are framed in binary terms (2007: 115). Therefore, when explaining frames that were employed 
by News24 and ILO, the researcher is disposed of in explaining framing in a competitive 
environment in which different news media could use a single frame but, in an effort, to advance 
a conflicting discourse. This approach will, therefore, avoid the pitfall of making frames “all-
powerful organizing principles whose authenticity and authority could never be challenged” 
(Carragee and Roefs 2004: 115). This is because, in communication, there are chances that 
numerous frames can be adopted in direct or indirect incongruity to each other.  
In every discourse, there are rules and conventions that give discourse identity and actualise its 
functional parameters. Foucault argued that “the rules of formation are conditions of existence for 
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a particular discourse” (1989: 24). In simple terms, the functioning of any given discourse is reliant 
on several enabling conditions. Drawing on this line of thinking, this study adopted the approach 
that discourse emanating from News24 and ILO were influenced and informed by a myriad of 
“historical, institutional, cultural, political, economic and social practices operating as discourse 
conditioners or enablers” (Chambwera 2016: 55). The discourse enablers or conditioners could 
include the history News24 and ILO, the ownership set up of the newspaper, a cultural practice 
that informs news production and reporting, economic and socio-political dynamics that are 
obtaining in the country and in which the two media institutions were operating. The discourse 
enablers occupy a crucial place in the process of frame production. To illustrate the above, Fourie 
notes that in the process of text creation, there are clusters of people who are guided by text 
production conventions that in turn out to be discursive practices (2009: 22). Therefore, this study 
examined these discursive practices in its endeavour to explain the frames that were used by 
News24 and ILO.  
Foucault argued that there is no such thing as neutral knowledge (1980: 69). For him, all 
knowledge, all "scientific" discourses, are intrinsically and intimately bound up with power. This 
would form what Foucault referred to as power/knowledge. Mills argues that knowledge 
discourses work within “institutions with their own “technologies” or techniques to regulate social 
conduct” (2003: 38). Therefore, it seems from the above expression that knowledge is a form of 
power which also operates to disseminate power (Foucault 1980: 69). This could be said about the 
media as producers of knowledge. The media is understood as key players in producing 
knowledge. Chambwera argues that “the media are key in knowledge production thus they become 
conduits for various relations of power in what Foucault calls the politics of knowledge” (2016: 
57). To substantiate the above assertion, it can be argued that the knowledge that is communicated 
by the media is not value-free (Chambwera 2016: 57). Since the process of obtaining knowledge 
is continuous in nature, it follows that the media are very cautious to utilise relevant frames that 
reverberate with the fixed mental schemas of their targeted audience (Chambwera 2016: 58). This 
observation compares to Foucault’s assertion concerning the 18th-century researcher and 
knowledge. Foucault asserts that “the 18th-century researches that were not just based on the 
collection of raw data but in terms of schemas which were more or less clear or conscious for 
them” (Foucault 1980: 74). Framing encompasses the process of linking some facets of reality to 
inspire a specific way of processing and interpreting information among the audience (Entman 
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2007: 169). For Foucault, power relations “go right down into the depth of society… they are not 
localised in the relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes” 
(Foucault 1995: 27). Drawing on this line of thinking, this study adopts the view that the forces 
involved in the process of frame production employed in the construction of the reality of the 
political leadership Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma are not solitary but multi-
faceted.  
Because power and knowledge are complementary, this current study examines how News24 and 
ILO were involved in communicating text and meaning replete with power when they were 
disseminating news. Whose goal was to legitimise or delegitimise either Cyril Ramaphosa or 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Foucault argues that, “as a discourse fixes text with a specific meaning, 
it disqualifies other meanings and interpretations” (1980: 65). Further, Foucault speaks of this 
discursive process as “reducing the contingencies (the other meanings) of text, in order to eliminate 
the differences which could challenge or destabilise the meaning and power of the discourse” 
(1980: 65). Therefore, this study endeavours to interrogate how the vacillation of power 
manifesting through frames in online press reports operated to legitimise or delegitimise Cyril 
Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The study draws inspiration from Foucault’s argument 
that “one cannot confine oneself to analysing the state apparatus alone if one wants to grasp the 
mechanisms of power in their detail and complexity” (Foucault 1980: 69).  
Moreover, Foucault argued that power and knowledge complement each other (1980: 65). 
According to Mill power and knowledge supplement, each other and one way this happens is 
through "the commentaries of discourse: the statements or texts which continually reaffirm the 
meanings enacted by the discourse, without ever breaching the discursive paradigm” (2003: 42). 
Therefore, the media has become political establishments that are incessantly entangled in power 
contestations. The entitlement is noticed in the way the media seek to legitimise or delegitimise 
political actors (Chambwera 2016: 79). Consequently, this study examined how News24 and ILO 
made claims for power by means of framing the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
and Cyril Ramaphosa. This study interrogated how by such framing there was a conscious effort 
to legitimise or delegitimise the two leaders that were contesting for the ANC presidential post.   
To add, Foucault also argues that for power to function successfully, there are certain discourses 
of truth that require operationalisation (1980: 93). In that regard, Foucault contends that, “we are 
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subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through 
the production of truth” (1980: 93). It appears that one of the principles and function of journalism 
is truthfulness. As such the media can therefore be viewed as a crucial player in the production of 
truth in any given society. Chambwera notes that framing is one of the ways in which the media 
operationalise the truth (2016: 57). To illustrate, the media simply uses frames to construct, 
package and contest the truth. More so, Foucault argues that we need to concern by the means in 
which "power disregards the rules of right and instead invest itself an institution"(1980: 93). 
Drawing inspiration on this assertion, this study therefore examined how power manifested itself 
in News24 and ILO when they framed Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s political 
leadership.  
 
Conclusion      
 
This chapter seeks to unpack the theory that informs the study. It explains the framing theory and 
the concepts of discourse power/knowledge as formulated by Foucault in 1980. The origins of 
framing are explained. It highlighted that framing has both sociological and psychological roots. 
Moreover, the difference between agenda setting and priming, and framing and agenda setting is 
discussed in depth. The relationship that exists between framing, culture, power and its elements 
is unpacked and linked to the key research questions. Further, the Foucauldian discourse of 
power/knowledge is employed to explain how frames as every so often unspoken and 
unacknowledged form part of the discourse which construct and is produced by knowledge. It is 
also highlighted that news power and knowledge are dependent variables. Having engaged the 
theoretical and conceptual framework that guided the thinking of this study, the next chapter 
presents tha methodological processes that was undertaken to complete this study. 
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Chapter 7: Research methodology 
 
Introduction  
 
This current chapter focuses on the methodology employed in the study. This section is vital to 
this work because it answers two main questions: How was data collected and/or generated? The 
second question is, how was that data presented and analysed? In this case, the researcher gives a 
detailed outline of the research approach that was employed to arrive at the answers he sought 
when embarking on this study. Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to provide a thorough 
description of the actions that were taken by the researcher to investigate the research problem. A 
rationale for the application of each step is also elucidated in this section. To that end, the following 
sections were discussed in this chapter: research paradigm (interpretivism) , research design and 
approach  (qualitative cultural study approach) , research strategy (case study), data collections 
procedures (content analysis), sampling of data (purposive sampling), quality control measures 
(trustworthiness) and modes of data presentation and analysis (thematic and critical discourse 
analysis).  
 
Interpretivism research paradigm  
 
This study is an explanatory in nature. It falls within the interpretivism research paradigm. Neuman 
defined interpretive research as a kind of study that is concerned with how “people interact and 
get along with each other” (2014: 89). In other words, it is the “systematic analysis of socially 
meaningful action through the direct detailed observation of people in natural settings in order to 
arrive at understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain social worlds” 
(Neuman 2014: 106). Neuman notes that the main aim of conducting interpretive research is to 
“develop an understanding of social life and discover how people construct meaning in a natural 
setting” (2014:104). The main aim of this study is to examine how News24 and ILO constructed 
and created meaning when they reported on the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma during the 2017 elective conference. Drawing on the Neuman’s 
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definition of interpretive research, this study takes the view that the press as they report the news, 
are engaged in the process of creating and maintaining their social worlds (2014: 80; 104).   
More so, Neuman argues that the interpretive research involves conducting a very close and 
detailed reading of the text to gain a profound and deep understanding of any given text (2014: 
104). In this case, the text would mean a broad combination of written words, pictures or 
conversations. Evidence from various scholars suggests that interpretive researchers conduct 
research to gain a deeper understanding of the meaning that is hidden within a text (Creswell, 
Hanson, Clark Plano and Morales 2007; du Plooy, Davis and Bezuidenhout 2014; Leedy and 
Ormrod 2005; Neuman 2014). This study, therefore, falls within the interpretivism paradigm 
because it is one of its endeavours to engage in the analysis of news text that was constructed by 
News24 and ILO when they reported on the ANC 2017 elective conference. This study aims to 
examine how News24 and ILO text on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was loaded 
with meaning in forms of frames that aim to legitimise or delegitimise the leadership qualities of 
these two presidential candidates. According to du Plooy et al. the true meaning of the text can 
only be reached through a detailed examination and study of the text, by contemplating its many 
messages and seeking the connections among its parts (2014: 103). Thus, this study takes the 
approach that the true meaning of the text can never be obvious on the surface. Instead, it can only 
be reached out through a detailed examination and study of a text (Neuman 2014; du Plooy et al. 
2014). As a result, the study endeavours to scrutinise the text constructed and produced by News24 
and ILO. In this case the researcher tries to navigate the inside of that text and draw out the 
viewpoint that the text presents in its entirety. This process helps the researcher to develop an 
understanding of how each text relates to the other parts of the broader social context.  
 
The cultural studies approach  
 
Evidence from various studies suggests that the cultural studies approach research “traverses the 
intersection of the text, power relations, and knowledge” to gain an understanding of how and in 
what manner reality is constructed (Marshall and Rossman 2011 cited in Chambwera 2016: 68). 
Mass media discourse plays a crucial role in reflecting a certain culture and catalysing its creation. 
According to Zelizer central to the cultural study of journalism is “it’s subjective expression, the 
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constructed nature of its meanings for events, the politics of identity building and the grounding 
of each of these premises in practice” (2004: 176).  
This study draws on British cultural studies which can be traced to the work of the Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies which was established in 1964 at Birmingham University. The 
most common work in that field was that of Stuart Hall (1980) and Raymond Williams (1983). To 
add, British cultural studies was a breakaway from English studies and was influenced by Marxism 
which was inclined to expose the working conditions of the British working class (Zelizer 2004: 
98). Scholars who form part of this class perceive “culture as everyday practice” (Hall 1997 and 
Allan 2004).  For instance, Hall (1997) and Allan (2004) view culture not in terms of the “the high 
and popular culture but as everyday practices” (Chambwera 2016: 59). In relation to that, Turner 
views cultural studies as "the need for seeing the cultural process as a whole, so that the textual 
analysis of media products (for instance) should be conducted in relation to an analysis of the 
institutions and social structures producing them" (Turner 1996: 52). 
More so, Turner also argues that cultural studies scholars like E.P. Thompson (1924-1923) 
perceived culture as “a lived network of practices and relationships that constitute everyday life, 
within which the role of the individual subject had to be foregrounded” (Turner 1996: 63). This 
study endeavours to examine how the news press represent the political leadership of Cyril 
Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Therefore, the examination of the frames that were 
used by News24 and ILO is literally an examination of the lived experience of media practitioners, 
their institutions and the social structures that constitute them (Chambwera 2016: 60). 
Additionally, Ziauddin and Loon stressed that the cultural studies approach seeks to investigate 
the issue at hand in terms of “cultural practices and their relation to power” (1999: 9). Woo, Rennie 
and Poyntz describe cultural studies as “theoretically and methodologically catholic” (2015: 285). 
What this means is that cultural studies are multidisciplinary because it borrows from a discipline 
like sociology, psychology, linguistics and anthropology (Ziauddin and Loon 1999: 48). Therefore, 
the introduction of cultural studies in this study occupies a significant place. It brings framing and 
cultural studies together to link the sociological approach to framing with the constructionist 
approach in cultural studies (Chambwera 2016: 60). For the purpose of this study culture is defined 
as the process of meaning making in any given society. Moreover, the term culture is applied to 
include the context of existing meanings and the dynamic which stimulate the production and 
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dissemination of new meanings (Lewis 2002: 3). This culture may be formed and operate through 
a broad range of social groupings and social practices: for examples, family, neighbourhood, age-
group, ethnic group, religion, workplace, text style, clothing style, nation, globe and so on (Storey 
2018: 45).  
Evidence from various scholars suggests that interpretive research has eight different typologies 
(du Plooy et al. 2014; Leedey and Ormond 2005 and Neuman 2014). These are hermeneutics, 
constructivism, ethnomethodology, cognitive, idealist, phenomenological, subjective, and 
qualitative sociology. This study falls within the sphere of social constructivism. Social 
constructivism presupposes that there is no such thing as a predetermination of reality (Amineh 
and Asl 2015; Yin 2003). Instead what we understand as reality is socially constructed. According 
to Creswell et al. social constructivism is a world view that assumes that people seek understanding 
of their world in which they live and work (2007:19). These scholars argued that “individuals 
develop subjective meanings of their experiences-meanings directed towards a certain object or 
things” (2007: 19). This study sought to examine how the news press constructed the reality 
(through the framing of issues) that was aimed at legitimising or delegitimising Cyril Ramaphosa 
and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. According to Neuman social constructivism research takes the 
form of an inquiry that perceived individuals as social actors (2014: 104). These individuals are 
continuously engaged in the creation of meaning through their day to day “interaction with other 
(hence social constructivism) and through historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ 
lives” (Creswell et al. 2007: 21).  
As a result, this study sought to construe the construction of news content by the press as social 
actors who are actively engaged in the construction of reality around the personality and leadership 
qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Drawing on Neuman’s argument that 
“social reality is fluid and fragile, and people construct it as they interact with others in an ongoing 
process of communication and negotiation” (Neuman 2014: 34), this study took the view that 
reality as it is constructed, it is more or less limited to context, time, space and groups or individuals 
in a particular situation and cannot be  “generalised into one common reality” (Neuman 2014: 34). 
Consequently, the constructed nature of news stories justifies the use of the constructivism 
approach in this study.  
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Hall notes that inside the constructivism approach lies two other approaches (1997: 67). These 
approaches are “semiotic and discursive approach” (Hall 1997 cited in Chambwera 2016: 60). 
According to Chambwera the semiotic approach is commonly linked to the work of de Saussure 
(1916) whereas the discursive approach is related to the Foucauldian works on discourse and 
power/knowledge (Chambwera 2016: 60). Nevertheless, this study draws on Foucault's (1980) 
concept of discourse, power/knowledge. This is because it is assumed that media content is a 
dynamic indicator of the common issues that pertain to culture (Gamson and Modiglian 1989 cited 
in Chambwera 2016:61).  
In addition, scholars like Terre Blanche et al. note that the constructionist approaches seek to 
determine “how the versions of the social world are produced in discourse” (2006: 282). This study 
aimed to examine, and construe frames utilised to construct meaning around the leadership and 
political qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the period leading, during 
and after the ANC 2017 elective conference. To achieve this, qualitative data in the form of words 
are examined in the “context of their cultural meaning and construction” (Neuman 2014: 105). 
Accordingly, drawing on Neuman’s view that constructivism scrutinises images and words in the 
context of their meaning (2014: 89). This research adopted the view that the cultural context in 
which News24 and ILO framed the political and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, is a structure of meanings (connotations and denotations) and practices 
and performances that work concomitantly to construct reality and aestheticism (Terre Blanche et 
al. 2006: 286). To add, the constructionist approach also assumes that the frames that were adopted 
and utilised by News24 and ILO were a “re-enactment of the prevailing discourses and relational 
patterns broader society” (Chambwera 2016: 60).  
 
Case study research strategy   
 
This study adopted a qualitative case study research design as it seeks to examine how News24 
and ILO legitimised and delegitimise (using frames) the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa 
and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Creswell et al. defined a research design as a map or structure that 
explain how the researcher will go about in collecting data that will answer the key research 
questions (2007: 67). Similarly, De Vaus and de Vaus noted that a research design serves the 
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purpose of making certain that the evidence obtained enables the researcher to answer the initial 
questions as clear as possible (2013: 2). Simply put, research design would refer to the plan a 
researcher puts in place to arrive at the evidence needed with the following questions in mind: 
“what type of evidence is needed to answer the questions (or test the theory) in a convincing way” 
(de Vaus 2014: 3).   
Evidence from various studies suggests that case studies are the prime examples of qualitative 
research (de Vaus 2014; Neuman 2014 and Stokes 2003). Stokes defined qualitative research as a 
range of research paradigms that are “primarily concerned with meaning and interpretation” (2003: 
3). For this scholar, qualitative researches are more typical of the humanities and approaches such 
as narrative analysis and genre analysis have been developed for the study of literature (Stokes 
2003: 3). According to de Vaus case studies are believed to be the perfect example of qualitative 
research design because they normally adopt an interpretive approach to data (2009: 10).  In simple 
terms, case study research “studies things in their context and considers the subjective meanings 
that people bring to the situation” (de Vaus 2009: 11). Baxter and Jack argued that case study 
research methodology allows the researcher to investigate complex phenomena in their context 
(2008: 544). In relation to that Yin (2003) cited in Baxter and Jack argues that qualitative research 
methods allow the researcher “to explore individuals or organisations, simple through complex 
intervention, relationships, communities, or programs” (Baxter and Jack 2008: 544). In simple 
terms, case study research ensures that the researcher explores the issue at hand from a variety of 
lances which in turn allows different aspects and corners of the issue to be revealed and understood 
(Baxter and Jack 2008: 544).  
Research from various scholars revealed three situations in which a researcher can make use of a 
case study approach (Baxter and Jack 2008; Stokes 2003 and Yin 2003). Firstly, a researcher can 
adopt the case study when they need to address and answer “how” and “why” questions. Secondly, 
the case study approach can be employed in studies where the researcher cannot manipulate the 
behaviour of those involved in the study. Thirdly, a case study approach can also be used when 
the researcher intent to cover contextual conditions because the researcher has the conviction that 
they are pertinent to the phenomena under investigation. Finally, the researcher can also use the 
case study when there are no clear boundaries between the “phenomenon and the context” (Baxter 
and Jack 2008: 545). This study adopted the case study of the ANC 2017 elective conference to 
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investigate how the online press use frames to legitimise or delegitimise the political qualities of 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In the context of this study, the case is the news 
media legitimising and delegitimising political leaders. But the case could not be considered 
without a context, News24 and ILO coverage of political leaders, and more specifically the ANC 
2017 elective conference (Baxter and Jack 2008: 545). The choice of the case study strategy was 
therefore informed by the assumption that the boundaries between the case (News24 and ILO 
legitimising and delegitimising of political leaders) and the context (ANC 2017 elective 
conference) are not clear. In simple terms, the case and the context are intertwined. Huberman and 
Miles defined the case as “a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context” (1994: 
430). To add, Baxter and Jack noted that the case is the unit/component of investigation or analysis 
(2008: 545). It will be impossible to answer the principles research question: how News24 and ILO 
legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma? without considering the context within which the phenomena is unfolding (Baxter 
and Jack 2008: 545).  
Various scholars have revealed that a common problem associated with the researchers who use 
case study approach “is the attempt to answer a question that is too broad or a topic that may have 
many objectives” (Baxter and Jack 2008; Creswell and Poth 2003; Miles and Huberman 1994; 
Stake 1995; Yin 2003).  However, several suggestions have been brought forward to counter the 
problem associated with a case study approach. Baxter and Jack argued that the researcher using 
case studies should bind the case by “a) time and place b) time and activity and c) by definition 
and context” (2008: 545). Drawing on the model proposed by Baxter and Jack (2008: 545), this 
study adopted the case of the ANC elective conference that took place from 17 to 22 December 
2017. Not every data was analysed in this case. The researcher analysed news articles that span 
from the period before and after the conference (1 October to 31 December 2017). The process of 
selecting and marking boundaries is important in the selection of the context because the 
boundaries help to guide the researcher on what falls in the scope of the research project. Baxter 
and Jack argued that “the establishment of boundaries indicate what will and will not be studied, 
they indicate the breadth and width of the study” (2008: 547).  
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Units of analysis  
 
The unit of analysis for this study is online news articles that the researcher collected from the 
news archives of News24 and ILO. Unit of analysis can be defined as the “what” of the study 
(Babbie and Mouton 2001: 45). Graneheim and Lundman defined a unit of analysis as the “great 
variety of objects of the study” (2003: 106). These scholars note that a person, an organisation, 
clinic or a programme can be used as a unit of analysis (Graneheim and Lundman 2003: 106). 
Patton defined a unit of analysis as “interviews or diaries in their entity, and the amount of space 
allocated to a topic or an interaction under study” (1987: 44). In the same vein, Weber notes that 
unit of analysis is “parts of the text that are abstracted and coded or every word or phrase is written 
in the transcript” (1990: 55). Similarly, Neuman notes that the unit of analysis refers to “what the 
researcher examines in order to construct summary descriptions of all such units and to explain 
differences among them” (Neuman 2014: 98). Drawing on Neuman’s definition, the term unit of 
analysis can therefore be extended to encompass “individuals, groups, organisations and social 
artefacts” (du Plooy et al. 2014: 45). Bless, Higson-Smith and Sithole also noted that “a period of 
time can also be considered a unit of analysis” (2013: 44). However, this study elects to use online 
news stories from News24 and ILO. These online stories can be regarded as social artefacts. This 
is so because according to Chambwera when newspapers and news artefacts are studied, every 
single editorial automatically becomes a unit of analysis (2016: 63). Consequently, in this study, 
editorials, analyses, news (political, business or economic), commentary and opinion pieces were 
chosen by the researcher with the belief that the news producers and their editors typically produce 
and publish content, even from the content contributors, that conforms to their prevailing and 
dominant acceptable frames (Chambwera 2016: 65). Thus, for the purpose of this study, every 
single story that comprises of some relevant information that relates to the political leadership of 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, be it editorial, analysis or “news” will be 
considered a unit of analysis. The choice to consider the entire story a unit of analysis is inspired 
by Van Gorp and Vercruysse assumption that “different framing devices are found throughout any 
story which combines to lead to the frames” (2012: 1274).  
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Data collection  
 
Data were drawn from News24 and ILO online archives. This was in the form of electronic news 
artefacts. As argued by Terre Blanche et al. data drawn from documents like newspaper articles, 
books, and official documents can be used in the gathering of qualitative research (2006: 86). To 
add, it can also be assumed that data from news articles and written documents are a good resource 
that can be utilised for constructionist analysis. This is so because news articles and books are of 
“a constructed nature and a means by which ideas and discourses are circulated in society” (Terre 
Blanche et al. 2006: 316). In this study, the researcher made use of online news stories as extant 
texts. According to Charmaz, there are two classes of text that can be used for analysis (2006: 98). 
These are elicited text and extant text. For Charmaz elicited text involves “research participants in 
the coming up of data” (2006: 98). This class of text may include data from interviews, internet 
surveys made up of open-ended questions (Charmaz 2006: 98). Whereas the extant text is the data 
from the text the researcher has no role in its construction. For instance, this type of text may 
include “public records, organisational documents, and mass media products” (Chambwera 2016: 
62). Be that as it may, Charmaz argued that extant and elicited text can be applied in a study both 
as primary and secondary data. News articles that were used in this study are extant text applied 
as primary data sources. Each single news article in this study was considered as a point of 
“intersection for social discourses” (Terre Blanche et al 2006: 316). As a result, to investigate 
frames that were utilised in any given story, every individual article becomes the entry point and 
work as a point of departure to unpack the range of forces and the practices that created it. 
 
Data gathering and data corpus  
 
In this study, the researcher retrieved relevant online articles/stories from News24 and ILO 
archives. This is so because the use of the internet has made it simple. Three search engines 
(Google, Yahoo and Bing) were used as gateways to News24 and ILO website. Content from the 
news archives of the two news websites was retrieved using search keywords. Personally, 
generated keywords like “Cyril Ramaphosa 2017, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 2017 and ANC 
Elective conference 2017” were typed in the search bar of each of the three categories (Business, 
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Politics and Economy). The search for news articles was only limited to News24 and ILO. This 
was done to search for metadata that speaks to the leadership qualities and political leadership of 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The search for the news articles was made easy 
because the websites of both News24 and ILO allowed for a focused search using the date range. 
This provision allowed the researcher to limit the search of news articles relevant to the study to 
the period between 1 October 2017 and 31 December 2017.  
Moreover, after the data corpus was gathered, meta information was attached to each article that 
resulted from the search. The meta information included the uniform resource locator (URL), date 
of publication, access date, search engine used, keywords used and source. This information was 
important because it helped in creating the data set, and ultimately offer more dimensions for the 
analysis of the thematic map later in the analysis of data.  
 
Generating the data set  
 
The results showed stories related to the candidates but stretched beyond the period of study. The 
initial total of these stories surveyed was 194 articles. The articles were all read in order to 
determine which once specifically focused on the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In the process of reading and selecting the stories, the researcher was 
more interested and disposed of in selecting the stories that appeared in favour of or against either 
of the two candidates. News24 produced 84 stories that were focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The researcher repeated the reading and selecting process in order to 
reduce the number of stories to the preferred benchmark. ILO produced 110 news articles that 
focused on the two candidates. Because the number of the article was beyond the preferred number, 
the researcher engaged in the process of reading and re-reading of the articles in order to select the 
best and suitable articles. The final batch of stories were those that reflected the news media’s or 
author’s position with regards to the leadership and political qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. After the process of selection was done, the researcher was left with 
100 news articles. The remaining contents were included in the data set and were relevant for 
analysis. The researcher created four folders that were titled:  
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i) News24 on Cyril Ramaphosa  
ii)  News24 on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma  
iii)  ILO on Cyril Ramaphosa 
iv)  ILO on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
The researcher then went on to print out these articles. They were printed because the researcher 
believed that coding would be easier and as such more reliable if the articles are in printed format. 
 
Population and sample size    
 
The population of the study was all the articles/stories found in News24 and ILO from 1 October 
to 31 December which focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. A total of 100 
(n=100) news articles/stories were purposively collected for examination. The sample included 
online articles from the Business, News and Politics sections of News24 and ILO. The sample was 
broad enough to included articles from editorial, news articles, commentary and opinion pieces. 
The choice of this sample was informed by the belief that the Business, News, and Politics sections 
are the most read categories. They are also likely to have been constructed to communicate a 
certain type of discourse. Purposive sampling was utilised in this study because the researcher only 
needs to make use of relevant articles that spoke to the leadership qualities and political personality 
of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Moreover, the online news articles were 
collected based on the understanding that “they are suitable for constructivist analysis, as they have 
an obviously constructed nature and are a means by which ideas and discourses are articulated in 
society” (Chambwera 2016: 63).  
A total of 50 online articles were retrieved from News24 and ILO respectively. From News24, 20 
articles were retrieved from the Business section (ten focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and ten on 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). Another 20 from the News sections (ten focused on Cyril Ramaphosa 
and ten on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). This makes them 40 in total. The remaining 10 articles 
were retrieved from the Politics section of News24 (five focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and five on 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). Thus, the total number of online articles collected from News24 was 
50. Similarly, a total of 50 online news articles were also retrieved from the ILO. 20 news articles 
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were collected from the Business section (ten focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and ten on Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma) and another 20 news articles from the News section (ten focused on Cyril 
Ramaphosa and ten on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma). More so, another ten articles were retrieved 
from the Politics section (five focused on Cyril Ramaphosa and five on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) 
(see Table 7.1). 
 
Table 7.1: Sample of articles selected from New24  
 
 
Category  Number of articles  
Business/ Economy section  20 (ten for each candidate)  
News/headlines Section  20 (ten for each candidate) 
Politics Section  10 (five for each candidate) 
Total  50  
Source: T Muringa   
 
Table 7.2: Sample of articles selected from IOL 
 
Category  Number of articles  
Business/ Economy section  20 (ten for each candidate) 
News/headlines Section  20 (ten for each candidate) 
Politics Section  10 (five for each candidate) 
Total  50  
Source: T Muringa  
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Duration of the study  
 
Analysis in this study is based on the news displayed on the online version of News24 and ILO 
online websites. The period of analysis spans from 1 October to 31 December 2017. Sensibly, the 
press conference announcing the nominees who were contesting for leadership positions of the 
ANC elective conference marked the beginning of the controversy and attracted widespread media 
coverage. This means that the sample included editorial, news articles, and commentary and 
opinion pieces in the pre and post congress coverage as well as the congress itself. In this study, 
editorial, news articles, commentary, and opinion were considered with the assumption that editors 
would mostly publish material, even from a contributor, that fits into the frames acceptable in their 
editorial policy. 
 
Data Analysis  
Inductive and deductive thematic analysis  
 
This study employed thematic analysis to acquire themes that enable the presentation of data as 
well as facilitating the discourse analysis. Essentially, thematic analysis refers to a systematic 
process of “identifying patterns of meaning in a database” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 89). In this 
case, the goal of thematic analysis is to highlight the most prominent constellation of meanings 
existing in the data.  
Evidence from different scholars has suggested that there are two ways of analysing data in 
thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998; Braun and Clarke 2006; Firth and Gleeson 2004; Hayes 2013). 
For instance, Braun and Clarke note that “themes or patterns within data can be identified in one 
or two primary ways in the thematic analysis process” (2006: 83). These scholars referred to these 
ways as inductive or bottom up and theoretical or deductive/ top down. In the inductive approach, 
the themes that a researcher identifies are closely related to the data itself (Hayes 1997 cited in 
Braun and Clarke 2006). Deductive or theoretical thematic analysis refers to the analysis that is 
theory driven. Du Plooy et al. noted that theoretical thematic analysis involves analysis that is 
theory-driven (2014: 97). Simply put, in the theoretical thematic analysis approach, the researcher 
does not need to go through all the finer detail of the data to choose the categories. The researcher 
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simply needs to make use of pre-existing knowledge and a conceptual organisation of the themes. 
Creswell et al. argued that “the theory-driven approach is particularly suited when there is already 
knowledge and a conceptual organization of the themes” (2007: 45). These themes should be 
analysed in the answers or when the goal is to test a theory. On the contrary, in inductive thematic 
analysis, the themes that the researcher analyse will not be related to the theoretical interest in the 
area or topic of inquiry. Therefore, in simple terms, inductive analysis refers to the process of 
coding data without the direct influence of the “researcher influencing the pre-existing coding 
frame, or the researcher’s analytic preconceptions” (Hayes 1997: 55). To that end, it can be noted 
that inductive analysis is “data-driven”. However, Braun and Clarke stressed that the assumption 
by inductive analysis that the analysis of data is independent of the other outside factors, but the 
data are superficial (2006: 84). These scholars argued that “researchers cannot free themselves of 
their theoretical and epistemological commitments, and data are not coded in an epistemological 
vacuum” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). This study employed an inductive thematic analysis. The 
choice inductive thematic analysis was informed by the need of the researcher to identify and 
examine frames that were used to legitimise and delegitimise the Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. The researcher allowed the data to speak for itself rather than approaching the data 
with pre-conceived themes and codes.  
 
Semantic and latent themes     
 
Various scholars revealed that there are different levels at which themes are identified in the 
thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998; Braun and Clarke 2006, Galvin, Suominen, Morgan, O'Connell, 
and Smith 2015; Vaismoradi, Turnen, Snelgrove 2016). For instance, Boyatzis notes that themes 
can be identified at both semantic and latent level (1998: 102). Graneheim and Lundman argued 
that an important decision when conducting content analysis is to choose whether the analysis will 
focus on manifest or latent content (2004: 106). Kondracki, Wellman, and Amundson note that 
both semantic and latent analysis deals with interpretation, but the interpretation varies in depth 
and level of abstraction (2002: 23). While manifest content refers to the obvious or the surface 
meaning presented in the content, latent content denotes the deeper and underneath meaning of the 
text. To add, Downe-Warmboldt (1992) cited in Graneheim and Lundman argued that manifest 
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thematic analysis deals with the “content aspect and describe the visible, obvious components, 
referred to as the manifest content” (Graneheim and Lundman 2004: 106). In line with the above, 
Braun and Clarke argued that “within the semantic or manifest approach, the themes are identified 
within the explicit or surface meanings of the data, and the analysis is not looking for anything 
beyond the written text” (2006: 84).  More so, Patton argued that semantic approach to thematic 
analysis involves the process of “progression from description, where the data have simply been 
organised to show patterns in semantic content, and summarised, to interpretation, where there is 
an attempt to theorise the significance of the patterns and their broader meanings and implications” 
(1990: 108).  
On the contrary, the latent thematic approach involves the analysis of what the text talks about. It 
also encompasses the relationship between the underlying meaning of the text. For example, Braun 
and Clarke argue that latent thematic level surpasses the semantic content of data (2006: 85). It is 
unique and different from semantic level because it focuses on identifying and examining the 
fundamental embedded ideas, ideologies, and conceptualisation “that are theorised as shaping or 
informing the semantic content of data” (Braun and Clarke 2006: 84). To add, in latent thematic 
analysis, the development of themes is infused with the process of interpretation and the analysis 
produced beyond mere description but is theorised (Braun and Clarke 2006: 85).  
Therefore, bearing in mind the constructionist approach that informs this study, it is from the latent 
thematic approach that this study conducted the process of thematic analysis. Burr argued that a 
relationship exists between constructionist paradigm, latent analysis and critical discourse analysis 
(1995: 44). This scholar noted that latent thematic analysis originates from the “constructionist 
paradigm” (Burr 1995: 45). Similarly, Braun and Clarke argued that the constructionist 
background of latent thematic analysis makes it overlaps with the critical discourse analysis (2006: 
34). According to Taylor and Ussher, the overlap between constructionism paradigm, latent 
thematic analysis, and discourse analysis has given birth to a concept called thematic critical 
discourse analysis (2001: 67). Braun and Clarke argued that in thematic critical discourse analysis 
“broader structures and meanings are theorised as underpinning what actually articulated in the 
data” (2006: 85). The latent approach is crucial to this study because it paves the way for the 
critical discourse analysis which is an integral aspect of analysing data in this study. Critical 
discourse analysis is a useful tool because it helps to shed light on the cultural/power relations that 
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are lying underneath the surface of the semantic structure of the data set (Richardson 2007: 102). 
In this study, themes and frames were identified and analysed beyond the mere semantic 
construction and meaning. The themes were also categorised, interpreted and analysed at the latent 
level to gain the underlying ideas, assumptions and conceptualisation, and ideologies that informed 
their construction (Braun and Clarke 2006: 64).  
 
A summary of the thematic process adopted in this study   
 
The process of thematic analysis involved the stages of gathering all relevant articles within the 
specific time frame. That is from the 1 October to 31 December 2017. This raw data is referred to 
as the data corpus. The researcher checked the data for relevance. All extraneous data was 
removed. This then allowed the researcher to retain the data that was best suitable and of most 
relevance to be the unit of analysis. Braun and Clarke referred to the refined content as the data set 
(2006: 56). From the main data set, the researcher then drew out, derived and categorised some 
preliminary codes. These codes allowed the researcher to identify different features of the data 
(either semantic or latent) that were pertinent for the process of analysis to kick off (Braun and 
Clarke 2006: 56). The coding of data was important because it allowed the researcher to organise 
data into various categories that are meaningful. The researcher then introduced themes that 
worked as umbrella terms for certain codes. All codes that emerged were assigned to a related 
theme if their meaning fell within that theme. More so, the other small emerging themes were 
assigned to bigger themes allowing them to occupy the place of sub-themes. 
At this stage of the thematic process, all themes that were introduced were only temporal. This 
type of themes is referred to as candidate themes. A process of recapitulation was conducted to 
review the validity of all candidate themes. Creswell et al. noted that the process of reviewing 
candidate themes is important in the thematic analysis process because “it allows the researcher to 
check for the validity of the assignment made, and verify whether a candidate theme actually does 
cover all the codes assigned to it” (2017: 34). Some of the candidate themes and codes were shifted 
from place to place during the preview phase. This process was carried on until all the wrongly 
placed and assigned codes were relocated to their relevant themes, and all worthless candidate 
themes have been abandoned. Finally, a thematic map was generated to visualise the sub-themes 
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and their interrelations. The map was used for analytic purposes. Figure 4.1 below visualise the 
thematic analysis process followed in this study.  
Figure 7.1: The thematic analysis process of this study 
 
 
Source: T. Muringa 
 
Generating codes and categorising articles  
 
In the coding process, ‘coding’ refers to the action while ‘codes’ refer to the names given to the 
concepts derived through coding (Corbin and Anselm 2008: 66). Corbin and Anselm explained 
that the main purpose of coding is to break down the data, rearranging and grouping it into 
identified categories and subcategories which bring together data about a topic which has so far 
been scattered across sources, and ultimately allow comparison within the data (2008: 66). The 
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researcher could code the utterance using emergent coding; whereby the researchers approach the 
data with no prior set coding categories but allows the categories and names of categories to 
emerge from the data. 
All the articles that were collected were scanned, printed and read to create the data set. The articles 
were reviewed and read again. This process is important because it allowed the researcher to 
generate valid codes. According to Braun and Clarke, these codes “underline interesting features 
of the article and are mapped to meaningful groups which describe the semantic content of these 
features” (2006: 76). Because this stage in the process of thematic analysis is dealing with the data 
set, all the articles were analysed, and they generated at least one code. Braun and Clarke argue 
that generally, an individual article may generate more than one code, "since each code describes 
one interesting feature, and is documented individually” (2006: 65).  
 
Defining themes and creating the coding sheet   
 
The codes that were generated in the previous section were used to identify candidate frames. In 
that process, every single code becomes a frame. But as patterns and association emerge, new sub-
themes were created, and additional codes are linked to existing themes. This paved the way for 
critical discourse analysis to kick off. The coding sheet used in this study is illustrated in the coding 
table below.  
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Table 7.3: Coding sheet 
 
Themes   frames  Problem 
description  
Causal 
interpretation  
 Moral 
evaluation 
Treatment  
Recommenda
tion 
Linguistic  
Expression  
E
co
n
o
m
y
 
 
Transformation  
 
 
Rand  
 
 
Markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
News24  
Efforts to legitimise 
Cyril Ramaphosa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efforts to delegitimise 
Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IOL  
 
 
Efforts to legitimise 
Nkosazana   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efforts to delegitimise 
Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma  
 
 
 
 
Efforts to endorse 
Cyril Ramaphosa 
campaign   
 
The economy is 
under threat 
from the Zuma 
faction led by 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
 
 
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
has similar 
policies to Jacob 
Zuma  
 
 
 
 
 
IOL  
 
The congress 
will focus on 
economic 
development  
 
 
 
 
The rand is 
performing 
poorly  
 
 
 
 
The markets are 
responding 
positively to 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
sentiments  
 
South Africans 
are blessed to 
have Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
And should be 
grateful 
 
 
 
It is misleading 
to elect 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma  
 
 
 
 
 
 
IOL 
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
was focused on 
economic 
development  
 
 
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini’s 
victory won’t 
improve the 
economy  
 
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa is 
the messiah of 
the South 
African 
economy 
 
The ANC 
leaders and 
members ought 
to support Cyril 
Ramaphosa  
 
 
 
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
must not be 
voted for  
 
 
 
 
 
 
IOL  
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
must be given a 
chance  
 
 
 
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
cannot be 
trusted  
 
 
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
must become 
president to save 
the economy  
 
" we need to 
come up with 
something that 
grabs the 
imagination of 
our people so 
that the markets 
can see that we 
are an economy 
worthy 
investing" 
 
“radical 
economic 
transformation a 
populist policy” 
 
 
 
IOL 
 
 
 
 
 
" Ramaphosa is 
seen as more 
market-friendly 
than is defeated 
rival 
Nkosazana-" 
 
“Support 
Ramaphosa and 
we will not see a 
downgrade – 
Gordhan”  
 
“Rand 
strengthens after 
Ramaphosa’s 
victory iol´ 
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E
le
ct
io
n
 v
ic
to
ry
  
 
 
Contribution 
to the nation 
and ANC  
 
Compromised 
leaders  
  
Electability  
 
Unity  
News24  
Efforts to legitimise 
Cyril Ramaphosa’ 
leadership qualities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efforts to discredit 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma’s 
campaign  
 
 
 
IOL  
Efforts to legitimise 
Dlamini-Zuma  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efforts to 
delegitimise 
Nkosazana’s able to 
win  
 
 
 
Efforts to endorse 
Cyril Ramaphosa 
Campaign  
 
The country 
has had poor 
leadership 
under Jacob 
Zuma that has 
divided the 
arty and nation 
 
 
 
The branches 
cannot 
nominate 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma  
 
 
IOL  
We have never 
had a female 
president 
 
 
 
 
 
Nkosazana has 
been in 
government 
and presided 
over its failure  
 
 
The private 
sector has no 
confidence in 
the leadership 
of the ANC  
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
can unify and 
rebuild the 
ANC and 
South Africa 
with his 
leadership 
skills 
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini Zuma 
will not win 
the battle for 
president  
 
 
IOL  
South African 
need to have a 
female leader  
 
 
 
 
 
It is risky to 
elect someone 
with flaws like 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
 
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
will inspire 
confidence in 
the ANC and 
private sector    
 
People should 
put their 
support on the 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa  
 
 
 
 
 
Nkosazana 
cannot be 
supported  
 
 
 
 
IOL  
A female 
leader in the 
person of 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
must be 
supported 
 
we should vote 
for Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
 
 
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
presidency 
must be 
supported  
 
“we think he is 
the most 
rightful person 
to steer South 
Africa 
forward” 
 
 
 
 
“win for NDZ 
will see the 
ANC lose 
2019” 
 
 
 
IOL 
“she is a 
leader of 
leaders and 
mother of 
mothers” 
 
 
 
“Nomination 
of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
a farce” 
 
 
 
“Cyril 
Ramaphosa is 
the best person 
to lead the 
quest to 
reclaim ANC 
victory” 
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Jacob Zuma  
and State 
capture  
 
 
ANC 
factionalism  
 
 
 
 
News24  
Efforts to legitimise 
Cyril Ramaphosa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Efforts to 
delegitimise 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
 
 
 
 
IOL 
 
 
Neutral on the 
faction in ANC 
 
 
 
 
Efforts to endorse 
Cyril Ramaphosa  
 
 
 
Jacob Zuma 
and his corrupt 
administration 
have destroyed 
the economy 
of South 
Africa  
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini- 
Zuma’s 
leadership 
mirrors that of 
Jacob Zuma  
 
 
 
IOL 
 
 
The leadership 
battles have 
divided ANC 
 
 
 
Corruption has 
destroyed the 
party and state  
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
will fight 
against 
corruption  
 
 
 
Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma 
will bring back 
Jacob Zuma’s 
reign  
 
 
 
 
IOL 
 
 
There is a 
need for a 
leader who can 
unite ANC 
 
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa is 
firm on 
combating 
corruption  
 
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
fight against 
corruption 
must be 
supported  
 
 
 
Nkosazana is 
not the right 
person to lead 
South Africa  
 
 
 
 
IOL 
 
 
A leader who 
speaks unity 
must be 
supported 
 
 
Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
must be 
supported  
 
"Ramaphosa 
has made the 
fight against 
corruption the 
centrepiece of 
his campaign" 
 
 
 
“Zuma 
supporters 
rally around 
Dlamini-
Zuma” 
 
 
 
 
IOL 
 
" The 
leadership 
battle has 
opened a rift 
in the ANC 
and pitted 
Ramaphosa 
and party 
veteran against 
Zuma” 
 
“Cyril 
Ramaphosa 
has vowed that 
when he takes 
over, he will 
deal harshly 
with corrupt 
officials and 
politicians” 
 
Source: T Muringa  
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Critical discourse analysis  
 
Evidence from various scholars revealed that Critical Discourse Analysis focuses on dominance 
relations by elite groups and institutions as they are being enacted, legitimated or otherwise 
reproduced by text and talk (Chambwera 2016, Braun and Clarke 2006 and Van Dijk 2001). For 
instance, Chambwera argues that discourse analysis presupposes the “study of the relations 
between discourse, power, dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analysists 
in such a relationship” (2016: 95). Similarly, Van Dijk stressed that Critical Discourse Analysis 
“is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, 
dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and 
political context” (2001: 357). In relation to that Richardson argued that CDA seeks "an effect on 
social practice and social relationships, particularly on relationships of disempowerment, 
dominance, prejudice or discrimination” (2007: 26). For Van Dijk:  
the typical vocabulary of many scholars in CDA will feature such notions as power, 
dominance, hegemony, ideology, class, gender, race, discrimination, interests, 
reproduction, institutions, social structure or social order, besides the more familiar 
discourse analytical notions (2001:375). 
CDA was a useful analytical tool in this study because the study aimed to understand power, 
dominance and social relations that characterised the news reports that were published by News24 
and ILO in their reporting on the political qualities and leadership abilities of Cyril Ramaphosa 
and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. More so, the study aimed to unpack the underlying discourses that 
pervaded the text as they were presented to the public with an aim to legitimise, delegitimise, 
disempower and discriminate Cyril Ramaphosa or Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from the period 1 
October to 31 December, a period that marked the end of the ANC 2017 elective conference and 
all its proceeding.   
Previous studies have revealed that CDA discards the possibility of a “value-free' science” (Van 
Dijk 2001 and Wodak 2011). For instance, Van Dijk contends that science, and particularly 
scholarly discourse, are intrinsically part of, and shaped by social structure, and produced in social 
interaction (2001: 88). In relation to that, Wodak argued that CDA views language use both in 
speech and writing as a method of social practice. What this means is that perceiving discourse as 
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a social practice suggests “a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the 
situation, institutions and social structure, which frame it” (Wodak 2011: 52). To that end, 
discourse is twofold in that it shapes, and it is also shaped that which constitute its existence. To 
illustrate the above, Wodak argues that:  
discourse is a socially constructed constructive as well as socially conditioned- it 
constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships 
between people and groups of knowledge (2011: 52) 
According to Richardson CDA's main objective is to establish the relationship that exists between 
text and its social conditions, ideologies, and power relations (2007: 26). This scholar argues that 
“CDA engages with, analyses and critiques social power and how this is represented and both 
explicitly and implicitly, reproduced in the news” (Richardson 2007: 29). This study draws on the 
definition by Richardson which stresses that “CDA involves analysis of a text at three levels, that 
is, the text level, the discursive level, and the social practices level” (Richardson 2007: 29). To that 
end, it is usually at the social practice level that CDA traverses past what is provided for under the 
thematic analysis.  
Drawing on Richardson’s (2007: 29) model of CDA, text level analysis and thematic analysis were 
done concurrently in this study. According to Richardson the text level for CDA refers to the 
discursive practice level (2007: 29). Simply put, discursive practices are those processes that 
inform and shape the journalistic creation of text as well as how their audience use and comprehend 
text (Richardson 2007: 29). Therefore, analysis in this realm place is into consideration that: 
 ... newspaper discourse fulfils particular functions; has been created in accordance with 
particular production techniques and in specific institutional settings; is marked by 
particular relationships between others agencies of political, judicial and economic 
power; is characterised by particular interpersonal relationships between writer and 
reader; and is consumed, interpreted and enjoyed in ways that are specific (Richardson 
2007: 76-77) 
More so, in this study, the analysis done at the discursive practices level encompasses specifically 
the professional and established institutional stimuli in the construction of text both at News24 and 
ILO. This approach was inspired by the desire to determine how professional and established 
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institutional influences could have manifest in the framing of the political leadership of Cyril 
Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Additionally, the setup of these newspaper target 
audience was also taken into consideration. This was so because the researcher believed that “the 
nature of a newspaper audience largely influences how journalists package their news stories but 
also influence such packaging” (Chambwera 2016: 67). It can also be argued that “it is also the 
target audience that could have played a role in how the two newspapers sought to legitimise or 
delegitimise either Cyril Ramaphosa or Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Chambwera 2016: 67).  
Results from previous research suggest that the news industry in South Africa is characterised by 
rigid competition for a target market whose buying power is threatened by the ever-increasing 
prices of commodities in the country (Chambwera 2016; Jackson 2019; Jere and Borain 2018; 
Richardson 2007). Therefore, the issues of readers being perceived not only as mere consumers 
who enjoy buying the newspaper, but as a target market for advertising, were placed into 
consideration and examined in this study. Moreover, drawing on various scholars of the political 
economy of the media, the researcher investigated the institutional issues relating to media 
ownership and control of News24 and ILO to determine how these factors could have affected the 
types of frames and the frames used to legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership and 
qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The researcher also examined the 
issues of professional ethics and practices of journalism as they manifest in the production of text 
under examination. To illustrate, the researcher examined the principle of objectivity and 
truthfulness as they manifest in the discourses of legitimacy and illegitimacy (Chambwera 2016: 
69).  
Furthermore, the researcher also examined the text at a social practice level. At this stage, the 
researcher was more concerned with exposing the relationship that existed between journalists and 
their social formations. It was assumed that this relationship could have shaped the construction 
of frames and their nature that journalist attaches to stories (Chambwera 2016: 69). As argued by 
Wadok, the researcher takes the view that the relationship between journalists and their social 
world is dialectical (2011: 345). What this means is that journalists influence the social world in 
the same way they are influenced by it. To substantiate the previous point, Richardson argues that 
analysis at the social practices level considers:  
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… economic practices, such as the whole mode and relations of production, the class 
composition of the audience and their relative value to other agencies such as advertisers; 
political practices, such as the structuring influences of political and legal institutions; and 
ideological practices, such as the role of journalism in spreading and supporting social values 
and the relationship of such social values to wider structured social inequalities (Richardson 
2007: 114)  
Different scholars suggest that when carrying out CDA, the researcher needs to consider the 
prevailing socio-economic system and economic conditions within that context (Chambwera 2016; 
Jackson 2019; Jere and Borain 2018; Richardson 2007). Drawing on Richardson (2007) model of 
CDA, this study examined the socio-economic system and economic conditions that were obtained 
in South Africa in the period leading, during and after the 54th ANC 2017 national elective 
conference. The idea was to ascertain how the prevailing conditions manifested in the news that 
was presented to the public and shaped the framing of the leadership qualities and leadership of 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma during the period under investigation. Bearing in 
mind that newspaper discourse and news media are two strong agents and conduits of power, the 
framing of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and the determination to legitimise or 
delegitimise them could be a motive to challenge or maintain the prevailing economic state of 
affairs, thus it required to be investigated. Additionally, the strong desire for relevance and survival 
in the deteriorating economic set up could also influence the news framing by News24 and ILO. 
Some of the factors that the researcher considered in the process of analysis were the ideological 
political system and the relationship between journalists and politicians both from within the ANC 
other outside the ANC. To add, the researcher also considered the reigning legal instruments in 
the country. These could also have impacted on the frames that were used by the journalists from 
News24 and ILO.  
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the analysis of the factors that influenced the framing of 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not done in isolation. Rather, in a bid to 
identify the frames used by News24 and ILO to legitimise or delegitimise the two leaders, an 
analysis was done in a way that identified and explained frames concomitantly while putting 
specific attention to the issues discussed in the previous sections. 
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Limitations of the study  
 
In critically investigating and interpreting the online articles sampled, the researcher relied heavily 
on his own subjective cognitive models and context models. While an effort was placed in order 
to remain objective in the process of interpretation of the text and using various sources as guidance 
and support to the analysis, the researcher's experience as a journalists political inclination and 
therefore his systems of beliefs, might have an effect on the results of the study. Moreover, it being 
a case study, the data sample was limited to the online news articles concerning one event (54th 
ANC National Elective Conference) and involves limited private owned news outlets. An 
extensive research, encompassing supplementary and diverse sources, or larger pool of data, may 
have permitted the researcher to reach further and more varied results on the subject. In addition, 
the use of critical discourse analysis as a data analysis approach constitutes a limitation. Owing to 
its “interpretive nature, and a lack of an explicit, structured and unified approach to analysis” (du 
Plooy et al. 2014: 97), the same data sample can be construed and investigated by means of 
different interpretive lenses.  
 
Data quality control  
Trustworthiness of the study 
 
Trustworthiness or truth value of qualitative research and transparency of the conduct of the study 
are critical to the helpfulness and veracity of the research findings. Trustworthiness or rigour of a 
study denotes the extent of “confidence in data, interpretation, and methods used to ensure the 
quality of a study” (Pilot and Beck 2014: 24). Amankwaa argued that in every study, the 
researchers ought to establish the procedures and measures essential for a study to be considered 
worthy of consideration by the person who reads (2016: 122). This study drew on Guba and 
Lincoln’s (1985) criteria for establishing trustworthiness. This is so because the criteria have been 
widely accepted and used as the foundation of establishing the notion of trustworthiness among 
qualitative researchers. These criteria include “credibility, dependability, confirmability, and 
transferability; they later added authenticity” (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 15). 
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Credibility  
 
The credibility of the study, or the confidence in the truth of the study and therefore the findings, 
is the most important criterion (Polit and Beck 2014: 21). According to Guba and Lincoln, the 
common question asked when one wants to ascertain the credibility of a study is “was the study 
conducted using standard procedures typically used in the indicated qualitative approach or was 
an adequate justification provided for variations?" (Connelly 2016: 436). Thus, in this study, the 
researcher employed various steps to ascertain that the data is credible. The researcher ensured 
that there is prolonged engagement with the data and reflective journaling. More so, the data and 
findings were revisited several times before presented. Lastly, to ensure credibility in this study, 
the researcher explored alternative explanations before the findings were presented.  
 
Transferability  
 
Available evidence suggests that the nature of transferability, the extent to which findings are 
useful to persons in other settings, is different from other aspects of research in that readers 
determine how applicable the findings are to their situations (Polit and Beck 2014: 45). Amankwaa 
argues that researchers need to provide a vivid picture that will inform and resonant with readers 
(2016: 122). According to Connelly qualitative researchers focus on the informants and their story 
without saying this is everyone’s story (2016: 436). In this study, transferability was ensured by 
supporting the study with “a rich, detailed description of the context, location, and people studied, 
and by being transparent about analysis and trustworthiness” (Connelly 2016: 436).  
 
Dependability  
 
Recent studies have proved that dependability has more to do with the constancy of the data over 
time (Connelly 2016, Creswell et al. 2007 and Polit and Beck 2014). For instance, Polit and Beck 
argued that “dependability refers to the stability of the data over time and over the conditions of 
the study” (2014: 45). Similarly, Connelly argues that procedures for dependability consist of 
preservation of a researcher’s audit track of “procedure logs and peer-debriefings with a colleague” 
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(2014: 436). Therefore, to ensure dependability in this study, the researcher preserved all notes of 
all activities that take place in the process of conducting the study. More so, all decisions about 
any aspect of the study were also noted down and kept safe. These decisions include the choice of 
what to constitute the unit of analysis, and what news articles to select for analysis (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994 and Creswell 2007).  
 
Confirmability  
 
Qualitative research scholars have noted that confirmability refers to the level of neutrality or the 
extent findings are consistent, constant and may well be repeated (Du Plooy et al. 2014; Connelly 
2016; Creswell et al.  2007; Guba and Lincoln 1994; Neuman 2014; Polit and Beck 2014). For 
example, Connelly stress that “qualitative researchers keep detailed notes of all their decisions and 
their analysis as it progresses” (2016: 435). The notes should be kept to allow other colleagues or 
reviewer to review the process they took in conducting the study. In this study, to ensure the 
confirmability of the research findings, the researcher allowed peer-review of the notes by 
colleagues. The researcher also handed over the notes, data, and findings to other respected 
researchers so that that they can be discussed in peer-debriefing sessions (Neuman 2014: 66). Guba 
and Lincoln (1994) cited by Connelly (2016: 435) argued that these peer-debriefing sessions and 
discussions avoid prejudices from only one individual’s perception of the study.  
 
Ethical consideration  
 
Data for this study was retrieved from online archival material. This material was already available 
for the public to use in the public domain. However, to ensure that the researcher followed and 
fulfilled all relevant ethical matters, this study went through the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
ethical review committee process. The steps taken by the researcher to conduct this study were 
approved and sanctioned by the University of KwaZulu-Natal Ethics Committee.  
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Conclusion  
 
This chapter chronicled the research methodology employed by the researcher in carrying out this 
study. It was explained and justified in this chapter why the researcher chose to use the constructive 
qualitative research paradigm. Moreover, the methods of collecting data used and the sampling 
technique employed by the researcher were explained. It was made clear that the study used 
purposively selected electronic archival material that was retrieved from News24 and ILO news 
websites. Additionally, the methods of data presentation and analysis were detailed. It how 
highlighted the researcher used both thematic and critical discourse analysis. Thematic analysis 
was important as it helped to categorise emergent frames and themes and paved the way for 
detailed analysis of the themes through critical discourse analysis. However, the following chapter 
presents, interprets and analyse the research findings. Findings in the following chapter were 
organised and analysed by the sequence of the themes that emerged in the coding of data.  
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Chapter 8:  Rand & market and Economic recovery & growth 
frame 
 
Introduction  
 
The previous chapter chronicled the research methods used to carry out this study. The thesis 
examined the frames used by News24 and IOL to legitimise or delegitimise political leaders during 
their reporting of the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress. It further examined 
how the leadership qualities and political personalities of both Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana 
Dhlamini-Zuma were framed in News24 and IOL. The study used editorial, news articles, 
commentary, and opinion pieces as units of analysis as it sought to examine how the content 
reported in the period leading, during and after the congress were framed to legitimise or 
delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma's political and leadership qualities 
both and national and political party level. A total of 100 news articles were analysed using both 
thematic and critical discourse analysis. 
The researcher used the thematic coding process to arrange data. Through this coding process, 
there emerged six broad frames that News24 and IOL used in the process of reporting news on 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. These frames were Rand and Market; Economic 
recovery and Growth; Jacob Zuma and State capture; Factionalism and Unity; Corruption frame. 
Both presses used the same frames in their reporting of the two candidates. However, these frames 
were used in contrasting ways. This will be explained in detail in this chapter and the once that 
follow.   
This chapter present, analyse and discusses data from Rand and Market; Economic recovery and 
Growth frame. In presenting and discussing the findings, the following questions will be answered: 
1. How exactly did News24 and IOL frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini 
Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at a party and national level in the period leading, during 
and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress? 
2. What are the similarities and differences in how the two News24 and IOL framed the 
leadership qualities of the two leaders?  
3. What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders? 
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4. How did such framing seek to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and 
Cyril Ramaphosa? 
Following this introduction, the next section focuses on the Rand and Markets frame. 
 
Rand and markets:  brief overview  
 
The rand and markets frame was used by both News24 and IOL extensively in the period leading 
to and after the elective conference. In both News24 and IOL, the frame was used to report on 
Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa abilities to change and build confidence in the 
ailing South African currency and poor performing markets. Sampled reports from both news-
press revealed that the press utilised the persuasion techniques that allowed it to focus and place 
emphasis on those specific aspects of an issue that encourages or discourages certain interpretation 
of the meaningful context (Entman 1993; Entman 2007; Cacciatore et al. 2016; Goffman 1979; 
Scheufele 2012). In this case, the rand and markets frame paid more attention to Cyril Ramaphosa 
ability to transform the markets and strengthening the rand. On the other hand, sampled reports 
also revealed that in both News24 and IOL, little and negative attention was placed on Nkosazana 
Dhlamini-Zuma's ability to transform and inspire confidence in the rand and market. Drawing on 
this observation, it can be opined that the press emphasised on certain sets of consideration (Cyril 
Ramaphosa) over the others (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) (Secheufele 2012). To add, the fact that 
the media places negative attention on the female candidates seems to agree with findings from 
previous studies (Cukier et al. 2016; Guha 2018). For instance, concerning the observation that a 
female leader was portrayed negatively and given less attention, Cukier et al. argued that more 
often in the press, women leaders are underrepresented and less likely to be portrayed positively 
(2016: 45). Guha also observed that female political candidates across the world are frequently 
misrepresented in various media platforms (2018: 67).  
Moreover, data from IOL and News24 revealed that the press placed the blame of the poor 
performance of markets and weakening rand on Jacob Zuma and his allies. The repeated emphasis 
on how Jacob Zuma's leadership and policies negatively affected the rand and markets was 
rampant in News24 and IOL. This manner of reporting issues by placing considerable emphasis 
and amplifying the role of Jacob Zuma when reporting about the rand and markets performance 
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deserve careful consideration. It seems to suggest that News24 and IOL chose to focus on certain 
elements of the stories and amplifying them so that the reader may arrive at a predetermined 
conclusion (Shulman and Sweitzer 2018: 156). Moreover, the reporters can also be said to have 
appealed to the already existing information in the memory and minds of its audience and reminded 
them of the reason why they rand and markets performance is not up to standard. By so doing the 
media can be understood to have drawn the audience’s attention to how the Jacob Zuma 
administration affected the rand and the markets, and then it goes on to construct a frame and give 
cues that audience will use to understand the information given to them so that they will adopt a 
certain course of action (Scheufele and Iyengar 2012: 20).  
Furthermore, incessant focus on Jacob Zuma and how he negatively affected the rand and markets 
seems to suggest that the press was participating in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse. To illustrate, 
the press can be said to have played in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse that was replete with 
statements of how Jacob Zuma and allies destroyed the country and its economy. To explain this 
observation, there were dominant sentiments in South Africa that the poor performance of the rand 
and markets was a result of Jacob Zuma’s poor policies and leadership. Therefore, drawing on the 
prevailing discourse about Jacob Zuma, it can be assumed that News24 and IOL reports 
participated and played out in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse. The press draws from the already 
existing discourse to make sense of the obtaining events and thus create reality from them. To add, 
journalists in the media houses make sense of the surrounding environment through using frames. 
These frames are culturally constituted in that they are not independent of the context and society 
within which they are constructed (Entman 1993: 34). This observation is consistent with findings 
from Sha et al. (2002) who argued that the media uses frames that are culturally constituted. For 
Sha et al. these frames activate knowledge, stimulate stocks of cultural morals and values and then 
create a context.  
 
Rand and markets:  News24  
 
Sampled reports from News24 revealed that in the rand and markets frame, the press paid more 
attention to Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to steer the rand and market performance in a positive 
direction. For example, Wallace and Gokoluk said:   
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Markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma’s ex-wife 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender. Still, a victory by Ramaphosa 
won’t necessarily buoy the rand much, given South Africa’s faltering economy, 
according to Credit Agricole (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1). 
To add, in another report Brand and Galouchko (2017) stressed that  
The rand has rallied more than 6% since Cyril Ramaphosa, who has pledged to 
revive the struggling economy and stamp out corruption, was elected leader of the 
African National Congress on December 18 (Brand and Galouchko 2017: 1)  
Further, in a different report Cronje (2017) reported that  
Other market analysts have noted that the local unit has been strengthening based 
on positive sentiment around the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC president 
(Cronje 2017: 1).  
Drawing on the above quotes it is apparent that the reporters placed emphasis on the ability of 
Cyril Ramaphosa to impact the rand and markets in a positive direction. But most importantly, this 
was done against serious vilification or downplaying of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's ability to 
influence the markets and the weakening rand. The reporters made it clear that the rand and 
markets were not favouring Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1). On the 
other hand, it was also emphasised that the markets were responding favourably towards 
sentiments of Cyril Ramaphosa victory. For example, in a report by Wallace and Gokoluk it was 
reported that “markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma’s ex-wife 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender” (2017: 1). Therefore, what this suggest is 
that News24 reporters when reporting on the matter of rand and markets chose and selected to 
place salience on the capacity of Cyril Ramaphosa while omitting and negating to report on how 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma can influence the rand and markets positively. This finding seems to 
confirm Entman’s argument that the press occasionally selects some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a certain 
problem definition, causal interpretation and moral evaluation (1993: 34). Evidently, in the case 
of the rand and markets frame, the press selected to portray Cyril Ramaphosa in a manner that will 
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allow its readers to perceive him as the right person to improve the markets and the performance 
of the rand.  
Additionally, the style in which Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's personality was downplayed deserves 
some careful consideration. To illustrate, the personality of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was 
discredited in that the press portrayed her as a leader whose rise to power was not going to change 
much in terms of the state of the rand and the market. Simply put, the press downplayed her 
leadership capacity by making emphasis that "markets are likely to respond negatively against the 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma victory" (Cronje 2017: 1). To add, the press also emphasised that "the 
rand is not likely to strengthen under Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership" (Brand and 
Galouchko 2012: 1). This manner of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma suggests that the press 
either consciously or unconsciously downplayed the leadership capacity of Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma while amplifying the ability of Cyril Ramaphosa to influence the rand and markets. Drawing 
on the previous observation, it seems that the News24 presentation of issues was slanted in favour 
of a certain gender over the other. In this case, gender bias was evident in that a female leader 
(Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) was downplayed in favour of a male leader (Cyril Ramaphosa). These 
findings seem to be consistent with Vos’ findings that showed that there exists a gender bias within 
the media that allows women to be underrepresented and less likely to be portrayed positively 
when they occupy leadership positions (Vos 2016: 45).  
Furthermore, sampled data from News24 revealed that the reporters applied the technique of 
sentimentality in the rand and markets frame. The sentimentality technique allowed the press to 
present the readers with their emotional past that was bound to evoke undesired feelings 
(Richardson 2007: 114). This means of presenting issues allowed the reader to understand and 
reflect the problem within the parameters and framework given by the news reports. For example, 
emphasis on how the rand and markets were contextualised and placed in their historical context 
by incessant reference to how Jacob Zuma's rule has negatively affected the economy. To illustrate, 
the poor performance of the rand and markets were blamed on the leadership of Jacob Zuma. It 
was made clear in the reports that were it not for Jacob Zuma's disastrous leadership, the rand and 
markets would have not been performing the way they are doing. For example, in a News24 report 
by Wallace and Gokoluk, it was said that “the rand and markets a result and suffer from the Jacob 
consequences of the disastrous Jacob Zuma rule” (2017: 1). Now, creating a link of the present 
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poor-performing rand and markets can be said to have reminded the reader about their emotional 
experience with Jacob Zuma. Referring to Jacob Zuma was likely to evoke negative emotions 
against Jacob Zuma because according to the post-Jacob Zuma discourse, anything to do with 
Jacob Zuma was despicable. To explain the previous assertion, the environment within which the 
press was operating is worthy our consideration. To illustrate, the issue of rand and markets 
performance has a deep emotional effect in most of News24 audience. Its target audience who are 
business and middle-class people with vested interest in the market performance and the rand were 
emotionally susceptible to the issue of rand and markets. This section of South African society 
was being affected by unstable rand and markets. The weakening of the rand means a loss of 
business and an increase in the cost of living for these two groups of society. As a result, any issue 
that presents a negative picture of the poor performance of the rand and markets was likely to 
evoke their emotions.  
However, a close analysis of the setting within which the News24 reports were constructed seems 
to suggest that when referring to Jacob Zuma's impact on the rand and markets, the press was 
actively vilifying the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma through evoking and painting a gloomy 
picture around the leadership of Jacob Zuma. This is so because over the years, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma was understood as the successor of Jacob Zuma (Du Plessis 2017: 98). She was 
also perceived as the leader of the Jacob Zuma faction that was meant to continue the Jacob Zuma 
legacy after his presidency (Mathekga 2018: 56). Therefore, by evoking the negative emotions 
brought by the Jacob Zuma rule, the News24 reporters were simply reminding its readers that 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is one of Jacob Zuma's cronies. As result, a victory for Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma means a return of Jacob Zuma’s rule that was not favoured by the rand and markets.  
Sampled data from News24 revealed that the reporters placed more emphasis on painting a gloomy 
and doomy picture of the weakening rand and poor market performance by ways of quoting 
different sources and business sources to authenticate their reports. For example, a News24 report 
of 17 November 2017, there was heavy reliance on the sources when reporting on the rand and 
markets. For example, in a report mention above (17 November 2017; Cronjie 2017), an analyst 
from Credit Agricole CIB and Toronto-Dominion Bank was quoted heavily in the report. The 
analyst explained how bleak the situation was for the rand and markets. He also expressed concern 
over how the ANC members will vote on the conference. To add, the analysts indicated that the 
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ANC members ought to vote for a leader who has the potential to bring confidence in the markets 
and who will allow the rand to regain its strength on the international markets. This stance by the 
analysist seems to have legitimating undertone that favoured the dominant voices that were of the 
idea that Cyril Ramaphosa was the only leader who has the potential to boost confidence in the 
rand and markets. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the use of the analysist to endorse the 
leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa was a conscious strategy by the reporters to assert their subjective 
agenda while hiding behind the guise of the analysts. Now, the analysist stance that the ANC 
"ought to vote for a leader who has the potential to bring confidence" (Cronjie 2017: 1), when 
carefully analysed within its context of its construction does not mean that ANC members should 
vote for Jacob Zuma or anyone related to him. There is no way the analyst could advocate the 
members to vote for a person who is linked to Jacob Zuma. Instead, drawing on the context and 
economic background, one can assume that by suggesting that the "ANC members should vote for 
a leader who has potential”, the analyst was insinuating and endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa. This is 
so because Cyril Ramaphosa at the height of the disastrous rule of Jacob Zuma, a different section 
of the South African society was calling for Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred and right candidate 
to bring confidence in the South African economy. 
However, the reporter's use of sources serves two objectives. Firstly, it allows the press to abide 
by the principle of objectivity. Secondly, the use of sources helps the reporters to inset their 
subjective opinions within the reports without them compromising the principle of objectivity 
(Chambwera 2016; Richardson 2007 and Wodak 2011). Therefore, when referring to sources (in 
the form of experts) outside South Africa, it can be assumed that this was a strategic 
communication technique by News24 reporters to report on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in a way 
that is seen as ethical. This serves to authenticate the press position and the situation that has 
affected South Africa and allow its audience to hear from a trusted and objective source who is an 
expert in the field of economics. Additionally, the use of analysist by the reporters seems to serve 
the purpose of authenticating the press' subjective ideological stance. These findings are barely 
distinguishable from Richardson (2007: 99) who argued that the continuous use of sources in the 
person of analysis seems like a way for the press to expediently state its position without 
jeopardizing the professional ethics of objectivity. In this case, the press applied this strategy to 
maintain its authenticity even in situations where they were communicating their own subjective 
opinion. 
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Table 8.1: Linguistic expression in rand and markets frame: News24   
 
“Markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma’s ex-wife Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender. Still, a victory by Ramaphosa won’t 
necessarily buoy the rand much, given South Africa’s faltering economy, according to 
Credit Agricole.” (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1) 
"Others reckon the bullishness will extend beyond the ANC conference. Toronto-Dominion says 
the rand may strengthen 10% to 12.55 next year if Ramaphosa or another candidate 
outside Zuma's faction wins, especially if they push the president to step down as head 
of state before his terms end in 2019." (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1) 
"Someone alternative to the Zuma candidate may be appointed as new ANC leader and 
presidential candidate for the 2019 election," said Cristian Maggio, head of emerging-
markets research at the Toronto-based bank. This would be a major improvement in the 
outlook for South Africa, especially if, again as I expect, after the appointment, Zuma is 
recalled from the presidency by the ANC." (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1) 
"Markets favour a win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma’s ex-wife Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, the other main contender” (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1).  
“The rand has rallied more than 6% since Cyril Ramaphosa, who has pledged to revive the 
struggling economy and stamp out corruption, was elected leader of the African National 
Congress on December 18.” (Brand and Galouchko 2017: 1)   
“The market is positively surprised by the increasing amount of support that Mr. Ramaphosa is 
rallying behind him,” (Brand and Galouchko 2017: 1)   
 
“Other market analysts have noted that the local unit has been strengthening based on positive 
sentiment around the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as ANC president.” (Cronje 2017: 1).  
"Ramaphosa is seen as more market-friendly than his defeated rival Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma" 
(Cronje 2017: 1).  
“As soon as it became public that Ramaphosa was the new ANC president, those behind the 
markets reacted positively.” (Cronje 2017: 1).  
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A deeper analysis of data at least hints that News24 framed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril 
Ramaphosa in binary and contrasting terms. What this means is that their election campaign was 
presented in terms of "win versus loose" "gain versus loss" situation. To illustrate this, Cyril 
Ramaphosa’s election campaign was packaged as a victory. It was presented as a gain for the 
markets, rand and South Africa. For example, a News24 report by Wallace and Gokoluk (2017: 1) 
compared the impact of the two leaders on the rand and markets when it said “markets favour a 
win by Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa over Zuma’s ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the 
other main contender” (Wallace and Gokoluk 2017: 1). Presenting Cyril Ramaphosa in terms of 
"win" or "gain" in relation to the rand and markets can be interpreted as a conscious or unconscious 
effort by News24 reporters to make their audience to be more averse to risk when they are 
presented with making of choices in terms of gains (Tewksbury and Scheufele 2007).  
On the other hand, Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma's relation to rand and markets was presented in 
terms of losses. Simply put, the victory of Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma was not a victory to South 
Africa. Instead, Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma's victory would continue the weakening of the rand 
and poor performance of the markets. By so doing, the reporters were consciously or 
unconsciously aware that their audience is very cautious when presented with information in terms 
of losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979: 267). Therefore, presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s 
possible victory as a loss and threat to the rand and markets would make its audience to be avoiding 
and more risk-seeking in terms of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's victory. Effectively, how the 
reporters framed the victory of the two political candidates served to legitimate and de-legitimate 
these two leaders. Put differently, portraying Cyril Ramaphosa's possible leadership as a victory 
for the markets helped to credit his leadership campaign. On the other end, presenting Nkosazana 
Dhlamini-Zuma's victory as a threat to the rand and market served to discredit her political 
campaign to be the next leader of the ANC. To add, how the two leaders were presented in this 
case seems to suggest that the reporters presented logically equivalent information to the audience 
in a way that encourages and discourages certain kind of interpretation and course of action 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 2013). This logical information as 
presented by News24 can be said to have motivated the readers to change their preferences 
concerning the weakening rand and markets and strengthening of the same.  
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Apart from being used to legitimise and discredit Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dhlamini-
Zuma respectively in the period leading to the conference. Analysis of the data found evidence 
that the rand and markets frame was also extensively used by News24 after the elective conference 
and the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa. In this case, the news reports were replete with information 
highlighting how the rand and markets positively responded to a Cyril Ramaphosa victory. For 
instance, in one report titled “Rand rallies to pre-Gordhan ouster levels on Ramaphosa”, Brand 
and Galouchko stressed that  
the rand has rallied more than 6% since Cyril Ramaphosa, who has pledged to revive the 
struggling economy and stamp out corruption, was elected leader of the African National 
Congress on December 18 (Brand and Galouchko 2017: 1) 
Putting the above quotation and headline into historical context, the rand was performing poorly 
since the last time Pravin Gordhan was a finance minister of South Africa. It was the period before 
he was removed from office by Jacob Zuma. During his period the rand was performing well and 
that was the last time the rand gained on the global markets. Now, presenting and comparing the 
gain of the rand with the period of Gordhan after the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa seems to suggest 
that News24 reporters essentially used the past discourse to explain the present. To illustrate this, 
News24 used the history of the present to justify and legitimise the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa. It 
did so by allowing its readers to refer to the past (where Cyril Ramaphosa was not president) and 
compare it with the present (where he is now the president) and then the readers would judge for 
themselves the extent to which Cyril Ramaphosa's victory could influence the rand and the markets 
as opposed to the period of Jacob Zuma’s presidency.  Drawing on this analysis, it seems that the 
media links the present to the future by digging deep in the frame reserves that already exist in the 
minds of the audience and evoke them, thereby allowing the audience to process them within the 
prevailing present conditions. The observation that the rand and markets frame was drawn from 
the past historical events ties well with previous studies that argued that frames are culturally 
constructed and as part of a culture they get embedded into the media content (Borra 2011, Van 
Gorp 2007 and McCracken 1986). This is made possible by journalists’ continuous reference to 
past events to explain the current unfolding reality (Borra 2011; Van Gorp 2007; McCracken 
1986).   
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Rand and markets: IOL 
 
The rand and markets frame was used by IOL when reporting on the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa 
and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the period leading to the ANC conference. From the analysed 
data, key results emerged that the rand and markets frame was mainly employed to expose how 
the rand and markets were performing in response to the nomination processes in the period 
leading to the ANC election. More so, the data showed that its extensive use in IOL was when IOL 
reporters used the potential victory of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to predict 
the performance of the rand and markets. For instance, the rand and markets frame were utilised 
more to credit Cyril Ramaphosa by indicating how his victory can positively affect the 
performance of the rand and the markets. On the other hand, analysis of data also indicated that 
the mention of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma concerning the markets was minimal. Furthermore, her 
mention concerning the performance of the rand and markets was replete with negative 
connotations that served to discredit her ability to positively steer the markets in a positive 
direction. For instance, an IOL report by van Zyl said, "the rand seems not to favour a Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma victory" (2017: 1). In a different report, Bulawayo said: "the rand performance is 
positive in response to Cyril Ramaphosa victory more than Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Bulawayo 
2017: 1).  
The results from the data also showed that while the press reported on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 
the reporters did not place a similar positive emphasis on how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's victory 
is related to the rand and markets. In simple terms, the press did not afford fair coverage to 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This observation suggests that IOL reporters were not impartial when 
they were reporting on the two political candidates. Instead, the reporters were biased in favour of 
Cyril Ramaphosa. Therefore, drawing on the assertion that the press placed less attention on one 
candidate over the other when reporting on the rand and markets, it can be suggested that IOL 
downplayed the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. It did so by not mentioning her positive 
impact on the rand and markets and by the limited focus on her when reporting on the issue of rand 
and markets. By so doing, IOL was successful in selecting certain aspects of the unfolding events 
and then place salience on them. Further, IOL placed focus on the specific aspect of an issue (Cyril 
Ramaphosa) while downplaying other aspects (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma), and thus create a 
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framework of reference that will guide its audience in interpreting the performance of the rand and 
markets in the period leading to the ANC elective conference.  
Additionally, in an IOL report of 29 November 2017, Philemon Bulawayo reported that the "the 
rand had also benefited from increasing signs that Cyril Ramaphosa was leading Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma in the race to replace President Jacob Zuma as leader of the ANC" (Bulawayo 2017: 
1). To authenticate the stated observation, Bulawayo quoted several sources that endorsed the idea 
that the rand and markets are responding in favour of sentiments of Cyril Ramaphosa's victory. In 
another report published on 6 December 2017, Khumalo said that the rand and markets are 
strengthening more in response to the sentiments that Cyril Ramaphosa is the possible winner of 
the ANC elections (2017: 1). In this report, the reporter quoted a handful of statistic that were used 
to justify the positive change in rand and markets performance after the announcement of Cyril 
Ramaphosa's victory in the ANC branches. For instance, the quoted sources placed emphasis and 
affirmed that a win for Cyril Ramaphosa was a positive step towards reviving the weakening rand 
and markets. One of the sources affirmed that “the market is starting to price a Ramaphosa victory. 
This we think is the real reason for the strength” (Bulawayo 2017”: 1). Similarly, in a different 
report, Bulawayo said, “Annabel Bishop, the chief economist at Investec, said the up case for the 
market is perceived to be an ANC election outcome where Cyril Ramaphosa is elected president 
of the ANC” (2017: 1). Put together, the heavy reliance on sources served to authenticate the IOL 
subjective stance that favoured a Cyril Ramaphosa’s victory.   
Moreover, sampled reports showed that IOL was emphatic in creating a link between Cyril 
Ramaphosa's victory in the branches and the rand and markets. Effectively, by associating possible 
Cyril Ramaphosa's victory to the positive performance of the rand and markets, IOL reporters 
engaged in the conscious or unconscious process of legitimising the leadership of Cyril 
Ramaphosa. What this means is that IOL reporters created the impression to its readers that the 
victory of Cyril Ramaphosa was going to bring about the positive economic performance that was 
to be ushered in by the positive performance of the markets. Drawing on this line of reasoning, it 
therefore, seems that IOL reports on the markets were simply artefacts that were replete with 
legitimating meaning; meaning communicated to its readers to make them understand the 
leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa in the framework created by the press.  
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Table 8.2: Linguistic expressions on rand and markets: IOL 
 
“rand had also benefited from increasing signs that Cyril Ramaphosa was leading Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma in the race to replace President Jacob Zuma as leader of the ANC” 
(Bulawayo 2017: 1) 
“The market is starting to price a Ramaphosa victory. This we think is the real reason for the 
strength” (Bulawayo 2017: 1)  
“Rand strengthens after Ramaphosa’s victory” (Khumalo 2017: 1)  
"The rand strengthened more 1% as markets increasingly priced in deputy president Cyril 
Ramaphosa's victory in the neck-and-neck race for the ruling party's presidency" 
(Khumalo 2017: 1) 
“Annabel Bishop, the chief economist at Investec, said the up case for the market is perceived 
to be an ANC election outcome where Cyril Ramaphosa is elected president of the ANC” 
"Rand strengthens on Ramaphosa's prospects" (Bulawayo 2017: 1) 
"The rand strengthened yesterday on hopes that Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa would win 
the race to become the next leader of the ANC at a party conference" (Bulawayo 2017:1) 
"Trader bets on Ramaphosa's win: Rand reaches 3-months high as ANC votes- (van Zyl 2017: 
1). 
 "The rand is stronger on the likelihood of Cyril Ramaphosa being elected ANC head, Stephen 
Innes, Singapore-based head of trading for the Asia Pacific at Oanda Corp., said a note" 
(van Zyl 2017: 1).  
"the chief economist for the Efficient Group said he had very little that the rating agencies would 
react negatively if Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma becomes the next ANC president" (Pillay 
and Pillay 2017: 1) 
"The rand responded well to the change in leadership" (Staff Reporter 2017: 1). 
"The rand responded well strengthening against the US dollar the election of the 65-year-old 
former union leader and businessman" (Staff Reporter 2017: 1). 
 
Results from IOL point to the fact that the press operated as terrain of cultural contestation where 
different ideological battles were fought (Gramsci 1937). In simple terms, the press participated in 
amplifying and authenticating the dominant ideological voices in the prevailing in South African 
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at the time of the conference. This was seen by the underlying ideological sentiments that were 
replete in their text. Results from the sampled data showed that the rand and markets frame 
endorsed and was pro-Cyril Ramaphosa sentiments. What this means is that the manner of 
presenting the rand and markets' positive response to the possible victory by Cyril Ramaphosa 
suggest their hidden interest in the victory of Cyril Ramaphosa. However, this cannot be 
understood without referring to the political context within which the news articles were 
constructed. 
More than the issue of impartiality in the representation of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril 
Ramaphosa, an underlying ideology that sort to naturalise and justify the contradictions and 
exploitation of the capitalist society were observed in the sampled data. What this means is that 
IOL report amplified and naturalise the class struggle that pervades South African society. For 
instance, in the rand and markets frame, there was an interminable emphasis on the notion that the 
rand and markets respond favourably to the positive sentiments of Cyril Ramaphosa. On the other 
hand, the readers were continually reminded that the rand will perform negatively to Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma victory. Moreover, the reports periodically emphasise that the business community 
is confident of Cyril Ramaphosa's win in the election. The presentation of these two candidates in 
binary terms present a contradiction of two societal classes that were epitomised by these two 
candidates. Drawing on the historical background of the two political candidates, Cyril Ramaphosa 
and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma hail from two different social classes. Cyril Ramaphosa stood for 
the elite/ruling class while Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood for the poor working class. The group 
of people who are identified in the reports that were impressed by the performance of Cyril 
Ramaphosa in the campaigns is not the poor people in South Africa. The poor or working-class 
has less to do with the performance of the markets or the strengthening of the rand on the 
international market. The performance of the rand and markets is the discourse of the elite in South 
Africa. It is the elites who have vested interest in how the rand and markets perform in the 
international arena. Drawing on this illustration, it is safe to assume that the reports that focus on 
the performance of the rand and markets simply reflected the ideas of the ruling class in South 
Africa. The ruling elite whose interests were spearheaded by Cyril Ramaphosa. Therefore, this 
manner of focusing on the ideas of the ruling party allows the press to ignore the struggles of the 
working class. What this means is that the ideas of the poor and working-class were downplayed 
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and thus remained invisible in IOL news reports. They were ignored as though they do not exist 
(Richardson 2007: 137). 
In addition, the way the press sort to naturalise and justify the ideologies of the ruling class help 
to confirm the argument from previous studied (Mesquita and de Almeida Medeiros 2016: 385) 
that news content does not only exist to inform the public about the current affairs, instead, it is 
carefully constructed social and cultural artefacts aimed at manipulating of social values and 
attitudes of readers. It does so by communicating the ideas of the ruling class. Together, these 
observations seem to suggest that news-press plays an important role in the legitimation of ideas 
of the dominant groups in society (Beetham 2018: 88). 
 
Economic recovery and growth: New24  
 
Data sampled showed that the Economic recovery and Growth frame was evident in almost every 
News24 business report during the period leading to and after the elective conference. It was 
apparent from the sampled data that the press attached meaning to a strip of unfolding events 
(elections campaigns) and thus promoted particular means in which the reader could define and 
interpreted the events that were unfolding (Shah et al. 2002 cited in Chong and Druckman 2007: 
103). To illustrate, in the period leading to the conference, the press chose to focus specifically on 
the events that were unfolding in this period. The news reports were replete with events that were 
directly related to the conference. Thus, by focusing on these events and placing emphasis on 
certain political candidates, one can assume that the press selected specific elements of the events 
and create a narrative that it gave to its readers through the Economic Recovery and growth frame.   
Apart from selecting a strip of unfolding events to give meaning to them, results from this study 
showed that the reporters selected some aspects of an individual story and give prominence to 
specific aspects of the story. For example, in a report by Vecchiato (2017), Cyril Ramaphosa 
statements in relation to growing the economy were quoted extensively. In this case, the reporter 
placed considerable emphasis on the aspects of Cyril Ramaphosa’s speech where he promised to 
rebuild the economy. Additionally, the report also presented and emphasised the idea that Cyril 
Ramaphosa possesses knowledge of not only the South African economy but also other 
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neighboring and international economies. For instance, Vecchiato quoted Cyril Ramaphosa 
saying, "South Africa needs to do what other economies were doing, that is to grow the economy" 
(2017: 1). This statement in the report was followed by a quotation from Cyril Ramaphosa that 
said "A number of economies around are growing and the world economy is responding very 
positively in terms of growth, but we are moribund and need to come with a plan that needs to take 
us out of this" (Vecchiato 2017: 1). What is clear from this manner of reporting on Cyril 
Ramaphosa’s leadership is that he was framed and presented to the reader as a leader who is 
concerned with the economic growth and recovery. To add, emphasis on his ability and willingness 
to grow the economy has only served to legitimise his leadership. 
To build upon the example used in the previous paragraph, it can be assumed the reporters either 
consciously or unconsciously endorsed Cyril Ramaphosa economic ideology. To substantiate, in 
the report discussed in the previous paragraph, the reporters embarked on the rampage to endorse 
Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred candidate to improve the economy of South Africa. Placing this 
report into context, Cyril Ramaphosa's economic approach that was being supported by these 
reporters is commonly understood considering the capitalist ideology. What this means is that 
Cyril Ramaphosa's economic policy was synonymous with the interest of the capitalist interest 
who were driven by profit. This is so because Cyril Ramaphosa in South Africa is well known as 
one of the richest people who has interest in many sectors of the economy. Therefore, his social 
status automatically placed him in the same camp with the capitalists. As a result, what he stood 
for were the interest of the capitalist. Drawing on this contextual analysis, it can be assumed that 
the media by supporting and endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa's economic turnaround policy it was 
playing an instrumental role in authenticating the capitalist ideology. The most plausible 
explanation of this is that News24 is owned by a big corporation (Naspers) who is also motivated 
by profit-making.  
Put together, the above illustration points to the fact that the press supported Cyril Ramaphosa 
only because his economic policies were in line with their interest and their ideology. He was the 
media’s favourite because of his proximity to their ideology This observation seems to be in 
complete agreement with findings of Wagner and Meyer (2017: 367). These scholars argued that 
the proximity of a media house to a certain ideology or organisation will motivate it to report more 
on that political party or candidate in a positive manner. To add, the media will also respond 
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positively to the messages of those political candidates it shares the same ideology with (Wagner 
and Meyer 2017: 367).      
In keeping with findings from previous studies (Richardson 2007; Chambwera 2016), results from 
the data showed that the news reports are cultural artefacts that cannot be isolated from the context 
of their construction. To substantiate, evidence from the data revealed that the Economic Recovery 
and Growth frame was not a brainchild of News24 journalist. Also, the frame was not created to 
report news for the ANC national elective conference. Instead, further analysis of the context of 
construction proves that the frame was had discursive roots in the prevailing "Economic 
Downgrade" discourse that dominated discussion in South Africa before, during and after the 
conference. To explain, there were negative sentiments that expressed concern for the need for 
economic growth and economic recovery after poor economic policies from Jacob Zuma's 
administration that negatively impacted the economy. In simple terms, the reports on economic 
recovery and economic growth bear semblance and replicated the situation that was in South 
Africa. This was is so because the reports on economic recovery and growth were replete with 
statements that were like those used previously in the conversation of an economic downgrade.  
Moreover, the notion that the construction of the economic recovery and growth frame was 
influenced by prevailing economic conditions can be seen by how the news reports endlessly 
replicated figures and sentiments that were common and dominant in the prevailing economic 
discourse in South Africa. For example, a deeper analysis of data indicated that news reports that 
focused on economic recovery and growth were replete with statistics and figures that were drawn 
from the previous (2016) budget speech by the minister of finance. To substantiate this 
observation, in a report by Vecchiato figures of the current economic growth were presented 
(2017). Vecchiato said, "South Africa economy is set to expand 0.7% this year, down from 1.3% 
predicted in the February budget" (Vecchiato 2017: 1). Essentially, these figures were borrowed 
from the previous budget speech. What the reporters did was simply to go and dig deeper into the 
previous national budget and use the figures that were reported in the budget of the previous year. 
This approach to news production through borrowing from other text (budget) point to the fact that 
the news reports as we understand them are not isolated from other text. Instead, they are a part of 
an intertextual text. Put differently, the fact that the reports resample sentiments and figures from 
other text points to the fact that text cannot be viewed in isolation because it exists in relation to 
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other text (Richardson 2007: 100). To add, it is also clear from the observation above that the news 
reports were successful in incorporating, reformulating, reinterpreting and re-reading previous text 
(Richardson 2007: 100). 
Moreover, sampled data showed that the Economic recovery and Growth frame was employed 
successfully to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in News24. For instance, 
reports that referred to economic recovery or economic growth when reporting on Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma were almost silent on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma plans to grow the economy. 
However, results from analysed data showed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma approach to economic 
growth was presented in a negative and de-legitimating manner. To substantiate, her economic 
policy was framed as “radical economic transformation”. The term “radical economic 
transformation” refers to the changing of the composition of output that the economy is producing 
and ownership and control patterns (Du Plessis 2017: 38). As an economic approach, “radical 
economic transformation” became a dominant phrase in South African politics after the emergence 
of the Economic Freedom Fighters political party. Its application according to the EFF, meant the 
immediate and abrupt transferred of control of the economy to the black majority. It also meant 
the redistribution of land without compensation (Pauw 2017: 88). All these approaches were 
perceived by many analysts in the South African society to possess detrimental challenges and 
undesirable impacts on the economy and food security.  
Moreover, apart from being the centrepiece of the EFF economic policy, "radical economic 
transformation" was also adopted in the ANC during the leadership of Jacob Zuma. Its application 
and meaning in the ANC were extended to policies that were perceived as pro-black. It was also 
applied to explain the land restitution policy that was pushed by Jacob Zuma and his faction. 
However, the adoption of the phrase by the Jacob Zuma government was met with a negative 
reaction. What this means is that the term was then used as a scapegoat to loot the state resources 
and as a façade by corrupt officials to engage in various corrupt activities (Booysen 2019: 56).  
Drawing on the contextual background of the phrase "radical economic transformation", the press 
by aligning Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership to radical economic transformation only served 
to discredit her leadership. This is so because the press created a connection between Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and one of South Africa's most hated policies. The policy was hated because it was 
assumed that its application in the South African economy will unsettle economic growth. More 
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so, its emphasis on land redistribution without compensation was perceived as a threat to the 
agricultural sector and ultimately to food security. What is more interesting is how the press played 
down the economic policy of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. It did so by selecting the negative aspect 
of the policy and amplify and then present them to the reader. The fact that the policy was 
detrimental to the economy was emphasised. This allowed the reader to interpret the policy of 
radical economic policy using the framework presented to it by the press. 
Put together, the results discussed above seem to suggest that the press discredited the leadership 
of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma through attacking her policy. This assertion seems to fit well with 
findings from previous studies that indicated that women are less likely to be framed as capable 
leaders (Gedalya et al. 2017). Their capabilities to lead are undermined. Moreover, the media tend 
to give them less coverage when compared to the amount of attention placed on their male 
counterparts (Vos 2013; Ngubane 2010). However, when comparing the results that the press 
discredited Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership by emphasising on the negative aspects of her 
policies, with findings from previous scholars. It should be noted that our results seem to be in 
contradiction with findings from previous studies (Ross 2002; Nacos 1997). To illustrate, while 
these scholars maintain that women politicians in their entirety are tremendously underrepresented 
in the political sphere, and in instances where they are represented, the importance is positioned 
on trivialities like the type of dressing and not on policies and ideologies (Ross 2002; Nacos 1997).  
Results from this study showed that the press paid a great deal of emphasis on matters of policy 
when they were reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, although in a negative manner. 
 
Table 8.3: Linguistic expression from the economic recovery and growth frame: News24  
 
“A lack of support from a clear majority of the 86 voting members of the ANC’s National 
Executive Committee will limit his scope to drive policy changes and assert his authority 
over President Jacob Zuma, whose second term as the nation’s leader ends in 2019” 
(Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1). 
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“A number of economies around us are growing, the world economy is responding very 
positively in terms of growth, but we are moribund, and we need to come up with a plan 
that needs to take us out of this.” (Vecchiato 2017). 
“New economic plan needed to avoid investment strike – Ramaphosa” (Vecchiato 2017: 1).  
“South Africa needs to do what other nations do during times of economic weakness and come 
up with a recovery plan that grabs the imagination of investors and its people, Deputy 
President Cyril Ramaphosa said in an interview in Cape Town” (Vecchiato 2017: 1).  
“Ramaphosa urges ANC to correct its ways to revive economic growth” (Mbatha and Vecchiato 
2017: 1) 
“Bold, decisive action is needed to change South Africa’s growth trajectory and the government 
should target an expansion of 3% in 2018 and 5% by 2023, he said at an ANC event in 
Soweto on Monday.  
The country needs a “new deal” to accelerate radical economic transformation so that growth is 
more inclusive of the majority black population, the deputy president said” (Mbatha and 
Vecchiato 2017: 1) 
“Lew Geffen, chair of Lew Geffen Sotheby’s International Realty, expects the property market 
in 2018 to show swift and significant improvement on the back of Deputy President Cyril 
Ramaphosa’s election as new ANC president” (Smith 2017: 2) 
“The ANC in Ekurhuleni will support Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to replace Jacob Zuma as 
ANC president, it said on Tuesday. This was due to her "unwavering commitment" to 
radical economic transformation, regional executive committee chair Robert Mashego 
said” (Tandwa 2017: 2) 
“Minister of Water and Sanitation Nomvula Mokonyane banged the radical economic 
transformation drum and voiced her support for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Gerber 
2017: 1) 
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“the Dlamini-Zuma faction now talks tough – radical economic transformation. This populist 
approach is partly a response to the growing unhappiness of the courage to fight 
corruption” (Thokoane 2017) 
 
From the analysed data, it was apparent that the press gathered and put together some elements of 
the two leaders’ leadership qualities in a bid to construct a reality (Van Gorp 2007). The most 
striking example is how the reporters created a connection between the dire situation affecting 
South Africa and the ability of Cyril Ramaphosa to address the ailing situation. To illustrate, in a 
report by Paul (2017), after the reporter painted a bleak picture of the South African economy and 
used the authority of Malusi Gigaba to justify it, the reporter juxtaposed this bleak situation with 
the speech of Cyril Ramaphosa. Cyril Ramaphosa was in this report quoted saying “A number of 
economies around us are growing, the world economy is responding very positively in terms of 
growth, but we are moribund and we need to come up with a plan that needs to take us out of this.” 
(Paul 2017: 1). The juxtaposition of Cyril Ramaphosa’s plan to grow the economy and the bleak 
situation that has characterised the economy plays a role in justifying the leadership of Cyril 
Ramaphosa. This is so because Cyril Ramaphosa was being presented to the readers as a leader 
who has a great plan and concerned about the potential that the South African economy has. He 
was also portrayed as a leader who is familiar with the economies around the world and how these 
economies could affect the South African economy. More so, reference made to the fact that Cyril 
Ramaphosa referred to the South African economy as "moribund" also gives the impression that 
Cyril Ramaphosa was in touch with the realities of the economy of South Africa. Put together, this 
manner of presenting Cyril Ramaphosa only served to legitimate him as a political leader who 
possesses the right qualities that were so much needed in South Africa after the disastrous rule of 
Jacob Zuma.  
Furthermore, how the press endorsed Cyril Ramaphosa bears some resemblance with sentiments 
for Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership that dominated South Africa for many years. To substantiate, 
over the years Cyril Ramaphosa was eyed as the preferred candidate to preside over the 
government of South Africa (Hartley 2018; Butler 2011, 2009, 2005). From the time of Nelson 
Mandela to the presidency of Jacob Zuma, calls for Cyril Ramaphosa to become president have 
been in the public discourse in South Africa (Butler 2009, Butler 2007). After the Nelson Mandela 
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resigned, Cyril Ramaphosa was recommended heavily but to take over the reins of power. 
Moreover, during the problematic periods of Jacob Zuma’s reign’s calls for Cyril Ramaphosa as 
the preferred candidate dominated public discourse (Pauw 2017).  
Therefore, News24 legitimating Cyril Ramaphosa by presenting him as the most capable candidate 
to bring about the much-desired economic growth has its inspiration from the ANC leadership 
renewal discourse that dominated the ruling party and South Africans that Cyril Ramaphosa was 
the preferred leader who can grow the economy. What this means is that the press by presenting 
Cyril Ramaphosa as the leader, it consciously or unconsciously selected some specific elements of 
the unfolding events (ANC leadership succession) and assemble a narrative that highlights the 
connection with the readers to promote a certain interpretation. Simply put, the press emphasis on 
Cyril Ramaphosa to become president was consistent with the calls (readily available schemas in 
the heads of the readers) for Ramaphosa to become president owing to his ability to lead both in 
the private sector and the government (Shulman and Sweitzer 2018, Gitlin 1980 and Goffman 
1974).  
Moreover, the economic recovery frame can be said to have been motivated and inspired by the 
prevailing socio-economic conditions that have affected the South African economy. The economy 
of South Africa during the period under investigation was not performing well. The rand was 
weakening daily; the prices of basic commodities were increasing. There was a lot of discontent 
in South Africa. There were poor investments in the country and South African credit ratings were 
downgraded leading South African economy into a recession. Calls for urgent need to revive the 
economy were growing daily. These calls prompted a protest that was calling for Jacob Zuma to 
resign and hand over leadership to a more capable leader. Therefore, it can be assumed that News24 
reference to all prevailing conditions in and juxtaposing them with Cyril Ramaphosa allowed them 
to dig deep into the past to influence the present. It explains the history of the present (Hook 2001: 
20). Simply, put, the fact that News24 reports on economic recovery and growth were replete with 
comments that referred to the causes of the economic decline and then present a possible saviour 
who can resuscitate the economy in the person of Cyril Ramaphosa seems to suggest that News24 
borrowed and evoked the past to legitimise the capability of Cyril Ramaphosa to turn around the 
fortunes of the country. Thus, the economic recovery and growth frame has its roots in the 
economic discourse that pervades South Africa in the period before the election campaigns.  
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The above assertion resonates with findings of Ihlen and Nitz (2008) and Miller (2006). These 
scholars emphasised the extent to which the prevailing events and conditions impact on the news 
frame. For instance, a study conducted by Miller revealed that the media content and frames are 
affected and mirror the events that were happening in the corporate world (2006: 45). To illustrate 
this observation Miller argued that "when environmental issues or accounting fraud occurs and 
when health issues are at stake, the media adopts protesters/antagonistic frames" (Miller 2006: 45). 
Put differently, what this means is that the media frames as they are packaged to the public are not 
independent of the unfolding events that are obtaining in their surroundings. Ihlen and Nitz argue 
that the media uses events from the world and different organization to frame their news (2008: 
65). These scholars argued that "occasionally, mixed frames from corporations and other 
organisations are used in the media news” (Ihlen and Nitz cited in Verhoeven 2016: 511).  
 
Economic recovery and growth frame: IOL 
 
Sampled data from IOL indicated that the economic recovery frame was used extensively by IOL 
in the period leading to the conference more than after Cyril Ramaphosa’s election victory. In this 
frame, the emphasis was placed on the potential of Cyril Ramaphosa and capability to revive the 
economy that was plundered by Jacob Zuma and his cronies when he was the president of South 
Africa. For example, in one report, Pillay and Pillay said that "the future of South Africa's economy 
and the possibility of further downgrades will be directly impacted by the outcome of the ANC's 
elective conference" (2017: 1). The previous quote, though sound neutral, a dramatic shift was 
evident in the report when the reporters first quoted Pravin Gordhan who said "the country needs 
new leadership, and that if Cyril Ramaphosa was elected there would be no need to worry about 
their rating agencies" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1). Now, this statement is suggestive in nature. It 
suggests that the new leader that South Africa needs were Cyril Ramaphosa. This is so because, in 
the same statement, the reporter went on to say that "if Ramaphosa was elected there would be no 
need for downgrade" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1). In simple terms, this statement implies that the 
reporters were crediting Cyril Ramaphosa through appealing to its readers that the problem of the 
downgrade and other economic challenges will be dealt with by Cyril Ramaphosa. 
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In keeping with findings from previous studies, results from the data showed that in the economic 
recovery and growth frame, reporters relied heavily on external sources to assert and authenticate 
their stories. They referred to external sources. Some of the sources' names were identified while 
some were referred to as “reliable sources”. To illustrate, in a report of 29 November 2017, the 
reporters quoted a variety of sources when they were reporting on the potential of Cyril Ramaphosa 
to transform the economy. What was more interesting is that the reporters relied on these sources 
to justify the potential for Cyril Ramaphosa to steer the economy of South Africa in the right 
direction. For example, a chief economist for the Efficient Group, Dawie Roodt was quoted saying 
that he has confidence that if Cyril Ramaphosa if elected ANC president was going to improve the 
state of the economy. The report said, "the chief economist for the Efficient Group, said he had 
very little doubt that the rating agencies would react positively if Cyril Ramaphosa becomes the 
next ANC president" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1). Moreover, another economist was also quoted 
saying that after the change of leadership in ANC there is no doubt that the new president will 
improve economic status in the country.  
The use of sources has its implication on how the content is read by the audience. This is so because 
sources allow the reporters to authenticate their report and erase the elements of biased reporting. 
Moreover, the reference to sources also seems to suggest that the reporters used sources to 
authenticate its subjective endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa without jeopardising its moral claim 
on objectivity. More often, the opinion of the sources cited by the reporters replicates the 
ideological standpoint and editorial policy of press in question. Findings discussed above seems 
to consistent with findings of Richardson who argued that more often, the journalist makes use of 
sources to justify and authenticate their subjective positions and opinion that they might have 
integrated into their reports (2007).   
Moreover, analysis of data showed that there was strong evidence that IOL framed Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in binary terms. To illustrate, the press contrasted the two 
leaders in the economic recovery and growth frame. What this means is that whenever the sources 
were presented and commented on the positive potential of Cyril Ramaphosa, they were also 
mindful to comment on the negative potentials that lie within the possible victory of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. Simply put, in a report of 29 November 2017, when the chief economist for the 
Efficient Group, Dawie Roodt's positive comments on Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to grow the 
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economy, the reporters was quick to stress and highlight on the negative aspects of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. Consequently, in terms of underlying meaning, one is tempted to assume that the 
pressing manner of presenting the two candidates allows it to assume the position of a cultural 
terrain and battlefield where ideological battles between the bourgeoisie and the proletariats are 
fought (Gramsci 1937). For instance, the two candidates stood for two different ideologies. 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood for radical economic transformation. This was an economic 
approach that was widely interpreted as pro-masses. On the other hand, Cyril Ramaphosa stood 
for the ideas of the ruling elite. He is best understood as capitalist. Drawing on this, it follows that 
the press by comparing the two leaders it was consciously or unconsciously comparing their 
ideologies and thus package the Cyril Ramaphosa ideology as the dominant one to its readers.  
 
Table 8.4: Linguistic expression in economic recovery and growth frame: IOL 
 
“economist has said that Ramaphosa's victory would lead to an improvement in the economy" 
(Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1)  
“expectations were that with Ramaphosa- a technocrat who is seen to be close to the business 
sector- as the president, the economy would improve” (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1) 
“Gordhan: #CyrilRamaphosa can rescue SA” (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 1) 
"the chief economist for the Efficient Group said he had very little that the rating agencies would 
react negatively if Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma becomes the next ANC president" (Pillay 
and Pillay 2017: 1) 
“but the rating agencies would probably act positively if Cyril Ramaphosa is president. He might 
be able to influence the facts over some time, but not overnight" (Pillay and Pillay 2017: 
1) 
“Ramaphosa promised to promote growth, improve investor confidence and tackle a 
disheartened 28% unemployment rate” (Staff Reporter 2017: 1)  
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“According to Ramaphosa’s plans, jobs become the highlight of government policy” (Staff 
Reporter 2017: 1) 
“Ramaphosa revealed his plans to ensure that the government avoids an unsustainable debt level. 
He will exercise fiscal discipline to ensure that resources are utilised for development, 
instead of servicing the debt"(Staff Reporter 2017: 1) 
 
Sampled data suggest that how Cyril Ramaphosa as a social actor was presented only sort to credit 
his campaign for president of the ANC. In a report titled “Ramaphosa’s plans for saving the SA 
economy”, IOL report embarked on a journey to describe and explain the so-called "Ramaphosa's 
plans to save the economy" (Staff Reporter 2017: 1). In this report the reporter begins by presenting 
the current situation that characterised the South African economy. Immediately after 
contextualizing the report, the reporter then stressed that “Ramaphosa promised to promote 
growth, improve investor confidence and tackle disheartening 28% unemployment rate” (Staff 
Reporter 2017: 1). However, interesting in this report was the position taken by the reporter to 
explain and justify the plan of Cyril Ramaphosa to revive the South African economy. What this 
means is that the reporter stance in the presentation of these plans simply reflected the biased 
support that the reporters have in favour of Cyril Ramaphosa's policies.  
To illustrate the above assertion, news professionals when reporting an issue are expected not to 
impose their feeling and emotion or perceptions in this story (O’Neill 2001 cited in Richardson 
2007). However, this was not the case in this report. The reporter consciously or unconsciously 
presented the economic plans in a way that was leading. It would guide the reader on how to think 
about the economic plans of Cyril Ramaphosa. For example, commenting on the economic plans 
the reporter said “Ramaphosa revealed his plans to ensure that government avoids an unsustainable 
debt level. He will exercise fiscal discipline to ensure that resources are utilised for development, 
instead of servicing the debt.” This manner of reporting explains the extent to which journalist act 
upon society (Richardson 2007: 115). What this means is that presenting Cyril Ramaphosa as the 
preferred candidate allowed the reporters to engage in the process of producing and reproducing 
social inequalities that through maintaining the dominant social ideas of the ruling elite. As 
highlighted earlier, Cyril Ramaphosa was understood as a candidate who represents the ideas of 
the ruling class.  
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Moreover, how Cyril Ramaphosa was framed as a capable effective leader as opposed to 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma seem to prove the extent to which gender bias lying within the text. 
Close analysis on how Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as a man with plans and ready to act, can 
be said to have deep cultural meaning. Now, presenting Cyril Ramaphosa as a capable leader seems 
to suggest that the press was activating or authenticating the already existing gender assumptions 
that pervade the South African society. What this means is that this manner of presenting Cyril 
Ramaphosa confirms the assumption that the man is always ready and able to deliver any task that 
they are given. The press presents Cyril Ramaphosa as a while men are viewed as ruthless, 
ambitious, and tough leaders (Nacos 2005: 440).   
Therefore, put together the New24 and IOL focus on the economic recovery frame can be said to 
have been motivated by the need to appeal to its audience and ultimately increase their circulation 
during an ailing and struggling economy. The economic recovery frame was likely to appeal to a 
greater portion of the urban population that was heavily affected by the performance of the 
economy. This portion of the South African society was interested in knowing the future of the 
economy and how it was going to perform in the next coming years. Their interest in the economic 
performance inevitably made them interested in who the next president of the country. This was 
so because the hopes for a better economic performance lied in the capabilities of the president 
who will replace Jacob Zuma.  
Drawing on the above context, the press by emphasizing on the economic recovery frame, it can 
be said to have been targeting its readers. To add, it also follows that targeting this population 
could only increase their circulation, sales, and clicks per second and improve their analytics. All 
this will be a haven for their advertisers. The argument raised here seems to agree with findings 
from previous research (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Hallin and Mancini 2004) that stress that 
the need economic competition and the need to increase profit exerts influence on the type of the 
content a press produces. In this case, it can be assumed that News24 and IOL when they were 
feeling under so much pressure to increase profits, their content became driven by the need to 
satisfy the needs of their consumers who in this case were aligned to a certain ideological 
standpoint. Thus, the press should be understood as a business interested in generating profit.  
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Chapter 9: Election victory frame 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter presents qualitative findings on the Election victory frame. It presents, analyse and 
discusses the findings. The chapter expounded the frames to answer the questions how such frames 
sought to legitimise and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and what 
are the other forces that might have influenced such framing. It is indicated in this study that 
News24 and IOL made use of the election victory frame. However, the frame was activated 
differently yet achieving the similar objectives. That is to legitimise or de-legitimise the leadership 
of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.  
Following this introduction, the following section presents, analyse and discusses findings on 
Election victory frame from New24 and IOL. In presenting and discussing the findings, the 
following questions will be answered: 
1. How exactly did News24 and IOL frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini 
Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at a party and national level in the period leading, during 
and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress? 
2. What are the similarities and differences in how the two News24 and IOL framed the 
leadership qualities of the two leaders?  
3. What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders? 
4. How did such framing seek to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and 
Cyril Ramaphosa? 
 
Election victory: News24 
 
A deeper analysis of News24 reports showed that the Cyril Ramaphosa’s election campaign was 
packaged as given and inevitable victory. Put differently, the press constantly presented Cyril 
Ramaphosa to its audience as a candidate who has been endorsed and a candidate who has the 
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victory even before the final elections. A closer look at this way of presenting issues gives the 
impression that News24 labeled and described their reports on Cyril Ramaphosa in a manner that 
they want their audience to think about the campaign and ultimately assume the press desired 
course of action. For instance, in a report by Everett and Jennings published on 29 October 2017, 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were both referred to in terms of their progress 
in the campaign. In this case, the reporters referred to surveys conducted by an unidentified Cape 
Town-based research agency and made extensive use of statistics to explain why Cyril Ramaphosa 
is the preferred and leading candidate in the build-up to the ANC presidential elections. Initially, 
the report quoted statistics from the previous national elections where ANC is said to have 
performed badly with a staggering election victory of 54% (Everett and Jennings 2017). It was 
highlighted in the report that the ANC members “should be thinking about the effect of their 
choices” in the coming up elections as they do not need a leader to who does not inspire confidence 
in the South African population (Everett and Jennings 2017: 1).  
Interesting in this report, was the extensive use of figures and statistics that were in favour of Cyril 
Ramaphosa. For instance, the report indicated that concerning the outcome of the forthcoming 
election, Cyril Ramaphosa was ahead and leading. This manner of reporting on Cyril Ramaphosa 
only served to endorse him as the ultimate winner in the election that was not conducted yet. With 
the use of statistics (to authenticate the subjective position of the journalists Richardson 2007, 
Chambwera 2016) and metaphors, Cyril Ramaphosa was presented to the audience as someone 
who was far in front in terms of the support, he was likely to muster. For example, Everatt and 
Jennings reported that “on the view of who should be president of the ANC, Deputy President 
Cyril Ramaphosa is streets ahead of all rivals” (2017: 2). The use of the phrase “streets ahead” 
simply served to make clear and accentuate the extent to which Cyril Ramaphosa was leading the 
elections. It allowed the reporters to create a feeling among its readers that Cyril Ramaphosa has 
already won the elections.  
More interestingly, the use of such a common phrase and metaphors work because it allows the 
press and its readers to use the language (making sense of something) that they are both familiar 
with (McCracken 1986: 71). The use of such a metaphor as the language the press and its reader 
are familiar with seems to suggest the press did not invent the metaphors when describing Cyril 
Ramaphosa as "streets ahead". Instead, the metaphor was taken from the broader society, where 
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its meaning can be understood with those who operate within that discourse. Therefore, the use of 
phrases and metaphors to inspire certain type of interpretation of the issue by the reader as applied 
by in the press has been found to be similar to the argument made by Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli 
(2001: 7) when they argued that the media choose to frame the kind of stories in a particular way. 
In this case, what the media does is to provide its audience with images through which they can 
perceive others. As a result of the images, frames, and catch-phrases that are laden with signifiers 
that can act as raw materials the readers use to confirm, modify or negate their already existing 
interpretation of the issue at hand (Tomaselli and Teer-Tomaselli 2001: 7).  
 
Table 9.1: Linguistic expression in election victory frame: News24 
 
“on the view of who should be president of the ANC, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa is 
streets ahead of all rivals in the view of respondents- with 43% approving of him as the 
next leader compared with 16% for Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma” (Everatt and Jennings 
2017: 1)  
"if we look only at black respondents who intend to vote in 2019, Ramaphosa stands at 46%, 
Dlamini-Zuma manages 20% and the rest remain unchanged". (Everatt and Jennings 
2017: 1) 
"69% of potential black voters in 2019 said Ramaphosa as leader would make them "much more 
likely" or "somewhat more likely" to vote ANC; 51% said the same of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma” (Everatt and Jennings 2017: 1) 
"The ANC West Rand region's chairperson Boyce Naledi endorsed ANC deputy president Cyril 
Ramphosa as his preferred candidates. The West Rand ANC Youth League did the same" 
(Tandwa, 2017: 1) 
"In Eastern cape, Ramaphosa received 423 branch nominations against Dlamini-Zuma's 61 
branch nominations" (Ngcukana 2017: 1) 
 
In keeping with findings from previous research (Chambwera 2016; Watkins 2009), results from 
this study seem to support the argument that the media reports are affected by the political events 
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and the dominant discourses that are obtaining at a given time. What this means is that the news 
election victory frame bears some resemblance from the events that were happening during the 
time of their construction. To illustrate this, it was common knowledge in South Africa that Cyril 
Ramaphosa was the preferred and potential presidential candidate for most of the ruling elites 
(Mathekga 2018: 67). For instance, calls for Cyril Ramaphosa to become a future president of the 
ANC date back to the time of Jacob Zuma, Thabo Mbeki and even Nelson Mandela. During Jacob 
Zuma's leadership, a certain faction in the ANC and the country were continuously calling for the 
resignation of Jacob Zuma pointing to Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred candidate. Then in 2012, 
Cyril Ramaphosa was elected vice president of the ANC and later vice president of the country. 
These events were all efforts by a group (referred to as white monopoly capital) in the ANC that 
believed that Cyril Ramaphosa is the preferred candidate and able leader to steer the fortunes of 
South Africa in the right direction (Mathekga 2018: 78). Put together, these events seem to suggest 
that News24 election victory frame was constructed in the manner that was in harmony with the 
dominant discourses and political statements within society. As a result, their news report was not 
isolated from the context of their construction. To add, paying reference to the prevailing context 
seems to suggest that the creators of the content plugged into a larger current social and political 
discourse which they believe the readers will respond to. This observation lends support to 
previous findings in the literature that states that the frames used by the news reporters to report 
on political candidates are profoundly entrenched in the culture, values, philosophies and 
discursive practices in which they function and in particular historical phases (Chambwera 2016; 
Davies-Laubscher 2016; Foucault 1980). 
Moreover, by drawing on the “statements” in the prevailing political discourse, News24 can also 
be seen to have allowed its audience to engage with the already existing information in their heads 
and gave them clues (by use of statistics) about who the preferred candidate is. In this case the 
preferred candidate who happens to be Cyril Ramaphosa. Therefore, it can be safely concluded 
during and before the elections, that News24 was consciously or unconsciously involved in the 
process of amplifying, clarifying and invigorating the prevailing and dominant interpretation that 
has characterized the South African political discourse concerning the leadership of Cyril 
Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
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From the analysis of data, one interesting result that emerged from News24 is that of the difference 
in the use of the election victory frame when reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In simple 
terms, the campaign of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was packaged as a "loss and shame" even before 
the actual elections took place. In the same report referred to above (29 October 2017), News24 
presented a statistical comparison of the campaigns of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma. While Cyril Ramaphosa’s election campaign was packaged as a victory, it was not the case 
with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s campaign for the presidency. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was 
presented as a political candidate who was always second to Cyril Ramaphosa in the run-up to the 
presidential election. The report highlighted that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was suffering from 
shameful defeats and was at the verge of losing all the provinces. In this Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
was only commanding 16% percent against 46% for Cyril Ramaphosa. In this case, the two 
political candidates were listed in binary terms and terms of "gains versus losses" and "win versus 
loss". What this means is that News24 presented Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
to its readers in logical terms (statistics) that either encourages or discourages certain interpretation 
and course of action among the readers (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 1984). This manner of 
presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma only served to discredit her as the potential leader of the 
ANC. The fact that her campaign could not attract enough response was given considerable 
attention and amplified by News24 reporters. As a result, this focus did not only do harm to 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma campaign but also served to discredit her campaign and her potential to 
win the election on the conference.  
Put together, the above scenario divulges the level of bias that pervades the press reports when 
reporting on female leaders. Clearly, by portraying Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a looser even 
before the election authenticates the argument raised by previous research that the media plays as 
a gendered mediator that actively perpetuate the gender double-blind that constrains female 
political leaders (Wright and Holland 2014:78). What is more is that the press manner of presenting 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma  as a leader who  lacks  political experience to win the election and 
attract more voters seems to be in agreement with  findings from Gedalya et al. 2017, Greenwald 
and Lehman 2017 and Nacos 2005 who argued that when reporting on female leaders the media 
always reflects a deep gender bias by means of presenting the female leaders as lacking experience, 
unable to attract support and unable to make decisions.   
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The most striking example of how the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s political leadership was 
discredited was seen in a News24 report that was published on the 29 October 2017 titled “Mazzotti 
denies involvement in NDZ campaign”.  The report said that "controversial businessman Adriano 
Mazzotti on Sunday denied being involved in funding the campaign for Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma"(Correspondent 2017: 1). Moreover, the report also stresses that the businessman's company 
does not support Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s campaign. Interesting to note in this report is how 
the reporters emphasised the fact that the businessman and other investors are distancing 
themselves from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political efforts to become president. This is a strong 
effort to discredit Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's campaign and leadership. To add, the reporters 
choose to focus on certain sets of consideration and overemphasize them over others allowed the 
press to encourage its readers to interpret the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma within a 
meaningful context (Cacciatore et al. 2016).  
To illustrate, text in the report referred above should be understood within the broader context 
within which the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and the news press were functioning. It can be said 
that the reports were affected by the obtaining economic and political conditions that characterised 
the period leading to the conference. What this means is that the reference and emphasis on the 
“businessman and investors who ditched Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma resemble issues that were 
taking place during the time of reporting. To demonstrate, during the period leading to the 
elections, the issue of investors dominated conversation both in the private and public sector 
(Mathekga 2018; Butler 2017; Marias and Groenwald 2017). It was believed that for South Africa 
to regain its feet after the weakening of the rand and poor performance in the market, it needs 
foreign direct investments. To add, it was also assumed that only a leader who is investor-friendly 
and who can inspire investor confidence was a necessity and should be everyone's preferred 
candidate (Marias and Groenwald 2017).  
Drawing from that context, every individual running for the presidency of the ANC needed to 
possess leadership qualities that inspire and attract investor. However, the presentation of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the report as someone businessman and investor do not want to align 
with would create doubt and fear among the audience of News24. Simply put, Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma in this report was presented and discredited as a leader who cannot inspire the confidence 
among the investors. As a result, the moral interpretation and required course of action is not to 
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elect Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma but lookout for a better candidate who can bring about investment 
in South Africa. Thus, this manner of reporting did not endorse the leadership of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, but it simply served to discredit her as someone who is not investor-friendly. 
Moreover, a desire to connect with the concerns of the readers and to do so immediately and in a 
direct manner almost pushed News24 reporters to sensationalize the nomination of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma for the presidency of the ANC. The reporters relied on adopting more rhetorically 
tailored language to represent the problem with the nominations of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. For 
instance, results from the data showed that the press made use of catchphrases and linguistic 
expressions that had an underlying negative meaning. These phrases and linguistic expressions 
were rhetoric and discrediting in nature. For instance, in a report titled “Nomination of Dlamini-
Zuma in Free State was a sham” (Mahlase 2017: 1), the report documents the nomination event 
that endorsed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in Free State. In this report, the nomination of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma was portrayed as the problem issue. The reporter said, "Free State branches have 
threatened to go to court again if necessary, this time to nullify the provincial general council 
(PGC) that nominated ANC presidential hopeful Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma" (Mahlase 2017: 1). 
More so, in the report, Ngcukana attempted to sensationalise the actual event and eventually 
discredit the character of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Simply put, throughout the report Ngcukana 
repeatedly referred to the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma using a phrase like "nomination 
of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma a sham”, “illegal”, “irregular and unacceptable” (Mahlase 2017: 1).  
This manner of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's nomination seems to suggest that the 
nomination was fake and possibly did not happen. Some terms used to refer to the nomination was 
that it was “illegal”, it was a “surprise” and “flawed”, and that the nomination process was 
“manipulated”. Moreover, the reporter also said, "the meetings in the branches, leading to the 
elective conference were irregular, unlawful, unconstitutional". Similarly, Zulu in a report of 29 
November 2017 said that “the complainants claimed that the branch meeting which ended with 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma being nominated included several procedural irregularities” (Zulu 
2017: 1). Put together, the use of negative phrases seems to perform the role of vilifying the 
leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. To the reader, the only moral interpretation that 
can be deduced is that, do not support Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma because she could not be 
nominated fairly and constitutionally. To add, the phrases carries with them underlying meaning 
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(replete with the power to influence voters' choices) that suggest that as a candidate, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma cannot be fairly and legally elected by the people unless she employs illegal tactics 
to manipulate the process (Foucault 1980: 56). This manner of reporting has within it the ability 
to discrediting the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. To illustrate, what this means is that 
the reports were not only successful in using sensational words to connect the reader to the 
problem, instead they were also successful in discrediting the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma to its readers by presenting it as questionable and lacking legitimacy drawn from the 
endorsement by all members who participated in the nomination process.  Thus, drawing on this 
line of thinking, one it can be assumed that the press text communicated knowledge that carries 
with it the power to influence the attitudes of its readers (Foucault 1980: 89).  
As suggested by Richardson (2007) and Watkins (2009), findings from the data point to the fact 
that what was selected, packaged, disseminated and received as the news was mediated by 
organizational processes, ideological beliefs, and power relations. To illustrate the point, deep 
analysis of data showed that the news reports that focused on the political candidates were partly 
opinion pieces and commentaries from the various people most of which were part of the 
newsreaders. The single most striking example is the commentary that was authored by Dr. Sean 
Gossel titled “Breaking Zuma’s Kleptocracy is up to all of us” (Gossel 2017: 1). This report is a 
typical example of how societies values, beliefs, and opinion constitute the new production 
process. In the commentary, Gossel (2017: 1) adopted a negative stance in which he blamed Jacob 
Zuma and those aligned to him for running South Africa like a Kleptocracy. This writer articulated 
that the ANC was captured by a “powerful, corrupt, and predatory rule” of Jacob Zuma (Gossel 
2017: 1). For the writer, it is Jacob Zuma's rule that needs to be dismantled and replaced by a good 
and moral leader. 
However, what is striking in the above commentary was the fact that the author suggested that 
Cyril Ramaphosa was the best and ultimate candidate to dismantle the Kleptocracy that was 
established by Jacob Zuma and his cronies. Gossel said Cyril Ramaphosa has all the resources to 
dismantle “Jacob Zuma’s Kleptocratic system” (2017: 1). Moreover, he also said Cyril Ramaphosa 
can "reinforce the renewed anti-corruption stance of parliamentary committees and appointing the 
state capture inquiry" (Gossel 2017: 1). To add, the writer also emphasised that “Cyril Ramaphosa 
can rally the power of his anti-state capture of the ANC behind his campaign” (Gossel 2017: 1). 
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Moreover, the most remarkable thing in these quoted statements is the use of phrases that indicate 
that Cyril Ramaphosa possesses the ability to dismantle the corrupt system of Jacob Zuma. For 
instance, suggestive phrases like “Ramaphosa has the ability”, “Ramaphosa can”, “Ramaphosa 
will” and “Cyril Ramaphosa possesses” point to the fact that the author was consciously or 
unconsciously endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader with abilities to change the situation. To 
that end, the impression given was that Cyril Ramaphosa has done that before, he will do it and 
has been doing it.  
Now, turning to the issue of how the society affects the news content. It can be argued that the 
position that any specific writer took to endorse Cyril Ramaphosa leadership resonates with that 
of the media institution in question. The stance taken by the writer in this article fits well with the 
ideologies that inform content production and distribution at News24. This is so because reporters 
and journalists often avoid publishing content from the public that does not resonate with their 
editorial policies and the ideologies that inform their news content (Richardson 2007: 82).  
Thus, drawing on the argument above, it can be assumed that the press content was influenced by 
the beliefs of its readers (who are also content contributors) in the same way as the news content 
influence how the society perceive the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma through its content produced by the members of the society. This observation provides 
additional support to the findings from Richardson 2007 and Wagner and Meyer 2017 that argued 
that the media text is affected by a myriad of factors like its production and its relation to the 
society that provides it with information. The ideas of the society are so integrated and so strong 
that it is difficult for the media to resist or separate them from its text (Wagner and Meyer 2017; 
Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2001).  
Further analysis showed that a great deal of attention was placed on endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa's 
leadership and discredited Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. For example, in a report of 29 December 
2017 titled “no women leaders, but throwing chairs allowed” (Ngcukana 2017: 1). Ngcukana 
embarked on a journey of documenting the events that had happened in the ANC in the previous 
two weeks. The reporter began by explaining the progress and identifying the poor performance 
of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the branch election. Ngcukana indicated that Cyril Ramaphosa 
was performing better in the primary elections, giving the impression that he was the most 
preferred candidate. Of note in this report was the emphasis that was placed on the relationship 
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that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had with the traditional leaders of the AbaThembu nation. The 
report made quick reference and reminded the readers that "South Africa is not ready for a female 
leader". It did so by quoting Mpendulo Sigcawu a traditional leader when he told Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma in 2015 that "South Africa was not ready for a female leader"(Ngcukana 2017: 1). 
This statement reflects the nature of patriarchy that pervades South African society. Essentially, 
the fact that the reporter referred to the statement that was made in 2015 concerning female leaders 
begged careful analysis. What is clear from this manner of reporting is that the reporter evoked the 
statements that were historically specific and unique to the patriarchal discourse Foucault (1980). 
Additionally, the reporter reminded the reader of the patriarchal statements that already existed in 
their minds.  This is so because the discussion of a female leader in South Africa has roots in the 
patriarchal discourse that have been ongoing.  
Also, the way the reports presented the experience of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma with the 
Amathembu Kings, and how these Kings could not endorse her as leader played a role as a 
discrediting strategy. This can be better explained by referring to the context within which these 
reports were produced. To illustrate, South Africa is understood to be composed of the most 
patriarchal and conservative communities. In a patriarchal system like South African societies, 
leadership is sacrosanct and remains a domain reserved for male figures. From the family unit to 
the national level, leadership is dominated by males. Therefore, any attempt by a woman to assume 
leadership can be simply interpreted as a threat to the male position in society. Now, by placing 
the reader's attention to how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was condemned by the Kings, the reporters 
allowed the reader to refer to their cultural frame that already exists in their heads. In this case, 
referring to this frame will allow the reader to see Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as one who is defying 
their culture by threatening the position of the male figure in society. Therefore, it seems in this 
case that New24 reporters were aware of the cultural discourses and the patriarchal ideology. They 
evoked the patriarchy frames which were effective in reminding its readers that South Africa was 
not ready for a female leader. Evoking the patriarchal ideology amongst its reader could only serve 
the purpose of discrediting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership as weak. It allowed the readers 
to interpret the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma through the patriarchal lenses evoked in 
their memory by the reporters. Consequently, in keeping with previous research, this manner of 
reporting seems to confirm the argument that in many instances, females are regarded as 
inconsequential inside the political domain and incompetent of bringing constructive 
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transformation, only because of the stereotypical positions dispensed to them by culture and 
society which encumbers them in sundry spheres (Gedalya et al. 2017; Vos 2013; Narcos 2005). 
Moreover, the most striking result that emerged is that news reports made extensive reference to 
cultural leaders in a bid to endorse and discredit the political candidates. This approach suggests 
that the press engaged in an active process of selecting a few elements of perceived reality and 
assembling a narrative that highlights connection among them to promote a predetermined 
interpretation (Gitlin, 2003, 1980). To illustrate, in a report on 27 October 2017, Mngadi said that 
the ANC Women's league visited the place of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini. This visit according 
to Mngadi was meant to introduce Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to the Zulu king ahead of the ANC 
elective conference. Moreover, it was also highlighted in the report that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
and some leaders of the youth league presented the king with various gifts. These include a cow 
and "a brown envelope" with tea for the king. Interesting to note in this report is how the press 
paid focus on some specific negative aspects of the event. It was highlighted in the report that after 
the king received the gifts from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, he immediately expressed his concern 
about the violence that was rocking the whole province of KwaZulu-Natal. In this case, the press 
paid a blind eye on the response of the king to the visit by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Perhaps, 
what the reader was expecting to hear was whether the King endorsed Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
as the leader or not. Regrettably, the reporter in this case was quick to draw the reader's attention 
to the matter of violence that was unrelated to the objectives of the visit. The report reads "the king 
used the visit by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as an opportunity to express how heart-breaking it was 
to see ANC members killing each other in KwaZulu-Natal" (Mngadi 2017: 1). This way of 
focusing on certain aspects of the story over other seems to confirm the arguments raised by 
various framing theory scholars that framing is the type of persuasion technique in communication 
where the media focuses on those specific aspects of an issue that encourages or discourages 
certain interpretation of the meaningful context (Cacciatore et al. 2016; Entman 2007, 1993). 
In addition, the press can be said to sought to discredit Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in two ways. 
Firstly, by not reporting what King Goodwill Zwelithini said about the leadership of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, the salience can be interpreted to mean that the visit was not considered important 
by the king of the Zulus that's why he did not respond or endorsed the purpose of the visit and 
instead decided to focus on the violence that has rocked the province. To add, silence on the 
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response of the king and choosing to focus on the violence seems to suggest that the press focused 
on a specific aspect of an issue and decided to give prominence to that aspect. The quick focus to 
the issue of violence allows the reporters to direct the reader's attention to exactly those properties 
of the story that are intended to be treated and acted upon by the reader (McCracken 1986: 75). In 
this case, the press decided to focus on violence and link it directly to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. 
The press amplified the issue of violence more than the purpose of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s 
visit. Secondly, the media by giving prominence to the issue of violence as the king’s response to 
the visit of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma can be said to have been discrediting the leadership of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by linking her to political violence that has affected the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this manner of presenting Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma visit to King Goodwill Zwelithini seems to suggest that the press was determined 
to assassinate the campaign efforts of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The emphasis on the 
involvement of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the KwaZulu-Natal politics and need to control bears 
resemblance with arguments that were raised by various scholars in Chapter 4 (Mathekga 2018; 
Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa 2017; Du Plessis 2017). For instance, Ndikhokele and Mtshiselwa 
argued that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma belonged to the KwaZulu-Natal syndicate that was 
associated with patronage (2017: 1). Thus, this resemblance found in the text seems to suggest the 
extent to which the press reports were intertextual in nature. In simple terms, they reverberate pre-
existing discourses.  
Turning to the notion of how the press reports could not be isolated from the context of their 
construction, deeper analysis of the data proved that the press digs deeper into the prevailing 
discourse to create a narrative that will encourage its readers to reach a certain interpretation of the 
events. To illustrate, the media when referred to violence and how it was denounced by the Zulu 
king, it actively participated in the KwaZulu-Natal political violence discourse. In simple terms, 
what this means is that the media used the person of the Zulu king to denounce the leadership of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by attaching her name to the political violence that has affected 
KwaZulu-Natal. To demonstrate, the report said, "Zwelithini used the visit to express how heart-
breaking it was to see ANC members killing each other in KwaZulu-Natal” (Mngadi 2017: 1). 
Drawing on this manner of covering the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, one is tempted 
to argue that the media amplified the gender bias that is typical of the media when reporting of 
female political leaders. This argument fits well with findings from previous studies that argued 
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that the modern bias facing women in politics is that the media simply use traditional frames- that 
is constructed around the dominance of men- in coverage of women, making it difficult for women 
politicians to be presented as anything other than political outsiders (Fountaine and McGregor 
2001: 59).  
Furthermore, the emphasis on political violence and linking it to Nkosazana-Dlamini-Zuma seems 
to suggest News24 applied the technique of sentimentality to discredit Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's 
political leadership. Put differently, the press consciously or unconsciously engaged in a process 
of reminding the reader of his or her emotional past; a past the reader was not happy to confront. 
In this case, the readers were reminded that one of the leaders (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) who 
has a vested interest to control KwaZulu-Natal has come home and the King has taken a chance to 
discipline her. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is one of the ANC leaders who has been involved in the 
battle to control ANC (Hartley 2018: 88). Her involvement and other powerful leaders in the 
control of KZN has led to political killings and outbreak of violence in the province. These killings 
left some part of the province traumatized (Pauw 2017: 89). Thus, by reminding the reader of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's involvement in the violence, the press inevitably did a disservice to 
her personality and her political ambitions by evoking past a negative emotional feeling among its 
readers. The way News24 reported on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's link to violence in the province 
seems to suggest that it engaged in the process of explaining the present by referring to the past 
discourse (Chambwera 2016 and Khuluse 2014). To illustrate the above, the press can be said to 
have employed the styles of presenting information in a manner that reverberates with prevailing 
underlying schemas amongst their audience, and thus allowing them to think of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma within the interpretive framework presented to them (Scheufele and Tewksbury 
2007: 56). Moreover, because the issue of political killings was not new, it is clear that News24 
presented the issue of pollical killings in a vivid manner that evoked the memory of its audience 
and allowed them to think of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma within the context of political killings and 
violence that was condemned by the king of the Zulu nation when he met her.  
Furthermore, a close analysis of the context within which this report was produced seems to 
suggest that the construction of the reports that focused on violence were not independent of the 
unfolding and prevailing social events. To place this matter in context, the KwaZulu-Natal 
province was burning with political violence at the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma visited the King of 
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Zulu nation. Much of the violence was said to be perpetrated by influential political leaders who 
were competing to control the province. Before 1994, the violent killings were more prominent 
between the ANC cadres and the Inkanda Freedom Party supporters (Pauw 2017: 99). However, 
more recently, the political killings in the province have been reported to be more between the 
political players of the same party as opposed to the members of different parties, ANC party 
members had leaders have been directly engaged in violence that has seen the hordes of its leaders 
(Mathekga 2018: 76). This violence was blamed on the factional fights and the battlers for a 
leadership position within ANC structures and the government. More so, conversations (public 
perception) concerning the violence suggested that most of the violence that took place in 
KwaZulu-Natal was orchestrated and masterminded by those in leadership positions (Butler 2017: 
101). These leaders like Jacob Zuma and his faction was placed at the heart of the battle to control 
the province and thus they were also linked to the violence. Moreover, there were also speculations 
that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was in the faction of Jacob Zuma and that she also had vested 
interest in controlling the province (Pauw 2017: 99). Therefore, News24 overtly discredited the 
political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by presenting the issue of violence and the 
response of King Goodwill Zwelithini in such a way as to convey a negative value judgment that 
was not immediately apparent, to create an inherent bias (Gofman 1978).   
Furthermore, News24 framing of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa can be said to 
have been affected by repeated reference to the cultural power dynamics its audience could 
resonate with and understand. To illustrate this assertion, a comparison of the report of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma visit to the king explained in the previous section can be made with the visit by 
Cyril Ramaphosa to the Zulu king and the Venda king in the same period. In a report of 5 
November 2017, News24 reported that thunderous cheers and ululations greeted Cyril Ramaphosa 
as he received a royal spear, cattle and hide shield from the Venda king. Moreover, the reporter in 
this news article interpreted this act as a sign that the Venda king has signified solid support for 
Cyril Ramaphosa ahead of the ANC presidential elections. An interpretation of the cultural 
activities by the newspaper reporter allows one to assume that the news reports were artefacts that 
conveyed meaning and that the reports were also influenced by the cultural context within which 
the news media was operating. This is so because the interpretation of the event and its meaning 
would require one who is familiar with that culture. Otherwise, a foreign person would not have 
been able to draw out the connotative meaning symbolised by the act of the Venda king when he 
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gave a spear to Cyril Ramaphosa. As a result, it can be stated that the prevailing cultural context 
influences the news and frame production allowing certain cultural meanings to be embedded in 
the media content (Van Gorp 2007).  
To add, comparing this report to the one Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma met with the Zulu king, one is 
tempted to conclude that News24 report was embedded in the culture that was personified by the 
powerful kings. Therefore, power wildered by the kings was used to legitimise and delegitimise 
the leadership of the two political candidates. In this case, News24 can be said to have reflected on 
culture and used the powers of the kings to present the two leaders. What this means is that News24 
denounces the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by referring to the Zulu king who is the 
highest figure in the culture within which Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is part of. Thus, it follows 
that if the most powerful figure in a culture denounces Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the course of 
action that follows from the subordinates of the same culture is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is 
condemned, and his practices are not accepted to this culture. On the other hand, the endorsement 
of Cyril Ramaphosa by the kings of Venda can be interpreted to mean that the leadership of Cyril 
Ramaphosa is accepted by the highest voice in the Venda culture, as such all the subordinates of 
that culture were therefore bound to endorse and follow what their cultural leaders have said. 
Therefore, drawing on this analysis, it can be stated that News24 in reporting the two political 
candidates was not oblivious of the prevailing cultural context. Instead, it used culture to create 
structures of meaning and practices and performances that work concomitantly to construct reality 
around the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa (Terre Blanche et al. 2006: 
286)  
Moreover, a deeper analysis of the data showed that the press legitimated Cyril Ramaphosa by use 
of the authoritative legitimacy strategies. In this case, the endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa was 
presented to the readers to legitimate him as the chosen. A case in point is the endorsement by the 
Aba Thembu kings. The endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa by people who are powerful leaders in 
society shows how the different aspects of this manner of legitimation were embedded in the 
culture. The use of cultural leaders to authenticate the presidential ambitions of Cyril Ramaphosa 
was different from Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma who was at the receiving end of the embarrassing 
rejection by the traditional leaders. The greatest among which came from the king of the 
AmaXhosa who condemned her and told her when she visited that the country was not ready for a 
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female leader. This condemnation by the traditional leaders based on gender and sexuality reflects 
the deeply rooted patriarchal cultures that pervade South African societies. This then was 
transferred into the public domain and amplified by the media to remind the people of their long-
held beliefs. Clearly, News24 delegitimized the leadership and personality of Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma by making use of powerful cultural authorities that people respect and listen within the Zulu 
and Venda culture. Because of that, the news reports of News24 can also be viewed as cultural 
artefacts that played a vital role in communicating the deeply rooted patriarchy that cuts across the 
political culture in South Africa.    
Apart from reporting negatively on the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the sampled data 
also showed that News24 also had some few positive reports on the leadership and personality of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In a report of 26 October 2017, News24 report that Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma was "her person". In this report, though much of the effort was placed on describing 
the factional battles that were triggered by the battle to replace Jacob Zuma with a female president, 
the report gave a fair and positive picture of the political leadership qualities of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. To demonstrate, the reporter explained the experience of Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma in the three political administration. It was highlighted that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
always maintained a professional relationship with his former husband Jacob Zuma. For example, 
the report stressed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma attended a birthday of Nelson Mandela in 2003 
after her divorce with Jacob Zuma, according to the report, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma maintained 
her professional gesture when she came face to face with Jacob Zuma. Moreover, in 2007 she 
campaigned with Thabo Mbeki for the top position in the ANC, but when it became clear that he 
was being ousted she threw her lot with Jacob Zuma. Though her initial tethering to Thabo Mbeki 
could have been out of principle, her switching sides proved that she could abandon her political 
senior when necessity dictated. The report said, "the fact that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood 
against her ex-husband and father of her children in a fierce power battle is a testament to the fact 
that she is her person, who does not make decisions according to the sentiment" (News24 Opinion 
26 October 2017). Moreover, the report also reads that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has never 
defended her former husband or any of his allegedly corrupt dealings. Put together, the press focus 
on the positive aspects of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma can be interpreted as a means by the press to 
be impartial and reduce bias in their reportage. However, the most striking thing about this 
assertion is that it contradicts with the findings from previous studies that emphasise on that in all 
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cases the media portray female leaders in the negative light. For instance, Cukeir et al. argued that 
“women are less likely to be framed as leaders or experts and are less likely to hold news host or 
anchor positions” (2016: 45). Results from the analysis presented in this section are in stark 
contrast with this observation. In our observation, it seems that the press afforded Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma a bit of fair coverage. 
To add, results from the analysis further strengthen the argument that the press also endeavoured 
to strike a balanced coverage when reporting on the political candidates. Results from News24 
showed that apart from presenting Cyril Ramaphosa in a positive light, the press had some reports 
that negatively portray Cyril Ramaphosa. This should be understood as a means of balanced 
reporting.  For example, in a report titled “Ramaphosa is an ‘American puppet”, ANCYL says in 
response to Kwezi remarks", Gerber quoted the ANCYL leader who commented that Cyril 
Ramaphosa was a puppet of the Americans (Gerber 2017: 1). The reporters' emphasis on the 
allegations of Cyril Ramaphosa as a ‘puppet of the Americans' can be said to have the potential to 
delegitimise the political leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa by referring to a comment that resonates 
with beliefs and views of some sections of the South African society both in political cycles and 
public discourse. Gerber in Daily Sun said, "He is a perfect front because he is a darling of big 
business, moralists and those pretending to be moralists" (2017: 1). Gerber in Daily Sun described 
Cyril Ramaphosa involvement with the west are as follows:  
 Also, it will be interesting to observe how long it takes Ramaphosa to rebel – thanks to 
pressure from his capital friends and benefactors, most of whom are masters of corruption – 
and betray the unity and the Zuma slate that made him the next president of South Africa 
(Gerber in Daily Sun 2017: 1)  
This manner of reporting seems to suggest that despite the positive coverage that the press has 
unceasingly shown on Cyril Ramaphosa, it endeavoured to strike a balance on how it portrayed 
political figures.  
Moreover, a deeper analysis of the reports that focused on Cyril Ramaphosa's relation to western 
countries supports previous studies that revealed that news frames are cultural artefacts that are 
deeply embedded in the context of their construction (Chambwera 2016; Davies-Laubscher 2016; 
Khuluse 2014). To illustrate this, the notion that Cyril Ramaphosa was a puppet of the west has 
been a matter of concern as indicated by the scholars in Chapter 4. What this means is that over 
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the years, there has been discussions and fears in the South African society that Cyril Ramaphosa’s 
presidency will only serve to extend and benefit the interests of the western countries (Mathekga 
2018; Butler 2017; Butler 2009). This is so because Cyril Ramaphosa has vested interest in the 
private sector (as highlighted in Chapter 4) where the western countries and the Americans have 
vested interest. According to Butler Cyril Ramaphosa has shares and financial interest in a variety 
of companies that are involved in business across a variety of sectors (2017: 235). For instance, he 
is involved in Puma Sport Cars (50 shares), Ntaba Nyoni Estates Game farming (100 shares), 
Mondi LTD Paper packaging (7500 shares) and Ntaba Nyoni Freedlot Cattle Ranging (100 shares). 
Cyril Ramaphosa is in partnership with various foreign investors where he is a director and a 
majority shareholder in some of the companies. For instance, Cyril Ramaphosa’s Puma Sports 
Cars has a Brazilian origins and close link to Volkswagen and General Motors. Puma Sports Car 
has also business interest in the Puma North American distributors who supplied the company with 
spare parts and other accessories for their cars. To add, Cyril Ramaphosa’s involvement in the 
Mondi LTD places him in the heart of a web and network of American and European investors. 
To illustrate, Mondi LTD9 is an international packaging company and paper group that has a more 
than 100 production sites in more than thirty countries. Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa’s close link 
to the private sector that is allegedly dominated by the western investors directly presents him as 
one of their own. For instance, Hartley said Cyril Ramaphosa had relations with the western 
companies even before end of apartheid in South Africa 1994 (2018). Cyril Ramaphosa was 
involved with the western business owners during the negotiations process. He was an active 
participant in the restructuring of the Anglo. In this case, Cyril Ramaphosa negotiated the transfer 
of Anglo assets to black ownership (Hartley 2018). Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa also had relations 
with the owners of London’s Pearson who are the owners the Financial Times, Cape Argus, The 
Star and Pretoria News. Therefore, drawing on his proximity to western investors it is safe to 
assume that his efforts to become president of the ANC and South Africa is nothing but a decoy 
by the Americans and the western countries to maintain their control the economy and the 
resources of South Africa. Therefore, one can conclude that the terms like ‘American puppet', 
                                                 
9 “Mondi is formerly owned by the Anglo-American plc. In 2000 the company expanded its holding in Neusiedler 
AG, both Austrian businesses, to 100% and 70% respectively. The company has interest in Poland. It is organised in 
various global divisions including fiber packaging, consumer packaging and fine paper. It also controls various forests 
and paper mills. It produces fine paper and industrial and paper packaging in plastic and paper” (BusinessTech 2018: 
1).  
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‘Agent of the West' and ‘Compromised leader', that was used by News24 were nothing news but 
familiar terms that already existed in the South African political and economic discourse. Thus, 
drawing on this, New24 can be said to have evoked the "discourse of white monopoly capital" 
where most of these terms have found a residence.  
 
Election victory:  IOL  
 
In keeping with previous research, findings from the data seem to suggest that the press 
consciously support certain individuals based on their ideology and their proximity to the powerful 
groups in society. For instance, in a report by Mahlati and Ana, Cyril Ramaphosa’s campaign was 
endorsed and presented as a victory. For instance, Mahlati and Ana said: "the outgoing chairperson 
of the ANC, Baleka Mbete, has endorsed Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa"(2017: 1). Moreover, 
in the same report, the ANC chairperson was quoted as boldly and publicly announcing his 
endorsement for Cyril Ramaphosa's election. Baleka Mbete said, "what we are announcing is that 
we publicly endorse comrade Cyril Ramaphosa" (Mahlati and Ana 2017: 1). Now, a reference to 
powerful people like the ANC National Chairperson allowed the reporters to authenticate the 
position that Cyril Ramaphosa was the preferred candidate. In other words, the reporters endorsed 
the dominant ideology within South African society by referring to one of the most powerful 
people within the political circles in South Africa. To substantiate, the dominant ideology and 
voices in South Africa were pro-Cyril Ramaphosa's victory. The dominant ideology was made up 
of the most powerful and rich people in the South African society. These people identified with 
Cyril Ramaphosa who is also understood as one of the richest people in South Africa (Butler 2017: 
67). Therefore, the placing of considerable attention by the reporters on how powerful people like 
Baleka Mbete endorsed Cyril Ramaphosa seems to suggest that the news reporters at IOL were 
aware of the dominant voices in the society. More so, not only were they aware of these dominant 
voices, but they allowed their content to be influenced by these voices of the powerful people. As 
a result, the dominant ideology was infused in their reports and became the position of the press 
allowing it to legitimate the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa.  
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Table 9.2: Linguistic expressions on election victory: IOL 
 
“the outgoing chairperson of the ANC, Baleka Mbete, has endorsed President Cyril Ramaphosa 
to take over from Jacob Zuma as president of the ANC” (Mahtlati and Ana 2017: 1)  
“what we are announcing is that we publicly endorse comrade Cyril Ramaphosa” (Mahtlati and 
Ana 2017: 1)  
“Ramaphosa who is a presidential hopeful was given a standing ovation by the former freedom 
fighters” (Mahtlati and Ana 2017: 1) 
“Various detachments of uMkhonto WeSizwe including famous Luthuli Detachment. Others 
came in wheelchairs and were among those rooting for Ramaphosa’s ANC leadership” 
“Dlamini-Zuma endorsed by Free State in ANC leadership race” (Mkokeli 2017:1)   
“Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s bid to lead the African National Congress received a boost when 
a majority of branches from the Free State endorsed her” (Mkokeli 2017: 1)  
 
In another report published on 8 October 2017, Ndaba and Makati reported that “the Umkhonto 
WeSizwe Military Veterans’ Association, President Jacob Zuma’s staunch allies have taken a 
swipe at Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa” (2017: 1). Though the previous statement may seem 
to discredit the leadership or conduct of Cyril Ramaphosa, a close look into the context within 
which the report was produced helps to unveil the hidden ideological meanings informing the 
report. To substantiate the findings, the reporters said Cyril Ramaphosa was condemned by the 
"Jacob Zuma's staunch allies”.  Considering that in the period leading to the conference Jacob 
Zuma and his allies had become despicable characters in South African political circles owing to 
their corrupt governance, it follows that being condemned by Jacob Zuma and his allies was not 
condemnation at all. Instead, it was a blessing in disguise. This is so because who so ever Jacob 
Zuma and his allies condemned was against the corruption and Jacob Zuma's poor governance. 
Thus, IOL reporters by emphasising how Jacob Zuma ‘staunch allies’ were not in favour of Cyril 
Ramaphosa, they were able to present Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader whose leadership would 
threaten corruption and the beneficiaries of Jacob Zuma’s administration. Such an approach to 
reporting on how the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa was threatening Jacob Zuma and his stalwarts 
allowed the reporters to legitimate Cyril Ramaphosa. It did so by elevating him as a leader who 
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was hated by those who were corrupt because he was going to dismantle or put an end to their 
disastrous rule.  
Moreover, in the same report, the reporters also indicated that "Cyril Ramaphosa was given a 
standing ovation by former freedom fighters" (Ndaba and Makati 2017: 1). This was another 
splinter group of the ANC that was known for its distaste of Jacob Zuma's rule. Within the South 
African liberation discourse, this group was understood as those who stood for good governance 
and was not aligned to Jacob Zuma. Therefore, IOL reporters by focusing on how Cyril Ramaphosa 
was endorsed by the “moral” group in the ANC, it was actively engaged in the process of 
legitimating his leadership by upholding the approval done by the powerful in the ANC. Now, to 
understand better how the approval of Cyril Ramaphosa by the freedom fighters meant to the 
leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa and the effect it had on IOL readers, one must consider the role 
this group of people occupies in South African society. The freedom fighters in South Africa are 
some of the respected people (Hartley 2018: 45). They draw their respect from their role in fighting 
the apartheid government that segregated against the non-white groups in South (Butler 2017: 89). 
Additionally, the freedom fighters are also respected for ending the minority rule and winning 
freedom for the majority in South Africa. Drawing on this contextual knowledge, it follows that 
who so ever endorsed by this group of people will inevitably be accepted by the people of South 
Africa owing to the respect they command. Therefore, reference to the endorsement of the freedom 
fighters as seen in the reports did not simply allow the reader to think of Cyril Ramaphosa within 
the parameters presented by press, rather it also allowed the press to stimulate stocks of existing 
political knowledge within its readers minds and thus create a context within which the political 
knowledge can be interpreted.  
Turning to the notion of underlying ideologies, one can observe that, the media reporters repeated 
emphasis on the fact that Cyril Ramaphosa was endorsed by War Veterans seeks to uphold a certain 
ideology; in this case, the ideology of the ruling elite. Firstly, the endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa 
never came from the poor or working classes. Instead, sampled data revealed that Cyril Ramaphosa 
was endorsed more by those who occupy powerful positions with the South African society. As a 
result, the dominant underlying ideology that the reporters were reinforcing when they were 
endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa was the dominant of the ruling elite. Thus, drawing on this observation 
and indications from the sampled data, it can be assumed that the news reports of IOL were 
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artefacts that sought to produce and reproduce the ideologies of the ruling elite and thus uphold 
the pre-existing social inequalities that characterised the South African society. South Africa is 
understood as one of the most unequal societies in the world. It is characterised by a huge gap 
between the poor and the rich. The rich control the large stack of the resources of the country 
including all means of production. Moreover, most media houses are owned by the same people 
who control the means of production.   
 
Conclusion   
 
Sampled data from IOL showed that the election victory frame was extensively utilised by the 
reporters in the period leading up to the ANC elective conference. Like in News24, the election 
victory frame was also used to package the campaign of both candidates either as a given victory 
or a loss. A common usage of the frame was seen in how both presses referred to powerful figures 
in society to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and legitimate Cyril Ramaphosa. 
However, what was more interesting in the sampled data from IOL is that unlike in News24 where 
reference to culture and cultural leaders were quoted, the reference to cultural leaders was 
employed differently in IOL. The difference in the use of the election victory frame was noted in 
the way News24 made use of metaphors and businessman and statistics to endorse and discredit 
and legitimate the leadership of the two candidates, sampled data from News24 indicate that there 
was extensive reference to culture, tradition and powerful figures in the African communities to 
endorse and discredit the leadership of the two political leaders. There was no emphasis or 
reference to culture and kings in IOL.  
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Chapter 10 
Jacob Zuma & state capture, Factionalism & unity and Corruption 
frame 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter presents the qualitative findings of the study obtained from the qualitative secondary 
data. The chapter sought to address the research questions based on exploring the nature of frames 
that were used by New24 and IOL when reporting on the political leadership of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in the period leading to the 54th ANC national conference. 
Three broad frames are presented, analysed and discussed in this chapter. These are, Jacob Zuma 
& state capture, Factionalism & unity and Corruption frames. In the presentation of these frames, 
the discussion and analysis are interwoven with theory and previous literature. Frames in this 
chapter were formulated using Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis approach. Analysis was 
done using Richardson (2007) critical discourse analysis approach. For the evidence, the chapter, 
direct quotations from the news articles of News24 and IOL are presented in the form of tables.  
Following this introduction, the following section presents, analyse and discusses findings on 
Jacob Zuma and state capture frame from New24 and IOL. In presenting and discussing the 
findings, the following questions will be answered: 
1. How exactly did News24 and IOL frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini 
Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa both at a party and national level in the period leading, during 
and after the 54th National Congress of the African National Congress? 
2.  What are the similarities and differences in how the two News24 and IOL framed the 
leadership qualities of the two leaders?  
3. What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders? 
4.  How did such framing seek to legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and 
Cyril Ramaphosa? 
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Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: brief overview   
 
The Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame was used by both News24 and IOL albeit in a different 
fashion. For instance, the frame was extensively used in IOL by linking Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
to Jacob Zuma through their marital relationship. To illustrate, the reporters in IOL continuously 
referred to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as Jacob Zuma’s ex-wife. This manner of reference was 
deeply rooted in the African traditional discourse of marriage. On the other hand, the Jacob Zuma 
and state capture frame as utilised by the New24 had its roots in the prevailing political and 
economic discourse. It also sorts to justify the ruling class ideas through vilifying the character of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and her relationship to Jacob Zuma. For instance, sampled data showed 
that the content in the New24 reports were heavily influenced by the prevailing political and 
economic situation in South Africa. However, interestingly, the most remarkable observation was 
that both presses utilised the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame to achieve similar objectives, 
that is, to legitimate the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa while discrediting the leadership of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
It is interesting to note that sampled data from News24 and IOL the media revealed that reporters 
relied on sentimentality to justify the presidential candidacy of Cyril Ramaphosa. Sentimentality 
refers to the tendency by the news-press to represent an issue from an emotional position. Data 
sampled from News24 revealed that sentimentality was instilled in the news reports through 
continuous reference to the emotional past. To illustrate this point, it was clear that the reference 
by the reports to the deteriorating economic situation and poor economic policies by the Jacob 
Zuma administration played a vital role of evoking the emotions that people had concerning how 
their country was being run by the Jacob Zuma government. Being emotional in nature as it is, the 
issue of our "democracy is being trampled, our economy has been destroyed and our country is 
under attack from the Jacob Zuma and his Gupta friends" played a pivotal role in evoking the 
feeling of national pride, implying that things were better without Jacob Zuma and that things can 
still be better without Jacob Zuma. Thus, instilling messages of sentimentality allowed the press 
to justify why anyone who was aligned to Jacob Zuma should not be voted. 
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Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: IOL  
 
Sampled data revealed that IOL reporters made use of the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame 
before and after the conference to align Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Jacob Zuma’s corrupt 
leadership while disassociating Cyril Ramaphosa from Jacob Zuma. Moreover, the results from 
IOL also showed that whenever Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was mentioned, an immediate reference 
and link was made that connect Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Jacob Zuma. Further analysis of the 
data within its context of construction proves that the strategy of associating Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma's leadership to Jacob Zuma's manner of leadership was a subtle way of discrediting her 
leadership qualities. To illustrate this, IOL reporters engaged in an active process of delegitimising 
the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by creating an unbreakable link between Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob Zuma who was known for all bad reasons in the political discourse in 
South Africa (Pauw 2017: 88). To explain, Jacob Zuma's leadership was marred by a lot of 
controversies ranging from corruption, maladministration, and poor economic performance 
(Mathekga 2018: 36). Therefore, the press by referring to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as Jacob 
Zuma ex-wife served only to remind its audience of the relationship that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
had with Jacob Zuma. 
Creating a link can be interpreted as an attempt by the reporters to discredit the leadership of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by evoking the stocks of cultural morals and values that its readers were 
familiar with (Jamieson and Campbell 1997: 72). To demonstrate the above assertion, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob Zuma were married and divorced legally. Though divorces are legally 
acceptable in South Africa, according to many African cultures, legal divorce has no place in its 
traditions (Du Plessis 2017: 46). Thus, drawing on the morals and values of the Zulu culture, 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob Zuma divorce only meant legal separation while these two 
still share a lot in common. As a result, the fact that Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
were separated did not occupy any significance within the broader African culture. Drawing on 
this line of reasoning, IOL reporters then went on to evoke the stocks of cultural values and morals 
dominant in the African marriage discourse and remind their readers that Nkosazana Dlamini-
193 
 
Zuma was customarily married and thus, had an unbreakable link to Jacob Zuma which was 
evident by the continued use of his surname. Consequently, this manner of evoking the moral and 
values operating in a certain culture to remind readers of the relationship that Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma has with Jacob Zuma allowed the reader to perceive Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma using the 
reference and framework given to them by the press.  
Furthermore, the link that was created to present Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as similar to Jacob 
Zuma seems to be detrimental to the character and leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This 
so because by reminding its audience of the relationship that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma enjoyed 
with Jacob Zuma, IOL reporters evoked on the dominant statement within the post-Jacob Zuma 
discourse. The dominant sentiments were that who so ever is related or connected to Jacob Zuma 
should not be trusted or allowed to occupy any leadership position in ANC. Put together, the 
technique of evoking the past when reporting on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership seems to 
suggest that the press used the past not only to contextualise the report but also to connect with the 
reader who can easily relate with the discourse of customary marriage and divorce within the 
African societies.   
 
Table 10.1: Linguistic expressions on Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: IOL 
 
"Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, former African Union commission chair, and Zuma's ex-wife" 
(Mahr 2017: 1) 
“Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, a wealthy businessman who has been increasingly critical 
of the president" (Mahr 2017: 1).  
"On Saturday, Zuma made a surprise announcement that the government would fully subsidies 
tertiary education for "poor and working-class "students, some observers read the move 
as the last minutes push to help the campaign of Dlamini-Zuma"  
“Ramaphosa is going to deal with the thorny issues of state capture and corruption, as he is likely 
to face resistance from the pro-Zuma bloc in the top six” (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1)  
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“Ramaphosa said his administration would drive economic transformation, and land 
redistribution, but unlike President Jacob Zuma, he did not elaborate on how radical he 
would be in his approach to transformation” (Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1)   
“The Umkhonto WeSizwe Veteran’s Association, President Jacob Zuma’s staunch allies have 
taken a swipe at Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa” (Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1)   
“Probe #StateCapture immediately, urges Ramaphosa” (Maqhina 2017: 1)  
“Ramaphosa said he had stated a number of times that the Hawks, NPA and other state organs 
should investigate wrongdoing immediately” (Maqhina 2017: 1)  
“Ramaphosa will want Zuma removed from office, so as to negate the president’s influence, as 
soon as possible” (Meyer 2017: 1)  
 
Findings revealed above seem to corroborate the findings from previous studies (Oyesomi, 
Salawu, and Onyenankeya 2019). Oyesomi, Salawu, and Onyenankeya argue that the news is 
presented in favour of certain individuals and presented in a manner that seeks to legitimise or 
delegitimise most influential political candidates over those they regard as not so powerful (2019: 
89). This assertion fits well with findings shown above that revealed that the press was more in 
favour of Cyril Ramaphosa than Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This could be because of how 
influential Cyril Ramaphosa is as an individual. Cyril Ramaphosa is well known for his influence 
in the making of democracy in South Africa. He is also known for his business interests that cross 
all sectors of the South African economy. When compared to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Cyril 
Ramaphosa commands a lot of influence as a politician and businessman.  
To illustrate how Cyril Ramaphosa’s influence might have affected the coverage he was afforded 
by the press, a close look at some of the reports will suffice. Data sampled showed that IOL 
presented Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader who despised Jacob Zuma's approach to leadership. For 
instance, in a report by Seale and Mbanjwa, Cyril Ramaphosa's victory was presented as a direct 
threat to the Jacob Zuma corruption and state capture (2017: 1). What this means is that Cyril 
Ramaphosa was now packaged to the readers as someone different to Jacob Zuma is known for 
corruption and state capture scandals. For example, Seale and Mbanjwa said that “Ramaphosa is 
going to deal with the thorny issues of state capture and corruption, as he is likely to face resistance 
from the pro-Zuma bloc in the top six” (2017: 1). Further analysis of the previous quote showed 
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that the meaning conveyed here is that Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership was contrary to that of Jacob 
Zuma and his leadership posed a threat to Jacob Zuma and all his allies. Clearly, by presenting 
Cyril Ramaphosa in contrast to Jacob Zuma, IOL can be said to have credited the leadership of 
Cyril Ramaphosa by distinguishing it to the bad leadership of Jacob Zuma whom they said was 
presented by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the race to take over the leadership of ANC.  
Moreover, IOL can be said to have made continuous reference to the disastrous leadership of Jacob 
Zuma to present the Cyril Ramaphosa leadership as credible. Thus, drawing from this assertion, it 
can be argued that the press' reference to the past bad leadership of Jacob Zuma when reporting 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa does not merely serve as a way of contextually 
events, but it helps create direct connection with the reader who can easily relate to the topic at 
issue. These readers were simply reminded that Cyril Ramaphosa was different from Jacob Zuma 
who is the author of their suffering. As a result, such form of presenting issues only served to credit 
the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa while discrediting Jacob Zuma and anyone aligned to him, in 
particular, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
Moreover, in terms of underlying ideologies, the sampled data revealed that IOL journalist 
highlighted the support of the pro-Cyril Ramaphosa (ruling class) ideology. What this means is 
that the tone of the reports and the picture painted when the reporters linked the Jacob Zuma and 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was driven towards presenting a negative picture of the Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, thus discrediting her leadership qualities and her ideologies. While the impression 
of Cyril Ramaphosa as opposed to Jacob Zuma help IOL reporters to position the press in the same 
camp that was in support of Cyril Ramaphosa. Put together, how the reports were constructed 
seems to suggest that the reporters were in favour of the pro-Cyril Ramaphosa ideology as opposed 
to the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma ideology.  
To add, how the press supported the ruling class ideology seems to suggest that the press was a 
political instrument whose reports were artefacts that conveyed meaning meant to communicate 
ideologies of the powerful to the readers. To illustrate, the endorsement of Cyril Ramaphosa as 
seen in the reports cannot be isolated from the power. The reports were artefacts of power in that 
they were meant to influence, shape and determine the attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of the readers 
(Richardson 2007: 31). Therefore, put together results from IOL seem to be in complete agreement 
with findings from previous studies that news media tends towards being biased towards certain 
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candidates (Kostadinova 2017; Iyengar and McGrady 2007). For instance, Iyengar and McGrady 
argued that news media tends to cover the strategy of campaigns and personality (2007: 55). By 
strategy of campaigns, the media is normally biased to follow and give more coverage to a 
candidate who is leading in the campaign or the political figure who appears to be the favourite of 
the public. 
 
 Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: News24 
 
The Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame was extensively used by News24 to legitimise the 
political leadership and political qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa while delegitimising Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. For instance, each time Jacob Zuma was mentioned in relation to Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, it was made clear that the two are inseparable and come a long way. On the other 
hand, when Cyril Ramaphosa was presented with Jacob Zuma, he was distanced and presented as 
a leader who shuns everything that Jacob Zuma's approach to leadership. The most striking result 
to emerge is that the media did not focus on issues of policies or campaign messages when they 
were reporting on the Jacob Zuma frame, Instead the reportage was founded on personality 
reporting. This observation corroborates with findings from previously studied that argue that the 
print media does not focus on ideological priorities of political candidates and their parties but are 
more disposed to report on their economic pledges and personalities (Kostadinova 2017: 636) 
More so, results from the data showed that the press created a context by which their reports will 
be interpreted within the framework of that context. To substantiate, when referring to Jacob Zuma 
in their reports, the reporters did not only present him side by side with Cyril Ramaphosa. Instead, 
reports of Jacob Zuma were followed by a brief explanation of how much damage the leadership 
of ANC and government has destroyed the economy and the lives of the poor South Africans. His 
leadership was linked to Gupta corruption. This kind of presentation it can be assumed gave a 
context and framework to the readers and allowed them to refer to the leadership of Jacob Zuma 
and see how much damage they have suffered. In this case, the press reporters can be said to have 
consciously or unconsciously hand-picked common statements about Jacob Zuma from the 
innumerable political discourse reserves of frames that are readily available (Van Gorp 2007). 
These statements were thus used to highlight how despicable Jacob Zuma is in comparison to Cyril 
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Ramaphosa. Cyril Ramaphosa was framed as a leader who has no tolerance for corruption. This 
way of presenting the two leaders allowed News24 sanitize intentions of Cyril Ramaphosa. He was 
given to the audience as a person who shuns corruption and this corruption that was epitomized 
by Jacob Zuma. For instance, in the report Vecchiatto said   
Ramaphosa has made the fight against corruption the centrepiece of his campaign and made 
attacks on Zuma, who’s been implicated in a series of scandals, including allegations that he 
allowed members of the Gupta family to loot billions of rand from state companies. Zuma 
and the Guptas, who are in business with the president’s son, deny wrongdoing (Vecchiatto 
2017: 1)  
Furthermore, the Vecchiatto stressed that “Ramaphosa has made the fight against corruption the 
centrepiece of his corruption” (2017: 1). Drawing on this statement and other of the same kind that 
was seen in the sampled reports. It can be assumed that New24 reports on corruption were 
predicated and informed by the popular political discourse of that time and previous years. This is 
so because the reports were replete with statements that are like those that were dominant in the 
post-Jacob Zuma discourse. Hence, News24 can be said to have referred to the frame reserves that 
are readily available in the minds of its audience (Van Gorp 2007). These frames were thus revived 
by certain cues that the media presented to the audience allowing them to process they are existing 
images in their mind about the political leaders. News24 evoked memories of Jacob Zuma in the 
minds of its audience by highlighting all the negative things that Jacob Zuma’s leadership has done 
over the years. These negatives were thus used to present Cyril Ramaphosa as the only possible 
alternative to the messy that Jacob Zuma has caused on the nation.  
To further illustrate how press reports relied on the post-Jacob Zuma discourse to legitimise the 
leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, a close analysis of statements in the reports will suffice. For 
instance, in a report by the Cohen and Vecchiatto, it was said that "Ramaphosa pledged a 
crackdown on graft, which has become increasingly rife during Zuma's almost nine-year 
administration" (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1). Simply put, this report helps to illustrate the 
notion that in a bid to legitimise the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, the reporters juxtaposed him 
to Jacob Zuma's failure to lead and corruption scandals. This approach on reporting Cyril 
Ramaphosa helped exposed Jacob Zuma's failures with a clear message that distanced the two 
leaders. What this means is that Cyril Ramaphosa stood out as an anti-corrupt leader who is ready 
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to go all out to decimate and a crackdown on Jacob Zuma orchestrated corruption and establish an 
anti-corrupt government that does not tolerate corruption at all levels of government. 
On the contrary, results from the data showed that the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame as used 
by News24 only served to discredit the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Evidence 
from sampled news articles revealed that most reports on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma mentioned 
Jacob Zuma. However, when Jacob Zuma was mentioned in these reports, there was less positive 
information about him. For instance, the mention of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's rephrased to 
“Dlamini-Zuma, Zuma’s ex-wife”. In one report News24 reported that  
Dlamini-Zuma, Zuma's ex-wife, also secured election to the committee, alongside Finance 
Minister Malusi Gigaba and former central bank Governor Tito Mboweni, who appeared 
on her faction’s list. (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1) 
Furthermore, Cohen and Vecchiatto said:  
His main rival is former African Union Commission chairwoman Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma, the president’s ex-wife and favoured successor (Vecchiato 2017: 1) 
In this case, it can be assumed that News24 by framing the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
and Cyril Ramaphosa by associating them (positively and negatively) with the name of Jacob 
Zuma applied the “moral evaluation” delegitimating strategy was used. In using moral evaluation, 
the New24 tried to use the paint of “good and bad”. Jacob Zuma, in the prevailing political 
discourse, was perceived as a bad leader. Therefore, borrowing from that prevailing discourse, if 
the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was linked to Jacob Zuma, it is logical that she was also as bad and 
Jacob Zuma her former husband. On the other hand, presenting Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader who 
despised the leadership of Jacob Zuma, News24 was able to present of a good Cyril Ramaphosa 
who is moral and committed to doing away with anything bad (Jacob Zuma and his faction) that 
has corrupted South Africa.  
Moreover, to further illustrate how the reports were constructed to delegitimate the leadership of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. On 14 October 2017 Stone reports that “Zuma supporters rally around 
Dlamini-Zuma" (2017: 1). In this report, it was highlighted that staunch supporters of President 
Jacob Zuma threw their weight behind Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The report said that "Zuma’s 
allies in the ANC also lambasted those criticising ANC presidential candidate Nkosazana Dlamini-
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Zuma’s campaign by linking her to the president". (Stone 2017: 1). Moreover, it was also 
highlighted that one of the closest allies of Jacob Zuma, Kebby Maphatsoe, president of the 
uMkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans Association (MKMVA), backed the candidacy of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Of note in this report is the link that the report created between 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Jacob Zuma and the allies of Jacob Zuma. The link was grounded on 
economic ideology. The report made it clear to the readers that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was 
aligned to the Jacob Zuma based on the economic approach they both subscribe to. It was 
highlighted in the report that "Dlamini-Zuma's policies are land redistribution, free education, 
skills revolution, women emancipation, youth development, and rural development" (Stone 2017: 
1). 
These policies were like those that were being implemented by the Jacob Zuma administration. 
Now, placing this into context, it is common knowledge that Jacob Zuma radical economic policies 
were losing popularity in South Africa. As such, most South Africans were not happy with the 
direction that was taken by Jacob Zuma's administration. This was evident in the number of 
protests that erupted across the country. These protests were calling for Jacob Zuma to resign 
(Pauw 2017: 78). Now, placing Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in the picture, it can be argued that 
aligning and equating her policies to those of Jacob Zuma was going to produce undesired 
consequences for her campaign. In this case, it seems that News24 reporters deliberately created 
the link between Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob in order tell its audience of the potential 
danger that follows if they choose to elect Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as their next president. 
Therefore, this approach by News24 has an underlying meaning that may not be evident at first 
view. The meaning, in this case, was to remind its readers that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was a 
simple appendage of the Jacob Zuma disastrous administration.  
Furthermore, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s link to corruption was also extensively reported by 
News24 during the primary election that was held by the branches in the period leading to the 
December conference. According to the ANC constitution, the ANC branches across the country 
were responsible for nominating the candidates they will be voting for in the national conference. 
However, the most striking the result to emerge is that the nomination of Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma was always contested based on corruption allegations. The press frames her nomination as 
marred by irregularities. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's supporters were reported to be engaging in 
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the process of vote-buying and vote-rigging. For instance, in a report of 29 November 2017, Zulu 
argued reports that "the ANC Sweet Waters branch are fighting to nullify the meeting at which it 
chose Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as its preferred candidate" (2017: 1). Further in the same report, 
election rigging, and procedural irregularities were cited as the reason why the election results that 
were in favour of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was supposed to be nullified. As though it was not 
enough, it was again cited in the report that over 244 members were deprived of their voting right 
and this has led to the victory of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
Drawing on the above example, the narrative that was constructed by the reporters is that 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma would not have won the election had all the members participated. 
Moreover, the reporter also linked Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership to the corruption that 
was prevailing in South Africa. What this means is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was presented 
as a leader whom electability is compromised. She could not win the election without rigging or 
the manipulation of the elections processes. Put together, this manner of framing the leadership of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma seems to suggest that the press was communicating the statements were 
dominating political discourse in South Africa in the period leading to the conference. To illustrate, 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership has been constantly under scrutiny in South Africa. She 
has been on the spotlight for all wrong reasons. Under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Thabo 
Mbeki, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was under attack for the Sarafina II drug deal that included 
millions of Rands (Du Plessis 2017: 43).  
 
Table 10.2: Linguistic expressions on Jacob Zuma and state capture frame: New24 
 
“Besides tribalism and factionalism, President Jacob Zuma leaves the ANC with a legacy of 
corruption” (Tawengwa 2017: 1)  
“Cyril Ramaphosa and his supporters who generally thought that voting for Cyril Ramaphosa 
would mean an end to Jacob Zuma’s legacy of corruption” (Tawengwa 2017: 1) 
“Ramaphosa has made the fight against corruption the centrepiece of his campaign and made 
attacks on Zuma, who’s been implicated in a series of scandals, including allegations 
that he allowed members of the Gupta family to loot billions of rand from state 
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companies. Zuma and the Guptas, who are in business with the president’s son, deny 
wrongdoing” (Vecchiato 2017: 1) 
 
Recently, before the national elections in 2017, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was also under public 
scrutiny after she was assigned presidential security at her homestead. Thus, the readers with all 
these previous knowledge and experiences in their minds, any mention of Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma involvement in any other “immoral” political manoeuvre would rekindle the thoughts they 
have of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Therefore, drawing on this expression, News24 rekindled and 
amplified the corruption frame in the minds of the audience and allow them to think of the 
candidature of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma using that as a reference point. These findings fit well 
with the findings from previous studies that suggest that frames activate knowledge, stimulate 
"stocks of cultural morals and values, and create context" (Jamieson and Campbell 1997: 72). By 
so doing, frames occupy a central position in communication as it is. 
Moreover, a close examination into why News24 was incessant on painting a bad picture of Jacob 
Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, can tempt one to think that the owners of News24 were 
trying by all means possible to distance them from the Gupta scandal they were involved in 
between 2015 and 2017. The owners of News24 were on the drive to regain their reputation that 
was affected through their involvement with the Gupta linked ANN7 news channel. As highlighted 
in Chapter 3, News24 is controlled by the Naspers Group. Naspers group is the one that controls 
MultiChoice. Between 2015 and 2017, Multichoice was under public scrutiny for its involvement 
with the ANN7. In 2017 it emerged that Multichoice agreed to pay the Guptas ’infinity Media 
Network a “once off” payment of R25 million. According to Groenewald “Multichoice agreed to 
increase its annual payment for infinity’s ANN7 news channel from R50 million to just over R140 
million” (2018: 1). After details of Naspers and Multichoice involvement with the Gupta family 
who were known to be allied to Jacob Zuma, criticism mounded on the company (Multichoice). 
To illustrate, Groenewald stressed that “criticism has been heaping for the company for funding a 
channel with dwindling viewership which essentially became a propaganda machine for the Gupta 
and Zuma families” (2018: 1). In the same year (2017), there were also allegations that Multichoice 
advanced a payment to SABC in return of political control over government policy on digital 
migration. Now, all these scandals tarnished the image and reputation of the Naspers and 
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Multichoice. As a result, the only way Multichoice and Naspers could regain its trust in the public 
and government was to try to distance itself from the leadership of Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. To add, the need to present itself as anti-Jacob Zuma motivated the owners through 
their newspapers to present themselves as anti-Guptas, Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma. Therefore, drawing on this illustration, it can be deduced that the framing of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma as closely linked to Jacob Zuma and the Guptas was an effort by the media owners 
to have their interests and ideas put through to the public that was slowly becoming suspicious 
about the credibility of Naspers and MultiChoice 
 
Factionalism and unity frame: brief overview  
 
The factionalism and unity frame was employed by both News24 and IOL. Though used 
differently, the frame ultimately achieved the same purpose in both presses; it delegitimised 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by presenting her as leader of a despicable faction that was a mere 
extension of Jacob Zuma’s interest. On the other hand, though Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as 
a leader of a factional group, attention in both presses was placed more on his ability to unite the 
ANC and the deeply divided nation. Put another way, Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership was framed 
as a leader who will revive unity in the ANC and South Africa. An interesting finding that emerged 
in the analysis of data that paid attention to factionalism and unity is that the Factionalism and 
Unity frame was not an invention of the news reporters. Rather, the reporters deliberately hand-
picked frames drawing from the unenumerable cultural reserves of frames that are readily 
accessible (Van Gorp 2007: 109). For example, the role of Cyril Ramaphosa as a unifier was 
extensively discussed by various scholars in Chapter 4. Following this section, the following 
section focuses on the data on News24 and IOL.  
 
Factionalism and unity frame: News24 
 
From the sampled data, strong evidence was found that in the period after the conference, Cyril 
Ramaphosa's win was framed as a victory over a Nkosazana-Dlamini-Zuma faction. To explain, 
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in a report by the Cohen and Vecchiatto, the reporters said: "the faction, led by the candidate he 
beat in the presidential race, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, probably has the loyalty of about 45 of 
the 86 NEC's voting members" (2017: 1). This serves to illustrate that the defeat or loss of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Cyril Ramaphosa was interpreted as the fall of factional group. Also, 
in the same report Cohen and Vecchiatto said:  
The power of the ANC presidency, the bandwagon effect, and individual calculations have 
all changed. And the scope of new deals is vast," he said. "So, given that in large measure 
Jacob Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma are yesterday's figures, the paradigm has shifted as well 
(Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1) 
In this report, the impression given is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s loss was a loss of a bigger 
faction, a faction that had an invisible but loud voice; Jacob Zuma.  
To add, the reporters said Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were things of the past. What 
is more interesting here is that the reporters tie Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's efforts to become 
president as the efforts of Jacob Zuma's faction to continue its reign behind the scenes. Put 
together, what this seems to suggest is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's loss to Cyril Ramaphosa 
was presented as the loss of Jacob Zuma and his faction. Additionally, it also gives the impression 
that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stood for the same agenda that Jacob Zuma stood for in his 
presidency. This had the potential to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This is 
so because, in the post-Jacob Zuma discourse, sentiments were that anything associated with Jacob 
Zuma was not worthy of leading ANC.  
Drawing on the above assertion, it can be assumed that News24 reporters delegitimised the 
leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by emphasising how much she falls within a factional 
group more than areas she spoke about uniting the party. What the press did, in this case, was to 
focus on aspects of the relationship that exist between Jacob Zuma and Nkosazana. Generally, the 
public only understood Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Jacob Zuma as divorced persons (Du 
Plessis 2017: 35). Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's political inclinations were neutral and thus not 
pronounced in the period leading to the conference. Though it was assumed that she belongs to a 
faction, it was not clear whether Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was in the same faction with Jacob 
Zuma. Thus, their factional relations were non-recognisable to the public. However, through 
placing salience and emphasis, the media was successful in turning the unclear factional ties and 
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nonrecognisable relations into noticeable occurrences (Gamson and Modiglian 1987: 37). It did so 
by amplifying the factional ties that were already present but non-recognisable in the minds of the 
audience by reminding them that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was not her person. Instead, she was 
pushing a factional agenda; an agenda to prolong the leadership of her former husband, Jacob 
Zuma.  
As indicated by Watkins (2009), the evidence that emerged from the data points to the fact that the 
political events and culture obtaining at a given time determines what the media focus on (2009: 
45). To illustrate the above, the discourse of factionalism and unity dominated the ANC political 
space in the period leading to the conference (Mathekga 2018: 89). The relationship of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma to a Jacob Zuma led faction raised fears of having Jacob Zuma return through a 
back door. Both in ANC and government fears that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s presidency would 
perpetuate the rule of Jacob Zuma was a cause of concern. As unrecognisable as they were in the 
public space before the conference, News24 reporters reignited such fears (return of Jacob Zuma 
through Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) already existing in the minds of its readers to delegitimise 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma potential leadership of the ANC. The statements that shaped the Jacob-
Zuma faction were also found in the arguments of various scholars discussed in Chapter 4. Scholars 
like Butler (2015), Du Plessis (2018) and Mathekga (2018) argued that the Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma was a pony in the Jacob Zuma fight to retain power even after his departure from the 
presidency.   
 
Table 10.3: Linguistic expression from the factionalism and unity frame: News24  
 
“the Dlamini-Zuma faction now talks tough – radical economic transformation” (Thokoane 
2017: 1) 
“Ramaphosa said he and Nkosazana are proof that unity is possible” (Gerber 2017: 1) 
“it is unlikely that the Nkosazana faction will try to remove Ramaphosa after the election” 
(Gerber 2017: 1) 
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“Over the past few months, our country has largely been divided into two campaign forces: one 
supporting Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa to ascend to the presidency, the other 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Each of them has no policies of her or his own. They would 
presumably implement the policies of the ANC. But why so much emphasis on them as 
individuals?” (Thokoane 2017: 1) 
“Zuma supporters rally around Dlamini-Zuma” (Stone: 2017: 2) 
“Zuma’s allies in the ANC also lambasted those criticising ANC presidential candidate 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s campaign by linking her to the president” (Stone: 2017: 1) 
“She said it is also sexist to say that when voting for Dlamini-Zuma that will create a Zuma 
dynasty. ‘We are not interested in personal issues of other people in the ANC. Who 
knows how many ex’s some of them have? So, we must condemn any form of sexism” 
(Stone: 2017: 2) 
“Ramaphosa said for us it is not about who has the numbers and then that is it, but about whether 
we have managed to put in a united team. Ramaphosa has been mentioned as the face of 
the unity campaign” (Stone and Cele 2017: 1).  
“The power of the ANC presidency, the bandwagon effect and individual calculations have all 
changed. And the scope of new deals is vast,” he said. “So, given that in large measure 
Jacob Zuma and Dlamini-Zuma are yesterday’s figures, the paradigm has shifted as 
well.” (Cohen and Vecchiatto 2017: 1).  
“At some point it must have dawned on the NDZ and Msholozi gang that anyone or anything, 
including the ANC, associated with Zuma was increasingly losing the trust of a large 
portion of the general public – the intellectuals, moralists and the greedy investor 
community” (Daily Sun 2017: 2) 
 
Moreover, evidence that emerged from the data provides additional support for the fact that news 
reports as we understand them, are not isolated to other text that operates within the same sphere 
(Chambwera 2016; Davies-Laubscher 2016; Van Gorp 2007; Foucault 1980). The press framing 
of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa is proof positive to how their reports were 
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intertextual and resemble previous text. Put another way, the text on factionalism and unity were 
not independent of other previous text and contextual influences. Evidence from the data showed 
that sentiments of factionalism and unity date back to 2012 in the ANC (Butler 2009; 2007; Hartley 
2018). More so, in the previous year (2016) news reports and discussion about factionalism were 
on the peak in ANC, culminating in several urgent meeting aimed at addressing factionalism within 
the party.  
Therefore, drawing on the illustration above, it can be concluded that the press reports during the 
period leading to the conference and after borrowed on though expanded an already existing 
discourse. To contextualise the previous argument, in the period before the conference the ANC 
was divided into factional groups (Mathekga 2018; Butler 2017). These factions were led by two 
main political figures. The first faction was led by Cyril Ramaphosa. This was the faction that was 
perceived as the group of the morally right. This faction had little involvement in corruption. Its 
leaders and members were pushing the anti-corruption gospel, thus were viewed as the moral and 
the most desired candidates to take over the leadership of the ANC. On the other hand, was the 
Jacob Zuma faction. This faction was thought to be led by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and had the 
support of the ANC Women's league. The Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma faction was labelled a gang 
of the corrupt. This is so because most of its alleged members including Jacob Zuma were involved 
in corruption and were at some point taken to court for corruption activities.  
In News24 the frame of factionalism was also evident in the gendered manner the campaign of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was packaged. Her campaign was presented to the audience as a 
campaign of the women in South Africa to claim their place in the ANC and South Africa. What 
this means is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was then going to be the first to the female president 
in the history of South Africa. To illustrate, in a report of 26 October 2017, News24 took an extract 
from a book by Carien du Plessis (2017). In this report, it was highlighted that Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma was going to be South Africa's first women president after decades of women 
marginalisation in the echelons of power. Moreover, it was also stressed in this case that the 
"campaign for a female president became synonymous with her campaign". News24 was therefore 
deeply involved in the politics of gender that has always affected the ANC. By reporting on the 
issue of female leadership News24 can be said to have focused on these specific gendered issues 
that evoke the feeling and perceptions that some of its audience already held. Thus, their report is 
207 
 
cultural artefacts that are consciously or unconsciously constructed informed by the broader 
societal discourse in which they operate.  
Strong evidence that emerged from the data showed that the factionalism and unity reports were 
replete with the gendered connotation that served to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma at the expense of Cyril Ramaphosa. What this means is that Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma was constantly portrayed as in a negative light. She was given to the readers as a leader who 
fans factionalism and despises unity. This was against the positive presentation of Cyril 
Ramaphosa. Cyril Ramaphosa was identified as the champion of unity. The continuous reference 
to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership as negative suggests that the press reporting was 
gendered and resembles sentiments dominant in a patriarchal society.  
The findings above seem to be in complete agreement with findings from previous studied. In 
relation our findings, Wright and Holland argue that these framings as carefully did by the media 
professionals, "demonstrates the role the media plays as a gendered mediator, perpetuating the 
gender double-blind that constrains female political leaders, as they negotiate the demand to 
demonstrate masculine leadership attributed without tarnishing the feminine qualities expected of 
them" (Wright and Holland 2014:78). Similarly, Fountaine and McGregor's study argued that the 
modern bias facing women in politics is that the media simply use traditional frames – that is 
constructed around the dominance of men- in coverage of women, making it difficult for women 
politicians to be presented as anything other than political outsiders (2001: 59). 
Further analysis proves that the gendered reports in News24 were simply cultural artefacts that 
served to amplify the prevailing ideological battle between patriarchy and feminism that pervades 
the South African public sphere. They were culturally constructed because topics of gender 
inequality pre-existed the production of the news reports. To demonstrate this, for years the issue 
of a women leader has been a subject of debate both in ANC and South Africa. A different section 
of the ANC leadership was calling for a female president. These calls pitted the ANC leadership 
into ideological factions and exposed the dominant patriarchal nature that forms the foundations 
of the ANC. In September 2015, at the conference of the Women’s League, it was declared that 
the party was ready and must have a female president. The group that called for a female president 
was in direct contrast with the faction that sought to maintain the status quo in terms of the 
gendered structure within the organisation. This group as it was known thought that a female leader 
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was too weak for South Africa. It was stated that a country that is so powerful on the Africa 
continent cannot be ruled by a female president. Also, public conversations in South Africa 
reiterated that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was too soft to be a president and motherly (Du Plessis 
2018: 67).  
Therefore, by drawing on the patriarchal discourse that only served to discredit the leadership of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the press participates in the prevailing patriarchal discourse. As such, 
it assumes the same position with those sections of the society that were biased towards a female 
leader. To that end, how the gender bias played out in the press seems to justify the findings from 
previous studies (Cukier et al. 2016: 45). Cukier et al. found that apart from the gender bias that 
exists within the political cycles, there is a great deal of gender bias that exists within the media 
(2016: 45). This bias is not independent of the patriarchal society within which the media functions 
and plays an integral part in its constitution.  
As opposed to IOL that placed the blame of factionalism on both Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and 
Cyril Ramaphosa, News24 placed the blame of factionalism exclusively on Jacob Zuma and those 
that were linked to him. For instance, a report of 20 December 2017, Tawengwa explicitly stated 
that the ANC was faced with an urgent challenge that needs the attention of Cyril Ramaphosa. 
This challenge he said was factionalism and tribalism. In this case, the reporter went on to say the 
problem of factionalism was because of the Jacob Zuma and his allies. Tawengwa said, 
"unfortunately, President Zuma's reign as ANC president saw tribalism and consequently 
factionalism permeating the organization like never before" (Tawengwa 2017: 1). Moreover, the 
report said, “Jacob Zuma's politics at the helm of the ANC can be described as a form of ethnic 
nationalism where ethnonationalism can be defined as support for the political interests of a 
particular ethnic group” (Tawengwa 2017: 1). However, interesting in this report is how the 
reporter created a link between tribalism and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The reporter said it was 
the same ethnic and tribalism approach that Jacob Zuma camp attempted to use on behalf of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (Tawengwa 2017: 1). Aligning Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to Jacob 
Zuma strategy of factionalism and tribalism is painting her with the same brush. It serves the 
purpose of presenting Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as a mere appendage of the Jacob Zuma political 
career.  
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Factionalism and unity frame: IOL  
 
The most interesting finding to emerge from IOL is that the Factionalism and Unity frame was 
exclusively used to endorse the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. To illustrate, it was used to present 
Cyril Ramaphosa as a man who has a strong desire and capacity to unite the ANC and South 
Africa. For instance, in a report of the 21 December 2017, Naicker said that “Cyril Ramaphosa 
vows to act, unify” (2017: 1). To add, Naicker reported that unity and action were the key points 
of Cyril Ramaphosa campaign and his closing remarks. In this report, the reporter stressed that 
there was nothing important to Cyril Ramaphosa than the unity of the ANC. Naicker said, "the 
string that wove Ramaphosa's speech together was unity" (2017: 1). In the same report, to 
emphasize how Cyril Ramaphosa was a man of unity, the reporter said Cyril Ramaphosa reached 
out to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma after defeating her in the election campaign.  
Moreover, in another report of 17 December 2017, Staff Reporter said also embarked on a mission 
to explain how Cyril Ramaphosa reached out to people who were deemed his enemies. For 
instance, the Staff Reporter said: “He reached out to COSATU and the SACP, alliance partners 
who had become estranged under Zuma's reign.” (2017: 1). Similarly, in another report of 17 
December 2017, Mahtlati and ANA quoted Baleka Mbete who expressed confidence that Cyril 
Ramaphosa was the right man to unite the ANC and the country (2017). Baleka Mbete was quoted 
saying she shares the same view with Cyril Ramaphosa who believes in unity and this unity she 
described as a unity "with a meaning"(Mahtlati and ANA 2017: 1). On the other hand, there was 
no direct mention of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's role in fomenting unity in the sampled reports. 
The way the press emphasised Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to unite while keeping silence on 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's role or ability to unite the country help explain the how the reporters 
consciously or unconsciously selected to place emphasis on an aspect of the everyday unfolding 
reality. The reporters selected some parts of the Factionalism and Unity discourse and organise, 
package and presented those elements to the readers to make sense of it. This observation is barely 
distinguishable from Fountaine and McGregor (2001). These scholars found that frames “are 
central to journalism as they work as routines for journalists that allow them to swiftly identify 
and organize information and to “package it for efficient relay to the audience” (Fountaine and 
McGregor 2001: 59). 
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Table 10.4 Linguistic expression in factionalism and unity: IOL 
 
“unity and action were key points of Cyril Ramaphosa’s closing address at the ANC’s 54th 
national elective conference” (Staff Reporter 2017: 1) 
“the string that wove Ramaphosa’s speech together was unity” (Correspondent 2017: 1) 
"He reached out to all South Africans: We must focus on the task of building a non-racial 
country, guided by the injunction in the Freedom Charter that South Africa belongs to 
all who live in it, black and white" (Staff Reporter 2017: 1) 
“He reached out to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, who had run against him in the campaign to be 
elected the 14th president of the ANC. (Staff Reporter 2017: 1) 
“Ramaphosa reached out to outgoing ANC president Jacob Zuma” (2017: 1).  
“Ramaphosa said while there was a lot of uncertainty in various sectors, people were looking 
for a conference that will be a big saviour for the country and emerging out of that 
conference an ANC that is united, rejuvenated, youthful, honest and has integrity.” 
(Mokati 2017: 1) 
“The battle between the two frontrunners for the ANC leader-Deputy President Cyril 
Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, an ex-wife of Zuma and former chairwomen 
of the African Union-has battle divided the party that has governed South Africa since 
the end of apartheid in 1994” (Winning 2017”: 1) 
“Mkhize is viewed as a compromise candidate in a campaign that has been characterised by the 
divisions being created by those who support Dlamini and Ramaphosa” (Chetty 2017: 
1)  
 
Furthermore, a deeper analysis of the linguistic expressions above shows points to the fact that the 
text in IOL report was artefact consciously constructed to communicate a set of meanings. The 
meaning was aimed at endorsing the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. From the data sample, the 
word unity was referred to more in connection with Cyril Ramaphosa than Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma. IOL placed a considerable amount of emphasis on how Cyril Ramaphosa "unity" was the 
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centrepiece of Cyril Ramaphosa's campaign. By so doing the reporters played a pivotal role in 
creating a positive image of Cyril Ramaphosa. 
The observation above fit well with findings from Carlos (2007) and Fiske (1994). For example, 
Carlson argued that discussion about political events and certain individuals in the media does not 
only reflect opinion and appraisal about those portrayed, rather they “organise, produce, and 
disseminate meaning about those events and particular individuals” (Carlson 2007: 267). This 
assertion is like the argument put forth by Fiske when he argues that “discourse is structured and 
structuring, for it is both determined by its social relations and affects them” (1994: 3). What this 
means is that discourse is continuously reproducing and always acting on the society while it is 
also being acted upon by that same society. 
From the sampled data strong evidence emerged that the reports that focused on unity have deep 
discursive roots within the unfolding political events. To illustrate, IOL reporters allowed the 
readers to give considerable consideration and retrieve the “unity” frame already existing in their 
memory. To better explain this assertion, one needs to look at how IOL reporters create a direct 
connection between the past and its readers. What this means is that in pre and post-1994 discourse, 
Cyril Ramaphosa occupied a special place as a man who has unified the country (Butler 2017: 
125). Cyril Ramaphosa is hailed in South Africa for his contribution in uniting the country during 
the period apartheid until South Africa signed the new constitution in 1996. As a negotiator and a 
politician, he is also known in the South African history for contributing to various peace 
agreements, most of which resulted in the unifying of ailing parties (Butler 2009: 125). Drawing 
on the sentiments that already existed, the reporters seem to have borrowed from past discourses 
and organize them into it can be argued that IOL reports on the discourse of unity was not in 
isolation of the past political discourses. Instead, the reports draw on this political background to 
reconnect the reader with his memories of Cyril Ramaphosa and thus allowed the reader to see 
Cyril Ramaphosa using “unity “as the framework of reference.  
Findings from the data showed strong evidence of how Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was given 
limited attention in reports that focused on Factionalism and Unity. It also emerged that whenever 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was mentioned, she was portrayed in a negative light. In a report by 
Winning, it was underscored that “Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, an ex-wife of Jacob 
Zuma and former chairwomen of the African Union-has battle divided the party” (2017: 1). On 
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the surface, this seems to be a neutral manner of reporting where blame was placed on all 
candidates. However, an interesting dynamic that emerged from the report was how factionalism 
was linked to Jacob Zuma and them to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In the same report, Winning 
shifted her attention from explaining how the two candidates have divided the party to how 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Jacob Zuma and allies were leading a faction that destroyed South 
Africa. This shift of emphasis exposes the lop-sided reportage that was against the leadership of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
Also, a report by Meyer referred to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's faction as "Jacob Zuma's Gupta-
aligned wing" (2017: 1). Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's faction was also referred to as the "captured 
ANC with improperly elected delegates" (Meyer 2017: 1). Additionally, the Meyer also stresses 
that "the captured forces failed by a hair's breadth in their attempt to highjack the party". As if it 
was not enough, the reporter also stressed that the defeated ANC wing was not going to rest until 
they can sway the ANC's agenda to suit their agenda of continued looting of state recourses. 
Clearly, this report illustrates the level of bias that pervades the Factionalism and Unity frame as 
it was used to portray Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma faction in a negative light.  
However, this more than a matter of impartiality on the part of IOL seems to be a matter of 
ideology. Simply put, the overemphasis of the one faction over the other exposes the report to as 
an actively participating in the ideologies contest that was obtained in the period leading to the 
conference. Two ideological factions were at odds during this period. The capitalist ideology was 
represented by Cyril Ramaphosa while the socialist ideology was represented by Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma. Therefore, by downplaying the person of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the media 
should be understood as attacking the socialist ideology. Also, by endorsing the leadership of Cyril 
Ramaphosa, it can be assumed that the media was protecting its capitalist interests. This is very 
likely because the media in South Africa is owned by the elites and a group of people referred to 
as capitalist. IOL is owned by Independent News and Media, South Africa. This company’s owners 
have a close relationship with Cyril Ramaphosa that dates to 1996. This relationship started when 
Cyril Ramaphosa was involved in the process of establishing the empowerment agreement that 
saw the unbundling of the Anglo America company. According to Hartley, Cyril Ramaphosa 
played a pivotal role in the selling of the Anglo-America’s assets (2018: 70). Some of these assets 
included 50% stake of the Business Day and Financial Mail. Moreover, Cyril Ramaphosa also 
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negotiated the sale of Anglo’s Argus Group assets, that included the Cape Times, Cape Argus, The 
Star and Pretoria News. These were all sold to Tony O’Reilly who were owners of the London’s 
Independent newspaper. Later O’Reilly renamed the company to Independent News and Media. 
Besides, Cyril Ramaphosa through Tshivase Shares Dealing investment company, he influences 
in some of the media institutions. For instance, he has indirect control in Independent News and 
Media company through his chairmanship of Pearson plc. Pearson owns Financial Times of 
London and half of the Economist magazine. Therefore, because the media incessantly supported 
the Cyril Ramaphosa's leadership's it can be assumed that the press participated in the ideological 
battle that pervades South Africa. Furthermore, not only did it participated in the communication 
of ideology, it went ahead to legitimate the dominant capitalist ideology that was represented by 
the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa.  
Findings discussed above seems to agree with studies discussed in chapter 5 (Walker and Laughter 
2019; Campbell 2011). For example, Walker and Laughter found that commitment to master 
narratives by the media allows them to legitimise events, individuals and ideologies. To add, 
Campbell stressed that journalists include terms such as "post-racial America" that serve to let 
dominant White mainstream off the hook for any further racial introspection (2011:45). This 
means of communication by journalists, therefore, plays a vital role in legitimising the dominant 
ideology within society. In relation to that assertion, Shah and Thornton argued that "the press 
enacts a mass-mediated ritual of social control through its coverage, allowing politicians, reporters, 
and others with access to the public discourse the opportunity to legitimate specific stories- 
generally once that reinforces white supremacy" (1994: 144). 
From the sampled data, strong evidence that emerged showed that there was a heavy reliance on 
the technique of sentimentality. What this means is that the reporters overemphasised the 
relationship that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had with the Gupta family. By so doing they 
discredited her political leadership. By emphasising the link that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had 
with Gupta through Jacob Zuma, this allowed the reporters to give the impression that Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma was a mere appendage of the Gupta and Jacob Zuma corruption. Further analysis 
exposed that the reports that focused on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's role in factionalism created 
an exaggerated connection between her political ambitions and the interest of the Gupta family. 
Now, the fact of the matter is that members of the Gupta family were close allies of Jacob Zuma 
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and not Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. According to prevailing discourses in the period leading to 
elections, members of the Gupta family were so close to Jacob Zuma and his government to an 
extent of influencing government policy (Pauw 2017: 78). Similarly, because of their corrupt 
activities, the Gupta family was no longer needed by many in South Africa. The Gupta's were 
known for "state capture". State capture is "a type of systematic political corruption in which 
private interests significantly influence a states-decision making process to their advantage" (Pauw 
2017: 78). Therefore, because the relation between the Guptas and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was 
not clear cut, it follows that the press when linked the two together they were exaggerating and 
over-emphasising the extent to which the Gupta's influences Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Simply 
put, there was not a single piece of evidence produced that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was aligned 
to the Gupta family. Drawing on this line of thought, it seems that the press constructed reality 
about the relationship Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma had. This was made possible by taking some 
stocks of frames that are lying in the prevailing social discourse in which the press functions. 
Placing the frame of factionalism into the ownership context, one is tempted to argue that how 
News24 and IOL seem to be the anti-Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma leadership which they align 
unapologetically to Jacob Zuma also draws its inspiration to the ownership and control structures 
of the press. To illustrate, News24 is owned by a group of companies who have a vast interest in 
other companies. Some of the companies in which Cyril Ramaphosa is a shareholder through his 
investment company Shanduka Holdings (Hartley 2018). On the other hand, IOL has a British 
pedigree. Its initial owners were from the Republic of Ireland. Now, because Cyril Ramaphosa 
business interests cut across all sectors including ownership of shares in various media companies 
it might suggest that a victory for Cyril Ramaphosa in the election would signify the win for those 
business and media houses in which he has an interest.  
On the other hand, the owners of the media could not have felt comfortable with a Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma's win owing to her radical economic transformation policy. To put it plainly, the 
radical economic transformation policies as pushed by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were a threat to 
media owners’ interest. Anything that has to do with radically transforming the economy did not 
settle well with those who owed companies and were in control of the economy (Pauw 2017: 78). 
Therefore, delegitimising Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma will be logical if we consider the media as a 
political institution. The local shareholders of IOL and News24 could take the side of Cyril 
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Ramaphosa while they would not sympathise with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma who posed a threat 
to their business interests. To illustrate, Cyril Ramaphosa has enjoyed years of warm business 
relations with local shareholder of IOL. For instance, Cyril Ramaphosa had shares in Times Media 
Ltd as its chair and Pearson Plc. (which owns the Financial Times of London and half of the 
Economist magazine) jointly own the Financial Mail business magazine and Business Day. All 
these companies are closely linked to Independent News and Media that benefited from the 1996 
empowerment deal that was presided and facilitated by Cyril Ramaphosa. To add, the Independent 
News and Media is the one that controls the Independent Online South Africa. Therefore, drawing 
on this background, the newspapers could have every reason to align themselves with the Cyril 
Ramaphosa faction, which was likely to protect their own business interests. Therefore, what was 
at issue here was, at least in part, the media seeking to protect its commercial interest more than 
anything else.  
The findings above bears resemblance with the findings of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004: 186). 
These scholars found that commercial pressure can encourage the media to distinguish themselves 
politically. Put another way, the media content and framing of issues, in this case, has ceased to be 
influenced directly by political allegiance to a political party. Rather, their content is now driven 
by the desire to satisfy the needs of their consumers who are inevitably aligned to a political party 
ideology of political actors (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Hallin and Mancini 2004).  
 
Corruption frame: brief overview  
 
The corruption frame was used by both News24 and the ILO when reporting on the political 
leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In both 
presses, the corruption frame served to legitimise the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa by presenting 
him as the alternative to the ‘disastrous’ Jacob Zuma rule. On the other hand, sampled data showed 
that there was a common trend in the way Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was presented. Put 
differently, there was strong evidence showing that little attention was paid in both presses to 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's plans to deal with corruption. The use of the similar frame by the press 
suggests that the reporters used frames that were purposefully and logically equivalent. However, 
that logically equivalent information was presented in a certain way that either encourages or 
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discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Kahneman and Tversky 2013). Following this section, the next section focuses on the News24 and 
then IOL.  
 
Corruption frame:  News24  
 
Table 10.5: The linguistic expression on corruption frame: News24  
 
“Corruption has to come to a stop, and it must happen with immediate effect,” Ramaphosa said. 
“We must confront the reality that critical institutions of our state have been targeted by 
individuals and families.” (Cohen and Vecchiatto2017).  
“Ramaphosa pledged a crackdown on graft, which has become increasingly rife during Zuma’s 
almost nine-year administration” (Tangwena 2017: 1) 
“voting for Cyril Ramaphosa would mean an end to Jacob Zuma’s legacy of corruption” 
(Tawengwa 2017: 1).  
“Ramaphosa has additional resources available to dismantle Zuma’s Kleptocratic system outside 
of the weak ANC structures” (Gossel 2017: 1).  
“Ramaphosa has additional resources available to dismantle Zuma’s Kleptocratic system outside 
of the weak ANC structures. These include his ability to hire the head of the NPA to 
replace Shaun Abrahams, reinforcing the renewed anti-corruption stance of 
parliamentary committees, and appointing the state capture inquiry.” (Gossel 2017: 1). 
 
In News24, Cyril Ramaphosa was framed as a leader who was against corruption. He was given 
the status of champion of a just society that has no corruption. Evidence from the data suggests 
that Cyril Ramaphosa's campaign was packaged as an anti-corruption drive and campaign against 
Jacob Zuma's 9 years of corruption. In a report by Cohen and Vecchiatto (2017), Cyril Ramaphosa 
was portrayed to the readers as a leader who was determined to combat corruption. Strong and 
unwavering emphasis was placed on the fact that Cyril Ramaphosa will put an end to corruption. 
Cohen and Vecchiatto said, "Ramaphosa pledged a crackdown on graft, which has become 
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increasingly fire during Zuma's almost nine-year administration" (2017: 1). Similarly, in another 
report by Tawengwa (2017), the reporter was more explicit when he suggested that "voting for 
Cyril Ramaphosa would mean an end to Jacob Zuma's legacy of corruption" (Tawengwa 2017: 1). 
A closer look at this quote proves that the reporters were deliberate and unequivocal in endorsing 
the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa. The reporter made it clear that if the reader-voted for Cyril 
Ramaphosa, they were guaranteed that corruption will go. It should be noted at this stage that the 
reporter unapologetically endorsed Cyril Ramaphosa as the preferred candidate. To add, in a 
different report by Gossel (2017: 1), Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as the leader with all 
necessary resources to fight against corruption. For example, Gossel said, "Ramaphosa has 
additional resources available to dismantle Zuma's Kleptocratic system outside of the weak ANC 
structures" (Gossel 2017: 1). Put together, the corruption frame as used by News24 when reporting 
on Cyril Ramaphosa was explicit in their support of the Cyril Ramaphosa leadership.  
 
Corruption frame:  IOL  
 
Table 10.6: The linguistic expression on corruption Frame:  IOL  
 
“throughout his campaign Ramaphosa has repeatedly said that those implicated in acts of 
corruption and state capture must be prosecuted” (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1). 
“ANC presidential hopeful Cyril Ramaphosa has vowed that when he takes over, he will deal 
harshly with corrupt officials and politicians” (Seale and Mbanjwa 2017: 1) 
“Ramaphosa said he was concerned about the state of Eskom, Transnet, Prasa and various water 
boards across the country that have lost huge amounts of money through corruption” 
(Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1)  
“without mentioning anyone by name, Ramaphosa said the money had been stolen from the 
state companies and given to certain people and families. He said he would make sure 
this came to an end" (Hans and Matiwane 2017: 1).  
"corruption will be brought to an end in our state-owned enterprises, he said" (Hans and 
Matiwane 2017: 1) 
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Evidence from the sampled reports points to the fact that how Cyril Ramaphosa was presented in 
IOL bears a lot of resemblance with how he was portrayed in News24 corruption frame. For 
example, just like in News24 where Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as an enemy of corruption, 
this approach was also evident in IOL sampled reports. To illustrate, in a report by Seale and 
Mbanjwa, it was stressed that "throughout his campaign, Cyril Ramaphosa has repeatedly said that 
those implicated in acts of corruption and state capture must be prosecuted" (Seale and Mbanjwa 
2017). This statement suggests that Cyril Ramaphosa was not tolerant of corruption and was 
determined to deal with all those who were involved in corruption. This position or standpoint is 
similar and resonates with the standpoint that is evident in the New24 reports. The similarity in the 
standpoint noticed in News24 and IOL seems to suggest two things. Firstly, it confirms the findings 
that the press reports during the period under inquiry were not isolated from text from other news-
press. The most plausible explanation is that the press operating within the same social and political 
context are likely to borrow frames from the context of their functioning (Chambwera 2016). 
Secondly, the similarity in endorsing Cyril Ramaphosa as a leader who is against corruption serves 
to confirm the arguments that the press was both in support of the pro-Cyril Ramaphosa ideology.  
This observation fits well with the argument raised by Iyengar and McGrady’s (2007: 55) and 
Foucault (1980) that the dominant groups in society maintain the status quo through their use of 
the mass media. this mass media is used as apparatuses that represents the dominant ideology and, 
in that process, constructing conformists’ identities. To illustrate this, the press’ for active support 
of the Cyril Ramaphosa suggests support of his ideological standpoint. Referring to the brief 
history of Cyril Ramaphosa discussed in Chapter 4, it emerged that Cyril Ramaphosa is an elite 
leader whose interest is synonymous to capitalists’ interest. Therefore, because of his capitalist 
nature, it follows that by supporting the Cyril Ramaphosa campaign and leadership, the media was 
also engaging in the process of qualifying the capitalist ideology. This can be explained by looking 
at two things. Firstly, the press in South Africa is controlled by a few individuals who own a variety 
of printing and publishing companies. These individuals and their establishments are profit 
motivated. They also want to ascertain that their interests are protected. As a result, they were 
likely to support the leader whose ideology resonates very well with their publication policy and 
agenda. Secondly, drawing on Marxist theory of ideology, the interests of the media owners are 
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not independent to the editorial policy of their newspapers (Marx 1896). To that, it follows that 
the reporters’ stance when reporting on Cyril Ramaphosa was affected by the editorial policy that 
is arguably a true reflection of the owners’ interests and ideology. Therefore, drawing on this 
illustration, one can safely conclude that the reports that sought to legitimise Cyril Ramaphosa 
sought to legitimise the ideologies of the political and economic elites whose interests were like 
those of Cyril Ramaphosa. The findings discussed here concurs well with Iyengar and McGrady’s 
(2007: 55) findings. These scholars found that media coverage of events and individuals is driven 
and affected by the interests of political elites. The elite interests are naturalised and portrayed as 
universal when they are presented to the public.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter presented the qualitative findings of the study obtained from the qualitative secondary 
data. The chapter address the research questions based on exploring the nature of frames that were 
used by New24 and IOL when reporting on the political leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
and Cyril Ramaphosa in the period leading to the 54th ANC national conference. Three broad 
frames are presented, analysed and discussed in this chapter. These are, Jacob Zuma and state 
capture, Factionalism and unity and Corruption frames. In the presentation of these frames, the 
discussion and analysis are interwoven with theory and previous literature. Frames in this chapter 
were formulated using Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis approach. Analysis was done 
using Richardson (2007) critical discourse analysis approach. 
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Chapter 11: Summary and conclusions 
   
Introduction 
 
This chapter summarises and concludes the research. It sums up on the key ideas that guided the 
framing, development and presentation of this thesis. Developing new knowledge is always the 
most important aspect of conducting every research. Therefore, this study was conducted with the 
purpose to examine the frames used by News24 and IOL to legitimise or delegitimise the political 
leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Data were 
purposively gathered from News24 and IOL online news archives. The initial sample consisted of 
100 news articles. 50 news articles were selected from News24 and IOL respectively. The inquiry 
spans from 1 October to 31 December 2017. The framing theory and Michael Foucault (1980) 
concept of discourse and knowledge/power formed the conceptual framework upon which the 
study was premised. Data were analysed using both thematic analysis and critical discourses 
analysis. To provide a detailed conclusion, this chapter first summarises each chapter. Secondly, 
it revisits the key findings that emerged from this study to summarise and breifly discuss them. 
Lastly, an overall conclusion on the key ideas of this thesis is be presented summing up how the 
research questions were answered and the new study contribution is justified.  
 
Summary of the chapters 
 
Chapter one introduced the study. The chapter focused on the background and introduction of the 
study. It further outlined the research question, objectives and the significance of the study. The 
chapter also introduced the key components that were later discussed in the thesis. For instance, it 
highlighted the research methodology that the researcher employed and theoretical and conceptual 
framework upon which this study is based. Furthermore, the chapter also defined the key terms. 
These are legitimisation and de-legitimisation. In this case, different literature that defined the two 
terms were discussed. It was highlighted that the discourse of legitimisation and de-legitimisation 
is complex and functions in various ways.  
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Chapter two looked at the background of the 54th ANC national conference. To that end, the 
events leading up to the conference were presented. The conference was seen to be of significant 
impact on the future of South Africa and ANC. For instance, it was indicated in this chapter that 
the conference had both political and economic implications on the future of South Africa. On one 
hand, the conference was perceived as the last hope that the South African economy must regain 
after the so-called “decade of waste”. On the other hand, the conference was viewed by most South 
Africans as the most decisive stage for the ANC and the country since 1994. Moreover, it was also 
indicated in this chapter that our knowledge of the organisation of the ANC National Elective 
Conference is limited to what is stated in the constitution of the ANC. To that end, rule number 10 
of the ANC constitution was outlined.  
Chapter three discussed the background and brief ownership set up of News24 and IOL. The 
chapter paid specific attention on understanding the background of the two press. Moreover, detail 
on the control structure of the press was also given considerable attention. The relationship 
between Media24, News24 and Naspers was unpacked. Also, the relationship between IOL and 
Independent News and Media was also discussed. The chapter also unpacked the complex nature 
of control that the Media24 and Independent News and Media has on different newspapers in 
South Africa.  
Chapter four discussed the biographies of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. The 
history of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was traced and presented. Additionally, the chapter discussed 
the various leadership attributes of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The review on literature on 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma showed that there is general negative perception about the leadership 
from the scholars. The chapter also unpacked the history of Cyril Ramaphosa. Various literature 
that focused on his background and leadership were reviewed. Overall, it emerged that Cyril 
Ramaphosa is a favourite of most scholars. This is because of the various leadership attributes that 
are attributed to him. The chapter highlighted the significance of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and 
Cyril Ramaphosa background to this study.  
Chapter five reviewed literature that is relevant to the study. This chapter is significant because it 
placed the study in focus. Four sets of literature were reviewed. Firstly, the chapter reviewed 
literature on media and legitimation strategies. Secondly, it reviewed literature on the media 
framing of political leaders. Thirdly, it also reviewed literature on the framing and presentation of 
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female political leaders. Finally, the chapter discussed literature that focuses on the various factors 
that influence media frames and news content. It was also indicated that there is limited literature 
that focused on the media legitimisation and de-legitimisation of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and 
Cyril Ramaphosa.  
Chapter six unpacked the theories and conceptual framework that informed the study. It explains 
the framing theory and the concepts of discourse power/knowledge as formulated by Foucault 
(1980). The origins of framing were explained. It was highlighted in this chapter that framing has 
both sociological and psychological roots. Moreover, the difference between agenda setting and 
priming, and framing and agenda setting is discussed in depth. The relationship that exists between 
framing, culture, power and its elements is unpacked and linked to the key research questions. 
Further, the Foucauldian discourse of power/knowledge was employed to explain how frames as 
every so often unspoken and unacknowledged form part of the discourse which construct and is 
produced by knowledge. It is also highlighted that news power and knowledge are dependent 
variables.  
Chapter seven chronicled the research methodology employed by the researcher in carrying out 
this study. It was explained and justified in this chapter why the researcher chose to use the 
constructive qualitative research paradigm. Moreover, the methods of collecting data used and the 
sampling technique employed by the researcher were explained. It was made clear that the study 
used purposively selected electronic archival material that was retrieved from News24 and ILO 
news websites. Additionally, the methods of data presentation and analysis were detailed. It was 
highlighted that the researcher used both thematic and critical discourse analysis. Thematic 
analysis was important as it helped to categorise emergent frames and themes and paved the way 
for detailed analysis of the themes through critical discourse analysis. However, the following 
chapter presents, interprets and analyse the research findings. Findings in the following chapter 
were organised and analysed by the sequence of the themes that emerged in the coding of data.   
Chapter eight presented qualitative findings on the two key frames that emerged from the 
thematic analysis of data. Firstly, data from the Rand & Market frame were presented, analysed 
and discussed. It was revealed in this chapter sampled reports from News24 showed that in the 
Rand and Market frame, the press paid more attention to Cyril Ramaphosa's ability to steer the 
rand and market performance in a positive direction. Moreover, findings from the IOL on rand and 
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market revealed that that the rand and market frame was mainly employed to expose how the rand 
and the markets were performing in response to the nomination processes in the period leading to 
the ANC election.  
Chapter nine presented, analysed and discussed qualitative findings on the Election victory frame. 
The chapter expounded the frames to answer the questions how such frames sought to legitimise 
and delegitimise Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and what are the other forces 
that might have influenced such framing. Critical discourse analysis was employed to analyse the 
data. The discussion of the findings was interwoven with previous literature and theory. It was 
indicated in this chapter that News24 and IOL made use of the election victory frame. However, 
the frame was activated differently yet achieving similar objectives. That is to legitimise or de-
legitimise the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. Following this 
introduction, the following section presents, analyse and discusses findings on Election victory 
frame from New24.  
Chapter ten presented the qualitative findings of the study obtained from the qualitative secondary 
data. The chapter sought to address the research questions based on exploring the nature of frames 
that were used by New24 and IOL when reporting on the political leadership of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa in the period leading to the 54th ANC national conference. 
Three broad frames were presented, analysed and discussed in this chapter. These are, Jacob Zuma 
& state capture, Factionalism & unity and Corruption frames. In the presentation of these frames, 
the discussion and analysis were interwoven with theory and previous literature. Frames in this 
chapter were formulated using Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis approach. Analysis was 
done using Richardson (2007) critical discourse analysis approach. For the evidence, the chapter, 
direct quotations from the news articles of News24 and IOL are presented in the form of tables.  
 
Summary of key findings and conclusions  
 
In response to the study’s research questions and objectives, the following key findings and 
concluding statements can be made:  
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Question 1:   
 
How did News24 and IOL frame the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dhlamini Zuma and Cyril 
Ramaphosa both at a party and national level in the period leading, during and after the 54th 
National Congress of the African National Congress?  
 
Findings   
 
Findings from the study showed that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership 
was framed in terms of contrasting and binary terms. In both presses, it emerged that Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma was portrayed as a villain while Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as the hero who 
would save South Africa. To achieve this, the press placed emphasis and gave salience to those 
aspects of Cyril Ramaphosa leadership traits that were positive. While emphasising on those 
aspects of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's leadership that were not positive. Additionally, the manner 
of framing the leadership of these two candidates served to downplay the potential of Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma while accentuating the ability of Cyril Ramaphosa to improve the state of the 
country. Moreover, the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was framed in terms of losses 
while that of Cyril Ramaphosa was packaged as a given victory.  
There is a similarity in the press framing of female leader between the present study and findings 
described in previous literature that focused on media framing of female leaders. Previous studies 
found that there is a gender bias that exists in the media that allows it to place more emphasis on 
male political leaders while downplaying female leaders (Guha 2018; Cukier et al. 2016). For 
instance, Guha found that women leaders are not portrayed positively in the news media as 
compared to their male counterpart (2018). To add, Cukier et al. found that women are 
underrepresented and are less likely to be portrayed positively or on leadership/expert positions 
and are more often represented as victims (2016: 45). Cukier et al. argued that “women are less 
likely to be framed as leaders or experts and are less likely to hold news host or anchor positions” 
(2016: 45). Moreover, though findings from this study confirm that women leaders are seldom 
portrayed positively. Findings from this study are in stark contrast with the findings of Vos (2013). 
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Vos argued that women leaders are given little coverage. The difference is that Vos’s study was 
focused on the number of times a female leader could appear in the front paper of the newspaper 
(2013). Thus, establishing the frequency of appearance as opposed to how the female is presented 
when they appear in the press.  
 
Question 2: 
 
What was the similarities and differences in how the two News24 and IOL framed the leadership 
qualities of the two leaders?  
 
Findings   
 
There was no significant difference between the frames IOL and News24 used when reporting on 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. One of the most remarkable finding to emerge 
from the data is that both News24 and IOL used similar framed when they were reporting on the 
ANC conference and leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. To 
substantiate, six frames emerged from the press (Rand and Markets, Economic Recovery and 
Growth, Corruption, Election Victory, Factionalism and Unity, and Jacob Zuma and State 
Capture). However, what is more striking is that the frames were used in totally different ways 
(except for the Corruption frame) yet yielding similar results. To illustrate, the Factionalism and 
Unity Frame from in News24 was operationalised using different delegitimating strategies and 
legitimation approaches. However, the same frame was also operationalised in IOL by use of 
totally different techniques from that applied in the New24. The difference in the use of frames can 
be explained by the difference in the institutional structures or editorial rules that govern each 
press. 
The Rand and Markets frame was used by both News24 and IOL extensively in the period leading 
after the elective conference. In both News24 and IOL, the frame was used to report on Nkosazana 
Dhlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa abilities to change and build confidence in the ailing South 
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African currency and poor performing markets. Sampled reports from both news-press revealed 
that the press utilised the persuasion techniques that allowed it to focus and place emphasis on 
those specific aspects of an issue that encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the 
meaningful context (Cacciatore et al. 2016; Scheufele 2012; Entman 1993; Entman 2007; Goffman 
1979). In this case, the rand and market frame paid more attention to Cyril Ramaphosa ability to 
transform the markets and strengthening the rand. On the other hand, sampled reports also revealed 
that in both presses little and negative attention was placed Nkosazana Dhlamini-Zuma’s ability 
to transform and inspire confidence in the rand and market. Drawing on this observation, it can be 
deduced that the press emphasized on certain sets of consideration (Cyril Ramaphosa) over the 
others (Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma) (Secheufele 2012). To add, the fact that the media places 
negative attention on the female candidates seems to agree with findings from previous studies 
(Guha 2018; Cukier et al. 2016). For instance, concerning the observation that a female leader was 
portrayed negatively and given less attention, Cukier et al. (2016: 45) argued that more often in 
the press, women leaders are underrepresented and less likely to be portrayed positively. Guha 
also observed that female political candidates across the world are frequently misrepresented in 
various media platforms (2018: 67).  
Sampled data from IOL and News24 the Election Victory frame was extensively utilised by the 
reporters in the period leading up to the ANC elective conference. Like in News24, the election 
victory frame in IOL was also used to package the campaign of both candidates either as a given 
victory or a loss. A common usage of the frame was seen in how both presses referred to powerful 
figures in society to discredit the leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and legitimate Cyril 
Ramaphosa. However, what was more interesting in the sampled data from IOL is that unlike in 
News24 where reference to culture and cultural leaders were quoted, the reference to cultural 
leaders was employed differently in IOL. The difference in the use of the election victory frame 
was noted in the way the News24 made use of metaphors and businessman and statistics to endorse 
and discredit and legitimate the leadership of the two candidates, sampled data from News24 
indicate that there was extensive reference to culture, tradition and powerful figures in the African 
communities to endorse and discredit the leadership of the two political leaders. There was no 
emphasis or reference to culture and kings in IOL.  
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The Jacob Zuma and state capture frame was used by both News24 and IOL albeit in a different 
fashion. For instance, the frame was extensively used in IOL by linking Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma 
to Jacob Zuma through their marital relationship. To illustrate, the reporters in IOL continuously 
referred to Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as Jacob Zuma’s ex-wife. This manner of reference was 
deeply rooted in the African traditional discourse of marriage. On the other hand, the Jacob Zuma 
and state capture frame as utilised by the New24 had its roots in the prevailing political and 
economic discourse. It also sought to justify the ruling class ideas through vilifying the character 
of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and her relationship to Jacob Zuma. For instance, sampled data 
showed that the content in the New24 reports was heavily influenced by the prevailing political 
and economic situation in South Africa. However, interestingly, the most remarkable observation 
was that both presses utilised the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame to achieve similar 
objectives. That is to legitimate the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa while discrediting the 
leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.  
The Factionalism and unity frame was employed by both News24 and IOL. Though used 
differently, the framed ultimately achieved the same purpose in both presses; it delegitimised 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by presenting her as leader of an of a despicable faction that was a mere 
extension of Jacob Zuma’s interest. On the other hand, though Cyril Ramaphosa was presented as 
a leader of a factional group, attention in both presses was placed more on his ability to unite the 
ANC and the deeply divided nation. Put another way, Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership was framed 
as a leader who will revive unity in the ANC and South Africa. An interesting finding that emerged 
in the analysis of data that paid attention to factionalism and unity is that the Factionalism and 
Unity frame was not an invention of the news reporters. Rather, the reporters deliberately hand-
picked frames drawing from the unenumerable cultural reserves of frames that are readily 
accessible (Van Gorp 2007). For example, the role of Cyril Ramaphosa as a unifier was extensively 
discussed by various scholars in Chapter 4.  
The Corruption frame was used by both News24 and the ILO when reporting on the political 
leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. In both 
presses, the corruption frame served to legitimise the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa by presenting 
him as the alternative to the disastrous Jacob Zuma rule. On the other hand, sampled data showed 
that there was a common trend in the way Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was presented. Put 
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differently, there was strong evidence showing that little attention was paid on Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma's plans to deal with corruption in both presses. The use of the similar frame to by 
the press suggest that the reporters used frames which are purposefully and logically equivalent. 
However, that logically equivalent information was presented in a certain way that either 
encourages or discourages certain interpretation of the meaningful context (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 2013).  
The similarity in the use of the same frame can be justified by the cultural context within which 
the press was operating. Culture occupies a crucial place in the framing of the Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa (Van Gorp 2007). Because frames form part of the culture, it is, 
therefore, possible that News24 and IOL applied the same frames since they are socially shared 
(Rees 2001 and Chambwera 2016). Thus, even though they may be different types of controls and 
regulations in News24 and IOL newsrooms, because they together with their audience share the 
same cultural symbols and memories, frames of Economic Recovery and Growth, Corruption, 
Election Victory, Factionalism and Unity and Jacob Zuma and State Capture were common to both 
presses, although understood from different standpoints.  
The findings in this thesis can be equated to findings in Chambwera (2016). This scholar found 
that when a similar frame can be used by the different media but in a different manner. However, 
an interesting difference was identified between findings that emerged from this study and 
Chambwera (2016: 62). Differing from Chambwera’s argument that a similar framework can be 
used differently to achieve a different end, findings from this study revealed that similar frames 
were utilised differently by New24 and IOL to achieve similar objectives.  
Moreover, another remarkable finding that emerged from this study is that the media frames 
carried with them elements of gender bias. To illustrate, frames were constructed to discredit the 
leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma based on the gender biases that were predominant with 
the context the press was operating. For instance, strong evidence emerged from all frames that in 
most stories that focused on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a trend of negative portrayal was evident 
in most of the reports. Simply put, IOL and News24 downplayed and misrepresented Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma by selecting to emphasise on those gendered elements of her leadership that they 
thought would discredit her campaign to become ANC president.  
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The findings discussed in the previous section correlates well with findings of Wright and Holland 
2014; Omari 2008; Ross 2002; Tendi 2011 and Thou 1999. For instance, Wright and Holland 
found that the press uses various gendered frames to vilify the speech and person of female leaders. 
These include strategic attack, uncontrolled emotional outpouring, and hypocrisy (Wright and 
Holland 2014: 588). In this case, the scholars argue that these framings as carefully did by the 
media professionals, "demonstrates the role the media plays as a gendered mediator, perpetuating 
the gender double-blind that constrains female political leaders, as they negotiate the demand to 
demonstrate masculine leadership attributed without tarnishing the feminine qualities expected of 
them" (Wright and Holland 2014:78). Tendi agued that the Zimbabwean media instituted a 
gendered high-tech surveillance on Joice Mujuru in 2014 (2011: 13). This survelance was aimed 
at vilifying the character ans leadership of Joice Mujuru in her battle to succeed Robert Mugabe. 
Tendi said “Mujuru was accused of ploting to assassinate Robert Mugabe in the state media” 
(2011: 13).    
To add, Omari (2008) and Ross 2002 found that women politicians in their entirety are 
tremendously underrepresented in the political sphere, and in instances where they are represented, 
the importance is positioned on trivialities like the type of dressing and not on policies and 
ideologies (Ross 2002: 92). However, a sharp contrast was identified between previous findings 
and those of this present study. Unlike previous research (Nacos 1997) that revealed that the 
newsprint media coverage of women in politics is low and that their stories placed in the inside 
pages and rarely do their names hardly make it to the headlines making them invisible. The 
findings from this study could not confirm that assertion. This is because of the difference in the 
type of methodology and data collection used. Studies that indicate that coverage of female leader 
in press pages are low have widely applied the content analysis to their studies where they were 
only limited to the counting of the number of appearances of female leaders in the newspaper 
pages. This study has gone beyond counting the number of appearances to an analysis of text 
beyond the surface.  
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Question 3: 
 
What array of forces could have influenced the framing of the two political leaders? 
 
Findings  
 
Strong evidence was found that the news frames were culturally constituted communication 
artefacts. Put another way, News24 and IOL reports were heavily influenced by the prevailing 
societal discourses that shaped politics and economy in the period leading and during to the ANC 
election. For instance, a deeper analysis of data points showed that the Rand and Markets draw 
from the economic conditions and prevailing political discourse. Statements and meaning that were 
found in the press reports were in a culturally constituted world. What this means is that beyond 
the sentences and the writer, there was meaning that resembled the statements that were dominant 
in the prevailing discourses. For instance, the Jacob Zuma and State Capture frame borrowed 
statements from the post-Jacob Zuma discourse that characterised the period leading to the 
conference. The meaning that was communicated by these frames was not constructed by the 
journalist. Instead, it was rented from the culturally constituted world. These findings confirm the 
findings of Friedland and Zhong (1996). This scholar argued that   from previous research that 
revealed that frames are bridges that connect the broader social and cultural spheres and everyday 
understandings of social interaction (Friedland and Zhong 1996: 35)  
The press reliance on the analysts points to how the journalist discursive practices are influenced 
and constituted by society. Findings from the data indicated that there was a heavy reliance on the 
opinions of the external sources. For instance, in the Rand and Market frame, News24 reporters 
relied extensively on the opinions of their external sources. However, the reporters use of sources 
serves two objectives. Firstly, it allows the press to abide by the principle of objectivity. Secondly, 
the use of sources helps the reporters to inset their subjective opinions within the reports without 
them compromising the principle of objectivity (Richardson 2007; Wodak 2011; Chambwera 
2016). This serves to authenticate the press position and the situation that has affected South Africa 
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and allow its audience to hear from a trusted and objective source who is an expert in the field of 
economics.  
Furthermore, the most striking results from this study are how the newspaper discourse was 
constituted by society as it constitutes society in the same way. IOL and News24 are the online 
versions of the various newspapers owned by the two presses. Their publications are in English 
and appeals most to the working class and the elites in South Africa. These two groups in society 
are the most economically active and do understand the issues of politics and economics in South 
Africa. Their interest in the issues of the economy can be said to be the performance of the markets 
and the performance of the economy. Such issues have a direct impact on their lives. As such, the 
emphasis on the frames on rand and markets and the positive reports on the candidate of Cyril 
Ramaphosa by the press should be seen within this light. What this means is that the press emphasis 
and packaging on Cyril Ramaphosa’s campaign as an economic recovery campaign was well 
informed by the interest of its readers. The reports were effectively used as marketing artefacts by 
the media because its content resonates with the interest of its readers. As a result, the reader's 
beliefs and values affected the content and the type of reports that were published by IOL. Thus, 
drawing from the above point, it can be postulated that in the period leading, during and after the 
conference, news content was constituted by the beliefs of the middle class and the ruling class, as 
such the news discourse was socially constructed by the beliefs of the dominant groups in society 
who are also IOL and News24 audience (Wodak 2011: 52). 
The findings from this study further strengthen the argument that media text does not operate in 
isolation of the context of its production. Evidence that emerged from this study showed that media 
frames are used to organise and package meaning that the readers can interpret. This meaning is 
borrowed from the already existing discourses. To illustrate, evidence that emerged from this study 
suggest that the frames used by the media shared semblance with prevailing economic and political 
events that were unfolding in the period leading to the elections. Remarkably, these findings 
substantiate previous findings of Chambwera (2016) and Khuluse (2014) discussed in the literature 
review. Chambwera (2016) and Khuluse (2014) found that the press when reporting political 
candidates, it evokes cultural discourses that serve the purpose of reminding readers and allow 
them to interpret issues and topics using the culturally constructed reality as a frame of reference. 
Similarly, Rees found that when the press report events and individuals it does not just create and 
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impose their worldviews on their audience, rather they evoked time-tested worldviews and 
paradigms that were in sync with those of their intended audience (Rees 2001).   
In keeping with previous studies, findings from this study also showed that economic competition 
and pressure exerts influence on the type of media frames. What this means is that selecting on 
Cyril Ramaphosa and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma appeared to be a deliberate attempt to improve 
profits by IOL and News24. The circulation of newspapers has been declining in South Africa over 
the years. The newspapers sales were recorded to have declined by 80% in the year 2016. 
Competition has increased over the years and there is an incessant growth of a myriad of small 
online news outlets. Twitter and other instant news applications possess a threat to profits. Now 
the audience is shared by a lot of news outlets. Therefore, as a remedy, the reporters were 
determined to focus on specific issues that are intriguing to their readers and make sure that the 
readers are continuously intrigued by their content. Sensationalism and puffery in the content 
became the order of the day so that the press remain relevant to its customers and ultimately 
increase profit. Therefore, drawing on this assertion, it can be argued that how IOL and News24 
covered the election was in response to the prevailing (capitalist) social practice and the discursive 
practices of the newspaper industry. Effectively, what this means is that news content as products 
are created and marketed considering the determining economic forces (Richardson 2007: 116).  
These findings corroborate Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
findings that the media are businesses who are interested in generating profit. Because of that, the 
nature of their content is driven by the need to retain readers and viewers test. Moreover, the 
argument that economic pressure extert pressure on the type of frames fit faily well with findings 
in a study by Chibuwe (2016:  1660). Chibuwe argued that the hunt for profit also influenced Daily 
News’ framing of the two cases. In addition, this scholar also found that the news editor stated that 
consideration of whether the story will sell influences the slant given to their stories. The 
differences in how the two newspapers framed the cases are a result of different ideological 
inclinations/positioning, the hunt for profits, and control and ownership dynamics (Chibuwe 2016:  
1660).  Newspapers are business. Most newspapers exist to make a profit and under the current 
conditions of capitalism, the continued existence of a newspaper depends on selling its product 
and doing so in the most profitable manner. By such a view, the news is a product, a product that 
must be made attractive and appealing to its consumers. As a result, this will make the reporters 
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produce news that overly emphasises issues, amusing, pleasurable and engaging to these identified 
consumers since stories that achieve "audience appeal" form the basic, most fundamental gauge of 
what to put into the paper (Franklin 1997 cited Richardson 2007: 78). The situation has been made 
worse by the fragmentation of the audience. Fragmentation of the audience can be understood as 
a division of the audience between ever-increasing numbers of media options. When presented 
with a variety of options the audience becomes more dispersed amongst different media options. 
The ultimate results of this process are that each media option will be eventually left with a smaller 
share of the audience. Since the amount that an advertiser is willing to pay is directly related to the 
audience share a media has the fragmentation of the media a negative effect of reducing revenue 
and resources. In the case of South Africa, audience fragmentation has affected media institutions 
a lot. There are now thousands of channels that are available through satellite, digital, and cable. 
Each media option serves the role of satisfying preferences of a certain audience. 
The single most conspicuous observation to emerge from this study is that apart from 
communicating ideas and information to the people, the press assumed the role of a political 
institution where it communicated and endorsed certain ideologies while discrediting others. 
Strong evidence of underlying ideologies was found in News24 and IOL reports that were 
consciously endorsing the leadership and possible victory of Cyril Ramaphosa. What this means 
is that the press propagated and accentuated the dominant ideas (pro-Cyril Ramaphosa) and 
sentiments. Both presses were in favour of Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidents as they were against the 
candidature of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. Cyril Ramaphosa in South Africa is understood as a 
rich and wealthy person. He owns a lot of companies and control business. It, therefore, follows 
that his interest is the interest of the elites. Whereas Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is understood as 
representing poor and the disadvantaged groups in South Africa. However, the media by 
downplaying the leadership qualities of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, simultaneously downplayed 
the interest of the poor and suffocated their voices before they even before they are given a chance 
to make decisions. On the other hand, the press by supporting the campaign and leadership of Cyril 
Ramaphosa, it endorsed the interest of the ruling class. It made its readers accept the Cyril 
Ramaphosa as the best and preferred candidate. As a result, this had an effect of endorsing and 
perpetuating the dominance of the ruling elite whose interest was represented by Cyril Ramaphosa. 
The findings here agree with the findings of Chong and Druckman (2007). These scholars argue 
that in a major political contest like elections, the news-press serves as a campaign tool that 
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communicates ideologies of the most dominant and powerful ideologies in society (2007: 120). 
To add, these findings also corroborates with findings in a study by Chibuwe that focuses on The 
Herald and Daily News’ framing of the leaked Zimbabwean Draft Constitution and Vice President 
Joice Mujuru’s fall from Grace. In his findings, Chibuwe argued that news framing in the two 
publications is influenced by powerful interests in society.  
In keeping with previous research (Maseng et al. 2018, Chambwera 2016, and Davies-Laubscher 
2014), findings from this study showed that the press reports were artefacts that communicated 
power through knowledge. To illustrate, the press reports not only transferred meaning from the 
culturally constituted world (McCracken 1986: 72). Instead, the press was successful and 
instrumental in communicating the power of the dominant groups in society. This power can be 
understood as the two-dimensional power (Richardson 2007: 31). This is the type of power that is 
used by social groups in making "non-decisions". What this means is that the power to make "non-
decisions" is a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and 
privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voices or killed even before 
they gained access to the relevant decisions making arena (Richardson 2007: 31). Suppressing the 
potential of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was tantamount to creating a group of “non-decision” in 
the society. The press rendered irrelevant the interest of the all those whom Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma stood for. The press reports also exercised power through influencing how the readers would 
think about Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and led to the reader to accept the social conditions that 
were not in the interest of broad segment of the population (Richardson 2007: 31). 
Contribution to research and future research  
 
The present study contributed to the existing body of literature. It contributed to the current 
understanding of how the press evokes cultural discourses when reporting on political candidates, 
to remind readers and allow them to interpret issues and topics using the culturally constructed 
reality as a frame of reference. The holistic analysis of this study added to existing research by 
identifying the different common culturally constructed frames that the South African media use 
to legitimate or delegitimate Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa’s leadership. No 
previous research that exists has ever holistically analysed the culturally constituted frames used 
to legitimise or delegitimise political leaders in the election event such the ANC 2017 December 
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elective conference. Moreover, the study also confirmed results from existing studies that 
emphasised that the newspaper and journalistic discourse is constituted by society as it similarly 
constitutes society (Van Gop 2007; Chambwera 2016). Additionally, the critical and holistic 
analysis of this study added to the body of research that focuses on the presentation of female 
political leaders in Africa and South African in particular. Findings from this study confirm 
previous research that emphasised that there is a gender bais in favour of male political leaders 
that is pervasive in most African media (Guha 2018; Cukier, Jackson, Elmi, Roach and Cyr 2016; 
Mavin, Elliott, Stead, and Williams 2016). This study has revealed that the gender bias that is 
prevalent in the news frames is borrowed from the patriarchal systems that shape society in which 
the media is functioning. The present study revealed that the IOL and News24 strive for objective 
and fair reporting as they fairly present a somewhat balanced reporting that placed more focus on 
policy issues and candidate manifestos as opposed to candidates’ personalities or their gender. This 
is a complete departure from previous studies that emphasised that the media in Africa when 
reporting on female political leaders, the absolute emphasis is placed on downplaying their 
personalities by amplifying culturally constructed gendered predispositions (Guha 2018; Cukier, 
Jackson, Elmi, Roach and Cyr 2016; Mavin, Elliott, Stead, and Williams 2016; Thou 2012). 
Furthermore, the study contributed to prior theory by applying, validating and extending the 
application of Van Gops’ (2007) framing theory and Michael Foucault (1980) concept of 
knowledge/power and discourse. The theories have been extended to analyse the frames used to 
legitimise and delegitimise Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa.  The results showed 
that the media select some aspects of the pre-existing discourse and frame them in a manner that 
conveys their preferred meaning. This meaning is not neutral, but it is laden with power and 
ideologies meant to serve the interests of the ruling elite and maintain the status quo. Findings 
from this study have shown that apart from communicating ideas and information to the people, 
the press assumed the role of a political institution where it communicated and endorsed certain 
ideologies while discrediting others. Also, existing research often separately depended on framing 
analysis or thematic analysis. The present research contributed by linking a variety of approaches 
in its methodology. The research included the case study, cultural studies approach, thematic 
analysis and critical discourses analysis. All the approaches were complementary to each other. A 
case study of the ANC 2017 election was covered with specif focus on the leadership and political 
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qualities on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The study contributed to existing case study research on 
ANC politics.  
The application of the discourse analysis to the published newspaper text specifically focuses on 
the outcome of the news processes as opposed to the different dynamics that inform the process of 
news gathering, selection and news discourse.  Cape and Benkaret argued that “applying a 
discursive approach to published news stories focuses on the outcome, not the process, and thus 
does not address the influence of proprietors, managers and editorial executives unless it is 
combined with ethnographic analysis – a combination of approaches that we would highly 
welcome" (2016: 435). A remarkable route for future research is to conduct longitudinal cases 
studies that apply a combination of approaches that will seek to analyse the whole process of news 
production. This will include in-depth interviews with news personnel in the various news 
institution. Additionally, a discursive news values analysis of news stories will also assist future 
research because it can provide insights into how news values are constructed through different 
resources and practices, including across different platforms (print, online, radio, TV) and in 
different types of news discourse (such as hard news, soft news, business, sports).  
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the present research was to examine the frames used by News24 and IOL to 
legitimise or delegitimise the political leadership and leadership qualities of Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. This study has identified that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril 
Ramaphosa’s leadership was framed in terms of contrasting and binary terms. The second major 
finding was that there was no significant difference between IOL and News24 manner of framing 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. One of the most remarkable finding to emerge 
from the data is that both News24 and IOL used similar frames when they were reporting on the 
ANC conference and leadership of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Cyril Ramaphosa. Taken 
together, these findings seem to suggest that media text does not operate in isolation of the context 
of its production. Evidence from this study showed that media frames are used to organise and 
package meaning that the readers can interpret. This meaning is borrowed from the already existing 
discourses. Culture occupies a crucial place in the framing of the Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and 
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Cyril Ramaphosa (Van Gorp 2007). Because frames form part of the culture, it is, therefore, 
possible that News24 and IOL applied the same frames since they are socially shared. The 
contribution of this inquiry has been to confirm that the newspaper discourse is constituted by 
society as it similarly constitutes society. Besides the comparatively limited sample, this work 
offers valuable insights into how the news frames are culturally constituted and reliant on the 
prevailing and dominant discourses in society. More broadly, more cross-national studies in the 
form of mixed methods is also required to determine how the media uses frames to legitimise or 
de-legitimise political candidates. 
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